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Abstract 
 
One of the goals of Plato’s dialogues is to stake out a territory for philosophy. In order to 
do this, Plato evaluates and critiques other, more established, disciplines like rhetoric, the 
sophistic movement, poetry, and finally, divination. The last, in particular, has been 
neglected even though it arises in nearly all stages of Plato’s writing. Accordingly, in this 
dissertation, I interrogate Plato’s concept of divination. First, I analyze his account of 
mantic authenticity, together with his curtailment of mantic authority. I specify the ways 
in which Plato both embodies and transforms divination. One significant component of 
this account is the relationship between divination and craft. Plato often uses 
uncontentious crafts like medicine and divination in order to illuminate the features of 
other more contentious crafts, such as moral knowledge. In the second part of my 
dissertation, I examine the relationship between divination and madness. In the Phaedrus, 
the best things we have come from madness, but this claim beguiles the reader of the 
Phaedo and Republic. Has Plato changed his mind about the role and value of madness? 
Finally, I interrogate the Symposium, specifically Socrates’ conversation with Diotima. I 
argue that Diotima represents an intuitive seer, someone that Plato elsewhere claims to be 
impossible. To this end, clarifying Diotima’s function in the dialogue is crucially 
important and I sketch an explanation that underscores Plato’s fundamental religousity. In 
my final chapter, I examine the relationship between divination and philosophy as 
depicted in Socrates, Plato’s most celebrated character.    
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Introduction 
At Phaedrus 244a8-d5, Socrates distinguishes between two sorts of divination. 
First, there are seers who undergo divine possession by a god or spirit, so-called 
possession divination. For the duration of the experience, the seer loses him or herself. 
The canonical example of this is what occurs to the Pythia at Delphi. Second, there are 
seers who access divine will through an intermediary, so-called technical divination. 
There are myriad kinds of this type of divination. One might, for instance, divine through 
material objects (e.g., bird movements, animal entrails) or natural phenomena (e.g., a bolt 
of lightning). Various textual sources, including the cited passage from the Phaedrus, 
demonstrate that Plato privileges possession divination over its material counterpart, but 
his justification is not entirely clear. The impetus for this dissertation is that Plato, on 
occasion, seems to ignore his own distinction. In particular, a seer like Diotima in the 
Symposium cannot be easily categorized according to the dichotomy developed in the 
Phaedrus.   
Despite sustained treatments in contexts like the evaluation of knowledge and the 
formation of the ideal state, there has been a disproportionate lack of attention paid to 
divination in comparison to, for instance, Plato’s concept of poetry and the poet.1 In fact, 
there has been no systematic treatment of Plato’s concept of divination. There are several 
ways in which this dissertation intends to contribute to current Plato scholarship. First, it 
challenges the thesis that Plato’s concept of divination is “too schematic and elides Greek 
                                                 
1
 In terms of Greek divination generally, the most comprehensive is Bouché-Leclercq (1879-82), 
specifically volume 1. Other studies include: Pritchett (1979) 47-90; Roth 1982 (PhD Thesis); Bremmer 
(1993) 150-183 and (1996) 97-109; and Flower (2008). Flower, in particular, is responsible for the first 
“book-length study of Greek seers in any language” (3) and has accordingly, proved invaluable to the 
present analysis. One caveat to Flower is his unwillingness to use Plato in his investigation. This is so 
because Plato, in seeking to legitimize philosophy, cannot help but distort divination. Flower’s most trusted 
source is Xenophon.  
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experience” (Flower 87). Second, it explores the connection between technē and 
divination and the adjoining implications for Platonic epistemology. For Plato, the 
inspired arts are uncontroversial forms of knowledge and he often appeals to them in 
order to investigate knowledge claims of a more contentious sort (e.g., moral 
knowledge).
2
 Finally, in a more general sense, this dissertation further substantiates the 
increasingly accepted contention of Plato’s pervasive religiosity.  
Part I – Methodology 
 Something must be said about the methodological approach to Plato adopted in 
this dissertation. One distinction often employed in the history of Platonic scholarship is 
between doctrinal and skeptical approaches to the dialogues.
3
 Whereas the former affirms 
the thesis that there are positive philosophical theses explicit or latent in the dialogues, 
the latter emphasizes their aporetic and inconclusive features.  
My argument does not rise or fall depending on the result of this debate. 
Divination does not receive an exhaustive treatment like rhapsody in the Ion or rhetoric in 
the Gorgias. Instead, it emerges at the joints of other arguments – the notion of divine 
inspiration, humankind’s relationship to the gods, and the craft analogy. In fact, there is a 
sense in which divination occupies both sides of the debate. When it comes to the 
doctrinal methodology, the status of divination is radically altered by, for example, the 
epistemological theses Plato develops in the Meno.
4
  
                                                 
2
 For instance, in the Laches, the search is for an adequate definition of courage, and attempts are made to 
define it in terms of a technē, at least initially (182c). Roochnik (1996) offers an in-depth analysis of this 
approach, especially chapter 1.  
3
 Press (1996) 508.   
4
 At the conclusion of the Meno, Socrates develops a disjunction between knowledge and right opinion. 
Since statesmen cannot give an account of their expertise, they are only able to govern according to right 
opinion. In this way, “they are no different from soothsayers and prophets” (ουδεν διαπηεροντōσ εκηοντεσ 
προσ το πηρονειν ē ηοι κηρēσμōδοι τε και ηοι τηεομαντεισ) (Meno 99c2-3). 
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At the same time, divination, particularly when it gets deployed in the context of 
divine inspiration, checks the rationalist presumptions of the philosophy. For instance, in 
the Phaedrus, Socrates notoriously says that the best things we have come from madness. 
In order to specify the meaning of this statement, he goes on to give an account of three 
kinds of madness – prophetic, telistic, and poetic. Unlike in dialogues such as the 
Republic and the Symposium, philosophy now encompasses a degree of madness. In this 
way, divination destabilizes what has been a popular interpretation of philosophy in 
Plato’s dialogues.  
Following the majority of Anglophone Platonic scholarship, I affirm a cautiously 
doctrinal methodology. In other words, I subscribe to the thesis that within the dialogues, 
there are positive doctrines that one can reasonably subscribe to Plato.
5
 This does not 
preclude a strong role for aporetic elements.  
 Another consideration is the distinction between developmental and unitarian 
approaches to the dialogues.
6
 The developmental methodology uses a medley of 
evidence, principally stylometry, to classify the dialogues chronologically. The most 
widespread classification separates the dialogues into early, middle, and late groupings. 
Although attempts have been made, further chronological classification, specifically 
within each group, is exceptionally difficult.
7
  
Part of the motivation for the developmental methodology is the recognition that 
not all the dialogues were written at once. If this is so, which seems probable, it is 
                                                 
5
 Wolfdorf (2008) states, “In the last decades of the twentieth century, Anglophone Platonic scholarship 
was principally conducted within a developmentalist and relatively doctrinal framework” (6). He goes on to 
point out that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, unitarianism has enjoyed a resurgence. 
6
 As Wolfdorf (2008) notes, doctrinal and skeptical methodologies can be applied to either developmental 
or unitarian methodologies.    
7As Kahn (1996) points out, “The attempt to establish a complete linear ordering of the dialogues on 
stylometric grounds has produced no reliable results, no agreement after a century of work” (45).  
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reasonable to think that Plato developed and refined his philosophical ideas as time went 
on. To take a well-known example, whereas knowledge of the Forms grounds the 
philosopher-kings’ expertise in the Republic, they go without mention in his late political 
work – the Laws.  
 One version of developmentalism characterizes the transition from the early 
dialogues to those of the middle-late as a transition from Socratic to Platonic thought. 
According to this line of reasoning, in the early dialogues, Plato is still ‘under the sway’ 
of his teacher, Socrates, and working through a distinctly Socratic paradigm. With the 
middle dialogues – Phaedo, Symposium, and most importantly, the Republic – Plato 
sheds his Socratic skin and develops his own distinctive philosophical positions. The 
foremost modern proponent of this is Vlastos who distinguishes ten theses, which 
distinguish the early ‘Socratic’ dialogues from the middle ‘Platonic’ ones. 8 One of the 
most important sources of evidence for this line of thought is Aristotle, who is the first 
developmentalist.   
 By contrast, the unitarian methodology emphasizes the unity, or continuity, of 
Plato’s thought. Like developmentalism, it can take many forms. For instance, one might 
interpret the ‘early’ dialogues as working through that which will culminate in the 
Republic.
9
 To the extent that these ‘early’ dialogues prepare the reader for the positive 
doctrines of the Republic, they enjoy a fundamental continuity. One can also adopt a 
unitarian methodology and yet reject the thesis that one dialogue deserves special 
status.
10
 Other unitarian methodologies exist, such as ‘fictive chronology’. This consists 
                                                 
8
 Vlastos (1991) 46- 49. For more information on the history of developmentalism, and its current 
proponents, see Brickhouse and Smith (1989) 9 and McPherran (1996) 14-16.   
9
 Kahn (1996) 39-41.  
10
 Griswold (2000) 195.  
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of exploring the fictional life of Socrates as he manifests in Plato’s dialogues. According 
to fictive chronology, the Parmenides is the earliest dialogue and the Phaedo is the last.
11
  
One problem for unitarianism is coping with inconsistencies between dialogues. 
One canonical developmental strategy is to claim that Plato has changed his mind about 
something. There are at least two other strategies that the unitarian can appeal to in order 
to explain inconsistencies between the dialogues.
12
 First, one can appeal to dramaturgical, 
or literary, elements in order to remedy an apparent inconsistency. In the current 
generation of Platonic scholarship, there is greater sensitivity to this element.  
A good example of this is Wolfdorf’s concept of a-structure, which he defines as 
“a linear sequence or progression of beliefs and values” (15).13 In the case of Plato, this 
literary technique is employed in order to transition from conventional Athenian views to 
Platonic positions. In different terms, Plato might have Socrates purposefully ape an 
Athenian view at one stage of a dialogue that is inconsistent with what he says in other 
places.
14
 A second strategy is to appeal to irony. If Socrates claims something that is 
altogether anti-Socratic or anti-Platonic, a reasonable explanation is to think that he is 
being disingenuous.
15
 Of course, to distinguish between ‘anti-Socratic’ and ‘anti-
                                                 
11
 To give some idea of the consequences entailed by taking the concept of ‘fictive chronology’ seriously, 
consider that the Parmenides is the earliest dialogue. Its engagement with the theory of forms is antithetical 
to the ‘early’ dialogues’ relative silence on the intelligible world. It grates against the developmental school 
of thought, which situates the Parmenides in Plato’s late period. Griswold (1999) 387-393. For Kahn’s 
criticism of ‘fictive chronology’ see Kahn (2000) 192-193.  
12
 Note that these strategies are at the disposal of the developmentalist as well.  
13
 Wolfsdorf (2008) 14-16.  
14
 For Wolfsdorf, a-structure explains most inter-textual inconsistencies (e.g., in the same dialogue) and 
intra-textual inconsistencies between dialogues.  
15
 Note that my account of these methodological strategies – increased sensitivity to dramaturgical elements 
and appeals to irony – is heavily influenced by Wolfdorf’s discussion. (2008) 20-21. 
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Platonic’ is to presuppose a difference between the two. To be clear, the ‘Socrates’ of 
Plato’s dialogues I regard as a literary construction.16  
 It is beyond the scope of the present dissertation to exhaustively investigate the 
current state of this debate, but a few methodological remarks are necessary. As 
mentioned previously, this dissertation works through a doctrinal framework.
17
 In terms 
of the debate between developmentalism and unitarianism, I subscribe to a weak form of 
developmentalism. By weak, I mean that robust arguments have been made against 
developmentalism, which do not necessarily refute it, but certainly check its supremacy.
18
     
In fact, as will become clear at various stages throughout this dissertation, two of my 
main reference points are the role of dramaturgical elements, together with purported 
instances of irony. In this way, I give some credit to the unitarian methodology. 
Nevertheless, I remain fundamentally developmentalist and indeed confine most of my 
analysis to what is normally characterized as the early-middle dialogues.
19
  
Part I – A Brief Survey of the Dissertation Chapters 
This dissertation contains seven chapters: 
I – What Does Euthyphro Know? 
II – Mantikē Technē 
                                                 
16
 This is not to say that there are continuities between the historical Socrates and the Platonic Socrates. 
Such an investigation, while no doubt fruitful and interesting, is beyond the scope of the present analysis.  
17
 It is also important to note one particular version of the doctrinal methodology, the so-called esoteric 
school of Platonic scholarship. This draws evidence from Aristotle and others, including statements made 
about writing in the Phaedrus, in order to claim that Plato’s dialogues do not contain Plato’s genuine 
philosophical convictions. Rather, the dialogues are intended to introduce people to philosophy. Only 
members of Plato’s Academy were privy to his actual system, which is thought to be thoroughly 
mathematical and metaphysical. This methodology has been popular in Germany, and to a lesser degree, 
the rest of the European continent.   
18
 For instance, Kahn (1996) notes that there is “no reason to exclude the possibility that he [Plato] was 
working on several dialogues at the same time” (45). Furthermore, there is no reason why Plato is required 
to present all of his doctrines in every dialogue. This can help explain the absence of, for instance, the 
Forms in certain dialogues.   
19
 In response to the recent unitarian arguments of Kahn and Griswold, among others, Brickhouse and 
Smith (2003) 112–31 have outlined reasons to think that such argument are unconvincing. 
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III – Between Inspiration and Technē 
IV – Inspiration and Eros: The Phaedrus’ First Speeches 
V – The Four Forms of Madness in the Phaedrus 
VI – The Puzzle of Diotima 
VII – Socrates, Divination, and the Daimonion 
 
In chapter one, I demonstrate that from the earliest extant sources in Ancient 
Greece, there was doubt surrounding the validity of divination. Doubt, of course, does not 
mean complete denunciation. Rather, it consists of rejecting certain forms of divination 
like augury or certain individual seers. It was self-evident in Archaic and Classical 
Greece that (1) the gods existed and (2) sought to communicate with humankind in 
various ways. 
I argue that Plato is no exception, both in the sense that he remains wary of 
certain divinatory practices and that he recognizes the essential validity of divination. In 
this sense, Plato embodies rather than defies Greek norms. He is not, as one might 
suspect, rejecting the entirety of divination on philosophical or epistemic grounds. 
Rather, he is amenable to it, and no more doubtful about it than anybody else. I claim that 
this general thesis of mantic authenticity best manifests itself in the figure of Euthyphro. 
Accordingly, in this chapter, I develop an account of Euthyphro – his occupation, claims 
to knowledge, and dramatic role – in order to defend the idea that Plato accepts the 
legitimacy of divination, even though it is philosophically impoverished.   
Chapter two analyzes the relationship between divination and Plato’s concept of 
technē. There are two related aims. First, I analyze the relationship between the general 
and the seer. In particular, I interrogate claims made in the Laches in order to determine 
the degree to which Plato diverges from the authority of seers we see in history. Second, 
and more substantially, I analyze the technē of divination in the context of a technē’s 
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subject matter. For Plato, each technē has its own unique subject matter, but claims made 
in the Laches seem to counteract the notion that the subject matter of divination is the 
future. This is so for epistemological reasons that collapse past, present and future.   
The Ion is the subject of chapter three. In this small dialogue, poetic inspiration 
functions in contradistinction to technē. Since Ion’s expertise does not stand up to 
Socrates’ critique, his Homeric performances cannot stem from knowledge, but from 
elsewhere, from divine inspiration. The two are presented as a strict disjunction. Yet, 
there is a puzzle here because as each gets explained, there is an appeal to divination. If 
rhapsody, and poetry by extension, cannot synthesize the two, why does Socrates seem to 
think that divination can? This puzzle suggests that Plato is being ironic. I interrogate this 
bipartite account in order to show how these two seemingly disparate features can be 
accommodated. 
In so doing, I reject the thesis that Socrates is ironic when he characterizes 
divination as the result of inspiration, and later, possession divination as constitutive of a 
technē. What I hope to contribute is that Socrates’ appeal to Theoclymenus at 539a-
demonstrates that Plato has a more multifarious concept of divination than is ordinarily 
ascribed to him.  
In the fourth chapter, I investigate the Phaedrus, which occupies a central role in 
Plato’s concept of divination. Not only does it formulate the distinction between 
possession divination and technical divination, as outlined earlier, but it also presents 
several interpretive puzzles. One such puzzle centers on the exchange between Socrates 
and Phaedrus at the beginning of the dialogue. Specifically, it is unclear to what degree 
the exchange deserves an ironic interpretation. While this puzzle does not deal directly 
9 
 
 
 
with divination, it is relevant in that irony is often held in contradistinction to inspiration. 
Socrates’ reputation as the exemplar of rationality precedes him. Rather than take him at 
his word, it is thought that Socrates only appeals to the divine in jest.  
What is so fascinating about the Phaedrus is that both of Socrates’ speeches are 
the result of inspiration. Yet, strangely, both express radically disparate positions on the 
nature of love. It seems reasonable to conclude that the palinode (244a-257b) embodies 
Plato’s genuine view; it contains important Platonic tenets that the first speech lacks. 
What, then, is the status of Socrates’ first speech? Is it merely strategic in the sense of 
engaging with Phaedrus on his own terms? This is a familiar Socratic approach. My aim 
in this chapter is to demonstrate that Socrates’ first speech is not as antithetical to Plato as 
it might seem at first. A consequence of this is that Socrates’ appeal to inspiration in the 
first speech, I argue, is genuine.  
In chapter five, I continue my investigation of the Phaedrus, this time focusing 
directly on the cases of divination in the Phaedrus. I argue that the role and function of 
divination in the Phaedrus is a rich one, not only because it provides a model for 
philosophy, but also on its own terms. In particular, the tension between its divine 
associations and its inability to justify its pronouncements makes for an interesting 
epistemological contrast.  
At first glance, Plato is ambivalent about the nature of divination. Consider the 
apparent inconsistency between the two latter principal references. On the one hand, 
Socrates states that the best things we have come from madness (244b-d). In other words, 
divination serves a paradigmatic example of its value. Yet, when the hierarchy of souls is 
10 
 
 
 
presented, divination, together with mystery rites and poetry, is ranked comparatively 
low, beneath the financier, the doctor, and the physical trainer (248-e).  
In chapter six, the distinction between possession and technical divination is 
critically re-assessed in light of Diotima, a figure who flouts Socrates’ distinction. I argue 
that Diotima’s knowledge is the result of her being a seer, and that this helps us better 
understand her account of eros. I also argue that Diotima is an exemplary seer, capable 
not only of divining superlative truths, but also of defending them with rational argument. 
In fact, my guiding thesis is that exemplary seers like Diotima, I claim, are functionally 
no different than philosophers. Although the recalled conversation between Socrates and 
Diotima will garner the majority of my attention, it is necessary to recapitulate the earlier 
instances of divination, inspiration, and mania in the dialogue. This is so because the 
earlier speeches give definition to Socrates’ speech. 
In the final chapter, I turn to philosophy generally, and Socrates specifically, in 
order to determine the extent to which divination enjoys affinity with both. One beguiling 
feature of Socrates, as Plato depicts him, is his daimonion, or divine sign. In a superficial 
sense, the daimonion is akin to what occurs to a possessed seer. Still, there seems to be 
important differences, such as the fact that Socrates can interpret this sign. I aim to clarify 
Socrates’ daimonion with special attention to divination. Insofar as the thesis of chapter 
six is persuasive, namely that Diotima is an exemplary seer that can interpret her own 
divinations, I hope to conclude that Socrates’ daimonion is not altogether unique from 
what occurs to an exemplary seer like Diotima.
20
  
Part III – A Brief Survey of Divination in Ancient Greece 
                                                 
20
 Throughout this dissertation, the translations are from Cooper (1997) unless otherwise noted.  
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In this section, I sketch divination in Archaic and Classical Greece, roughly from 
the time of Homer (8
th
 century B.C.E.) to the 4
th
 century. The seer (mantis), 
etymologically, derives from the Indo-European root *men, which means someone in a 
‘special mental state’ and this was overwhelmingly understood to be religious in nature.21 
Other terms were employed as well however. In addition to mantis, Homer also uses 
theopropos and thuoskoos.
22
 Aeschylus characterizes Amphiaraus as a prophētēs and a 
mantis (Seven against Thebes 609-11), and this is identical to Pindar’s description of 
Teiresias (Nemean Odes 1.61-62). Nevertheless, mantis and its variants are the dominant 
Greek terms. Scholars agree that Plato was probably etymologically correct when he 
connected mantis to mania at Phaedrus 244b-c.
23
 The expertise of the seer was quite 
broad and:  
…encompass[ed] all of the various forms of divination that are found in 
our literary sources. These methods include the interpretation of the 
movements, behavior, and cries of birds (augury) and the interpretation of 
dreams and of portents (such as lightning, thunder, earthquakes, eclipses, 
and any unusual occurrences).
 24
 The seer also examined the entrails of a 
sacrificial animal for marks and abnormalities of various kinds (extispicy), 
as well as interpreting the results of burning the entrails (empyromancy). 
(Flower 24)  
 
In contrast to technical divination, there was also possession divination, which occurs 
when a seer serves as a mouthpiece for a god.
25
  
                                                 
21
 Roth (1982) 9-18. A related term is enthusiasmos (en-theos – ‘a god within’). Its cognates, as evidenced 
in Homer, were originally connected to the seer (mantis or theopropos). Naddaf (2009) 56-67. 
22
 For theopropos Iliad 12.195, 13.59. Odyssey 1.365. For thuoskoos Iliad 21.200 , Odyssey 21.118, 22.292. 
23
 Flower (2008) 23.  
24
 Another interesting example is dream interpretation. Dodds (1959) identifies three sorts of dreams in 
Ancient Greece. First, there are symbolic dreams, which need to be interpreted. Second, there are visions, 
which unambiguously display future events to come. Finally, there are oracles; these occur when an 
authority figure – priest, parent, king, or a god – actually reveals him or herself to the dreamer and states 
clearly what will be or what is to be done. 104-108    
25
 Flower distinguishes between two kinds of possession divination. In the first kind, the diviner’s self-
identity completely evaporates. The Pythia, the priestess at Delphi and the most well-known female seer, 
constitutes an example of this sort. Consider the opening of Aeschylus’ The Furies; we have the Pythia 
state that she can “only prophesize what the god directs” (98). In the second sort of possession divination, 
12 
 
 
 
It is helpful to contrast the poet with the seer who underwent possession, 
particularly as it concerns the preservation and expression of their respective works. 
Whereas each recitation of the poet or rhapsode permitted a degree of variance, the seer’s 
pronouncements were preserved verbatim. The seer’s speech is synonymous with the 
speech of a deity. Any alteration then can only be a human alteration. Thus, even the 
metrical imperfections of a particular divination were preserved rather than corrected.
26
 
Such was not the case in the context of poetry. This recognition has more implications for 
poetry than it does for divination for the simple reason that it reveals the potential for 
poetry to be interpreted non-literally.
27
 If the language of inspired poetry can be 
justifiably altered, the easiest way to do justice to its divine origins is to interpret it 
allegorically.    
Furthermore, it is worth meditating on the craft (technē) of the seer. One might 
expect such an ascription be confined to those forms of divination concerned with the 
interpretation of material signs. In fact, even possession divination was considered a 
technē!28 That each type of seer claimed a technē is further confirmed by the recognition 
                                                                                                                                                 
the diviner retains some semblance of self-identity. Cassandra in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon is an example of 
the second sort. Even though she prophesizes, she is aware of the content of her prophecy, which in this 
case is her own death. Although it may sound strange to us, even this sort of divination was considered a 
technē. For instance, Cassandra is characterized as being seized by the “technai entheoi” (1209), namely 
the inspired arts. 
26
 For the precise reasons of divine possession, Flower writes “A Delphic oracle in hexameter verse does 
not have the same ontological status as epic poetry” (219).  
27
 One must distinguish between two features of divination. First, the conviction that the seer’s 
pronouncements were the literal voice of a god, and second, that seers often communicated in puzzling 
language. The two are not incompatible; clearly, if the seer is speaking cryptically, this means that the god 
is speaking cryptically the oracular utterance is actually divine.  
28
 Roochnik (1999) provides a useful survey of technē’s scope from Homer and Hesiod onward. He argues 
that despite the unambiguous ‘productive’ conception of technē – one whose predominant applications are 
to woodworking and smithing – there is already in Homer embryonic potential for the word to be expanded 
to bodies of knowledge with no “tangible product” (Roochnik 25). Such is the case in the Homeric Hymn to 
Hermes where lyre-playing is characterized as a technē. Such is probably the case with divination as 
evidenced by Cassandra’s technai entheoi. A connection between the two thus goes back at least to 458 
B.C.; the year of the first performance of Aeschylus’ Oresteia. 22-26. 
13 
 
 
 
that they were open to critical evaluation. If a seer prophesizes x, and x does not come 
about, then some explanation is required. Although there always remained some 
interpretive freedom, the seer only had marginal ability to change the future by appeal to 
the gods. Moreover, the seer’s pronouncements could not be taken deterministically. In 
other words, a seer could not make guarantees. The signs were ‘favorable’ or 
‘unfavorable’ but if, say, a general were to blunder, a different event than a seer’s 
prediction might occur.
29
  This is one way, among others, that seers were able to retain 
legitimacy despite making a false prediction. 
There were other ways of maintaining legitimacy in the face of prophetic failure. 
Perhaps the seer was fake; perhaps one seer was more talented than another, thereby 
explaining differences in a specific oracle. Still further, one might even disbelieve in the 
authenticity of certain methods of prophecy (e.g., augury, or the examination of entrails). 
Granted, it is important to note that some seers were not conscious while they divined 
(e.g., the Pythia), and therefore did not have to defend their divinations like a military 
seer. In such cases, of course, the onus fell to the interpreters of the seer. After all, one of 
the legitimizing tropes of divination was the gods communicated in cryptic language.  
Human error was always a decisive possibility.  
Does the evidence confirm Plato’s distinction between technical and possession 
divination? As in so many distinctions, exceptions slip through the cracks. In the case of 
divination, there is evidence of a seer who coalesces elements of both kinds. In this case, 
a seer has a special ability to spontaneously see reality, or the future, but does not do so 
by becoming possessed. In other words, the seer need not divine through an intermediary 
                                                 
29
 The important point to take from this is that mistakes could “be accommodated within the system (of 
divination) itself” (Flower 117). 
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– lightning bolt, livers, etc. But at the same time, the seer is not possessed. Consider 
Calchas in the Agamemnon. He prophesizes from seeing the two eagles that Troy will 
fall, but that Artemis will be unhappy and kill the winds. Thus, a sacrifice is needed. 
Calchas is not possessed but he does intuit, or see, things to come. This visionary sort of 
divination has been dubbed ‘intuitive divination’. 30 
This typology is flexible. There is overlap, both between the sort of divination 
discussed, particularly between technical and intuitive divination, and between seers and 
other professions.
31
 Seers also possessed other more marginal areas of competence – 
healing, purification, and the enacting of ritual. Properly speaking, this was first and 
foremost the domain of the priest, but if a priest was unavailable, such duties fell to the 
seer. Several more qualifications are necessary. For one, Greek seers did not require 
expertise in all areas of divination. Regarding divine possession, for instance, it seems 
this was confined to those who were anchored in one place, such as the Pythia at Delphi. 
Many seers, by contrast, were migrant, much like the sophists, and traveled from city to 
city.
32
  
Finally, it is instructive to appreciate that one did not even have to be a seer in 
order to practice divination. There is evidence from Xenophon that many people had a 
“working knowledge of extispicy (inspection of entrails)” (Flower 55) to judge whether 
                                                 
30
 Flower (2008) 86-88.  
31
 Other relevant professions included the priest, poet, exegetai, and chresmologos. These latter figures 
served as “professional collectors, chanters, and interpreters of oracles” (Flower 60) neither enjoyed the 
same prestige as seers nor engaged in technical and possession divination.  
32
 Johnston (2008) rejects the prospects of distinguishing divination between technical and natural. Rather, 
she favors a distinction between ‘institutional oracles’ and ‘independent diviners’. See 27-29. For my 
purposes, Flower’s typology has the advantage of distinguishing divination in epistemic and psychological 
terms, which better capture the motivation behind Plato notion of divination.   
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‘x’ or ‘y’ was favorable. This did not negate that in situations of particular gravity, one 
consulted an acknowledged expert.
33
  
With all the evidence, it is plain that divination played a central rather than a 
peripheral role in Archaic and Classical Greece.
34
 This has not always been a conviction 
of scholars, particularly those who subscribe to the thesis that Classical Greece was the 
apex of rationalism. But it is against this intricate backdrop that Plato emerges with his 
own ideas. 
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Chapter 1 – What Does Euthyphro Know? 
Abstract: 
 
I argue that too little attention has been paid to Euthyphro’s occupation as a seer. I further 
argue that his occupation provides a better account of the Euthyphro as a whole. This 
depends upon a close analysis of the dialogue, together with the Cratylus, since 
Euthyphro makes an appearance in that dialogue as well. I hope to show that what 
prompts the dialogical exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro – the charge of 
pollution (miasma) against Euthyphro’s father – is the result of divination. In other 
words, Euthyphro holds a true belief about the impartiality of justice. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that his engagement with Socrates reveals the limits of divination, specifically 
that seers are unable to adequately interpret their divinations. 
 
Introduction 
It was axiomatic in Classical Greece that (1) the gods existed and (2) 
communicated with humankind.
35
 Divination was one of the paradigmatic means of 
communication. Although Plato is wary of certain divinatory practices, he recognizes the 
essential validity of divination.
36
 In fact, seers populate several of his dialogues, usually 
to underscore an epistemological point, or to puzzle over the nature of divine 
inspiration.
37
  
In this chapter, I argue that too little attention has been paid to Euthyphro’s 
occupation as a seer. I further argue that his occupation provides a better account of the 
Euthyphro as a whole. This depends upon a close analysis of the dialogue, together with 
the Cratylus, since Euthyphro makes an appearance in the latter as well. I aim to show 
that what prompts the dialogical exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro – the charge 
of pollution (miasma) against Euthyphro’s father – is the result of divination. In other 
                                                 
35
 Flower (2006) 132-152 notes that although its influence waxed and waned throughout antiquity, most 
people “had a belief in the validity and importance of divination” (152). One example of skepticism is 
Xenophanes (Cicero’ On Divination I 3.5) who is noteworthy for his radical theology.    
36
 cf. Charmides 164e; 173c; Euthyphro 3e; Republic 364b; Theaetetus 179a; Timaeus 71a-72; Laws 694c; 
908c-d.    
37
 E.g., The Delphic Oracle in the Apology; Diotima in the Symposium; Euthyphro in the Euthyphro; 
Theoclyemenus in the Ion. 
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words, Euthyphro holds a true belief about the impartiality of justice. Nevertheless, I 
maintain that his engagement with Socrates reveals the limits of divination, specifically 
that seers are unable to adequately interpret their divinations.  
Part I – Euthyphro in the Euthyphro 
 The Euthyphro is concerned with defining piety (to hosion), and so consists of 
explicating the relationship between humans and the gods. Euthyphro provides five 
definitions of piety, but each is critiqued and ultimately rejected by Socrates.
38
 Whether 
or not there is a Socratic conception of piety tacitly expressed in the dialogue is still hotly 
debated.
39
 For the moment, I avoid this topic, but I develop an account later on. The five 
definitions are: 
1. Piety is prosecuting the wrongdoer (5d).  
2. Piety is “what is dear to the gods” (esti toinun to men tois theois prosphiles 
hosion) (7a1).
40
  
3. Piety is what is dear to all of the gods (9e).  
4. Piety is that part of justice that concerns itself “with the care of the gods” (to peri 
tēn tōn theōn therapeian) (12e6) 
5. Piety is the knowledge of how to sacrifice and pray (14c).  
 
The first definition is false because it is too narrow in scope; it does not provide the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for all cases.
41
 This is a familiar pitfall of many 
Socratic interlocutors.
42
  
                                                 
38
 McPherran (2002) 105-106 discusses the notion of treating Euthyphro as a Platonic construction versus 
an historical person. 
39
 McPherran (1985) 283-284 offers a survey of what he calls the constructivist camp, which holds that 
there is indeed a positive conception of piety, and the anticonstructivist camp, which rejects any positive 
claims about piety and emphasizes the aporetic nature of the dialogue. More recently, Dimas (2006) argues 
for the constructivist position and Rabbas (2005) argues the opposite.  
40
 All translations by Grube in Cooper (1997). 
41
 The question that has most often concerned scholars is whether or not this definition is merely an 
instance of piety (as opposed to a universal claim), or whether it is a universal claim, albeit too narrow to 
accept. The popular position nowadays is with the latter option. Nehamas (1975) 287-294; Versenyi (1982) 
45-46; Burns (1985) 314-325; Rabbas (2005) 293-309.  
42
 cf. Laches 190c; Republic 331b-c. 
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The second definition is rejected due to the lack of consensus among the gods, 
thereby giving way to the third definitional candidate.
43
 Although the gods might 
disagree about who is guilty of impiety, they all agree that whoever commits impiety 
deserves punishment (8d). The Euthyphro dilemma is the harbinger in this case. Although 
Euthyphro has improved the definition by eliminating disagreement, he now faces the 
independent problem of explaining why the gods love what they do. The property of 
‘being-dear-to-gods’ depends upon the gods holding something dear; they do not hold 
something dear because it has the property of ‘being-dear-to-gods’. Rather, there must be 
some other reason that gives independent support for being held dear. Euthyphro submits 
to this line of reasoning and the discussion proceeds to the fourth definition.  
Now piety is defined by appeal to domain, namely as that part of justice that 
concerns itself ‘with the care of the gods’ (12e6). But what does ‘care’ (therapeia) mean 
in this context?  Socrates considers two possibilities. First, to care is to “aim at the good 
of the object cared for” (ep’ agathō tini esti kai ōphelia tou therapeuomenou) (13b) such 
as in the case in horse-breeding. This is rejected because the gods do not improve through 
the care of humankind.
44
 Both Euthyphro and Socrates agree that humankind has a 
negligible effect on the Gods. The second meaning of care is akin to the relationship 
between master and slave. This encapsulates the asymmetrical relationship between 
humankind and the gods. Humans serve the gods as slaves serve their masters.  
One consequence of the shift is a move away from the epistemological component 
of caring for the gods. In the first sense of care, pious individuals possess technical 
                                                 
43
 It was certainly within the realm of Greek popular religion that there could be discord amongst the gods. 
At the same time, by the 4
th
 century B.C., there was a healthy intellectual discourse that challenged the 
conceptual consistency the thesis that the gods could be at odds with one another. McPherran (1996) writes, 
“The stories of the gods’ quarrels may well have been doubted by other Athenians” (70). 
44
 Lannstrom (2011) 266-268 notes this as she seeks to dismantle the do ut des principle of sacrifice.  
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knowledge, as demonstrated when Socrates states, “not everyone has knowledge of 
tending horses, but rather the one skilled with horses” (hoion phamen hippous ou pas 
epistatai therapeuein alla ho hippikos) (13a4-5). By contrast, when the pious person is 
conceptualized as a slave, it is the god who is the knower.
45
  
This point segues to the fifth definition, namely that piety is the art of sacrificing 
and praying to the gods. In other words, people seek to secure something from the gods. 
Consequently, piety rewards people. What about the gods? What do they receive from 
piety? According to Euthyphro, the gods receive pleasure, which gets specified as 
whatever is dear to them. A familiar problem immediately arises. Whatever is pleasing to 
the gods is god-loved (15c). This returns Socrates and Euthyphro to the third definition of 
piety, which was already rejected because of the Euthyphro dilemma.   
The dramatic context of the Euthyphro is instructive, both in the way that piety is 
contextualized into a concrete example, and in drawing out the continuities between the 
two characters. Socrates meets Euthyphro on the way to his trial; Euthyphro, incidentally, 
is on his way to prosecute his father for manslaughter (4a), which he claims is an instance 
of piety. Prior to the argumentative engagement – where Socrates challenges Euthyphro 
to provide an adequate definition – Socrates blithely compliments Euthyphro about his 
wisdom and laments the unfortunate skepticism of the Athenian Assembly. Indeed, 
taking for granted Euthyphro’s wisdom, Socrates desires to be his student, thereby 
foreshadowing a Socratic tenet that will never be denied, namely that knowing piety 
improves one’s life (16a). This is so despite the ironic undercurrent; as is so often the 
case, Socrates is nobody’s student. 
                                                 
45
 I am indebted to Weiss (1994) 268-269 for this point. 
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Consider Socrates’ motivation to be Euthyphro’s student in the context of the 
dialogue. In the opening exchange, Euthyphro compares himself to Socrates (3c). For 
Socrates, it is a familiar story that is related to us in the Apology. Meletus has accused 
him of corrupting the young by creating new gods, and disbelieving in the old gods (3b). 
In Euthyphro’s vernacular, Meletus is condemning Socrates’ divine sign (daimonion) as 
well as the more general notion of religious innovation. Such accusations, according to 
Euthyphro, are easily persuadable, and so Meletus has a good chance of smearing 
Socrates’ reputation in front of the Assembly.  
Euthyphro states that he has suffered through similar experiences; he has often 
been ridiculed in the assembly when speaking on divine matters: 
Whenever I speak of divine matters (peri tōn theiōn) in the 
assembly and foretell the future, they laugh me down as if I were 
crazy; and yet I have foretold nothing that did not happen. 
Nevertheless they envy all of us who do this (3c1-4).  
 
hotan ti legō en tē ekklēsia peri tōn theiōn, prolegōn autois ta 
mellonta, katagelōsin hōs mainomenou: kaitoi ouden hoti ouk 
alēthes eirēka hōn proeipon, all' homōs phthonousin hēmin pasi 
tois toioutois. 
 
This draws out the resemblance between Socrates and Euthyphro; a resemblance 
dismantled in the argumentative section. Indeed, it might seem that the most obvious 
parallel is between Socrates and Euthyphro’s father.  Socrates is being tried for 
corrupting the young and believing in false gods and Euthyphro’s father is being tried for 
manslaughter, but both constitute gross impiety. Nevertheless, the opening frame shows 
that the more nuanced relationship is between Socrates and Euthyphro himself.  
There are a number of superficial similarities. Socrates has his daimonion; 
Euthyphro claims wisdom in divine matters. Both have a tense relationship with the rest 
22 
 
 
 
of the Athenians. Both are willing to apply their moral convictions rather than capitulate. 
Socrates’ philosophical convictions lead to his demise; Euthyphro, as well, is ready and 
willing to sacrifice his filial relationship for the sake of what he takes to be true. Yet 
despite these similarities, one function of the Euthyphro is to demarcate Socrates from 
figures like Euthyphro.
46
    
Even though Euthyphro foretells the future and gets lambasted by the assembly, 
his actual similarity to Socrates is minimal. First, Socrates is being brought to trial. 
Euthyphro has never been charged. Second, Euthyphro experiences ridicule, but it is not 
altogether clear whether Socrates will undergo a similar experience.  Indeed, Socrates 
picks up on this immediately (3e); he expresses ignorance about the outcome of his trial, 
especially if he confronts an earnest assembly. Under these circumstances, which are not 
akin to those experienced by Euthyphro, “…the outcome is not clear except to you 
[Euthyphro] prophets (tois mantesin)” (3e4).  
Of crucial importance, both quotations – first where Euthyphro claims expertise 
on divine matters (3c) and second when Socrates characterizes Euthyphro (3e) – 
demonstrate that Euthyphro is a seer. His name stems from euthyphron, which means 
‘right-minded’. Euthyphro believes that he has divined the presence of pollution where 
others have not perceived it (4c).
47
 He is in Athens because of the pollution, which 
consists of his proximity to a killer – his father. He seeks to avoid pollution for himself in 
the Athenian law courts.
48
 In fact, it is doubtful that Athenian legal practice linked 
                                                 
46
 McPherran (2002) 120-121 refers to Euthyphro as the “dark Doppelganger of Socrates” (112) and 
formulates an analogy between Euthyphro’s focus on pollution and Socrates’ focus on corruption.  
47
 McPherran (2002) 113-114 provides a cursory look at the fifth century Greek notion of miasma. It was 
an “impersonal, invisible material taint that polluted individuals transmit to others” (114). Thus, even the 
innocent could incur it. If one was polluted, purification, in a broad sense, was the cure.  
48
 Furley (1985) writes that Euthyphro “was doubtless counting on the acquittal of his father in courts; he 
had done his duty, both to his father and himself, by placing the responsibility for cleansing any possible 
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pollution to homicide.
49
 Nevertheless, it is still fair to ask whether Euthyphro’s inability 
to provide Socrates with an adequate definition of piety bankrupts his case.
50
 Socrates, 
for one, would like to commit Euthyphro to such a consequence (15d). Whether or not 
Euthyphro’s father could be prosecuted on the grounds of secular justice is an open 
question; what is important for my purposes is that Euthyphro believes in the presence of 
pollution, which the law courts can assuage.  
That Euthyphro is a seer does not yet tell us whether he embodies the mores of 
Greek popular religion
51
 or whether he is a religious eccentric, perhaps a representative of 
an orphic cult. Scholarly opinion has been sharply divided.
52
 A determination of this 
concern doubtlessly entails a certain interpretation of the dialogue. If Euthyphro 
represents religious orthodoxy, then the dialogue could be interpreted as exhibiting the 
fundamental incoherence of the Athenian conception of piety, thereby foreshadowing the 
injustice Socrates will experience in the Apology. Just as Meletus is incapable of 
defending himself against Socrates, so too does Euthyphro fail to defend his assertions.   
The situation is more complicated if Euthyphro represents a religious sect. The 
dialogue could then be seen as a contest between philosophy and mystic religion. On this 
account, the Euthyphro dilemma demonstrates that piety must be subordinate to a secular 
version of justice. More concretely, we might take the connections between Socrates and 
                                                                                                                                                 
blood-guilt in the hands of the court” (206). It may have been that it was up to the victims’ family, often a 
male relative, to prosecute. This makes Euthyphro’s status uncertain. There is a great deal of material on 
the status of the case: Burnet (1924) 102, 104; Dover (1974) 273-274; MacDowell (1978) 59, 111; Brouer 
(2002) 52-53; Al-Maini (2011) 1 for a survey.  
49
 Bendlin (2007) 185-186 states that the evidence for such a claim is “meager” (185) and notes that there is 
no mention of pollution in Draco’s law of homicide, which was republished in 409/08 B.C.E.  
50
 Burnet (1924) 83.  
51
 Mikkalson (1983) 3-12. 
52
 Those who believe Euthyphro represents Athenian mores include Grote (1865) 322, Heidel (1902) 165, 
and Cornford (1912) 311. Those who believe he is more non-traditionally religious include Taylor (1950) 
147; Burnet (1924) 85-87; Hoerber (1958) 95-98; McPherran (1996) 34-35. 
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Euthyphro to heart. Although Euthyphro seems to be Socratic, he is actually in desperate 
need of the Socratic elenchus.
53
  
There are good reasons on both sides. The strongest evidence that Euthyphro 
belongs to a peripheral sect is found in his first definition of piety, namely that it is 
simply the prosecution of a wrongdoer (5e).
54
 His justification is Olympian in nature; 
Zeus bound Cronus for acting unjustly, and Cronus himself castrated his father Uranus. 
Euthyphro’s conception of piety, then, is one that is derived from Homer and Hesiod.55 
This is problematic because in the context of late 5
th
 century Athens, the prestige of the 
epic poets had waned. This does not mean that they were any less visible to the 
Athenians.
56
 In fact, it has been argued that with the birth of philosophy the epic poets 
began to be interpreted allegorically as opposed to literally.
57
 Many Greeks were 
incensed by the immorality of the Gods, which in part explains Plato’s own reformation 
of the traditional deities at Republic III. Euthyphro not only appeals to the Homeric gods, 
but explicitly cites their gross immorality in justifying himself to Socrates!
58
  
                                                 
53
 McPherran (1996) 35  
54
 Allen (1970) 20-21 argues that Euthyphro’s entire case is a baseless. We know Socrates’ trial occurred in 
399 B.C. But in 404 B.C., Naxos was not under Athenian jurisdiction. If the killing had occurred recently, 
it could be prosecuted in Athens. If the killing occurred 5 years earlier, a statute of limitations would take 
effect. Heidel (1902) points out that this may be why Euthyphro so emphasizes the polluting effect of 
having his father go unprosecuted (4b-c).  
55
 Allen writes, “The bloody history of Zeus, Cronos, and Uranus was generally treated as allegory, or 
frankly dismissed as false” (25). Also Hoerber (1958) 96  
56
 Furley (1985) 202-203 offers plenty of examples that demonstrate the pervasiveness of the Homeric 
Gods.  
57
 Naddaf (2009), especially 111-112, provides an extended analysis of this complex development. Naddaf, 
pace Long (1992), distinguishes between strong and weak allegory by appeal to the intentions of the 
author. In the strong sense, the author composes the text so that it ought to be interpreted allegorically. The 
weak sense, by contrast, merely allows allegorical interpretation irrespective of the author’s intention, and 
it is in this latter sense that the works of the epic poets can be interpreted allegorically. Indeed, the focus on 
intention to distinguish the two sorts encompasses consciousness as well. To intentionally allegorize is to 
consciously allegorize, and one can do this either as an author or as an interpreter.  
58
 Naddaf (2009) 104 cites Euthyphro as evidence for the thesis that traditional Athenian religion held a 
literal interpretation of the works of Homer and Hesiod.  
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Nevertheless, there are reasons to resist the thesis that Euthyphro embodies an 
eccentric religiosity. First, even though his appeal to Homer and Hesiod is questionable, 
it would be well to keep in mind that both poets still enjoyed Pan-Hellenic influence. 
Second, it is a feature of the definitional dialogues that the initial attempts at definition 
parrot conventional views. This serves to clear space for a transition from conventional 
views to the Platonic (or Socratic) view.
59
 In the Laches, for instance, the first attempt at 
defining courage focuses on the proper conduct of the hoplite, the canonical occupation 
of the courageous person (190e). Amongst other considerations, Socrates is able to 
persuade his interlocutors that courage, properly defined, may require the hoplite to 
abandon his post and flee. This serves to make way for the Platonic conception of 
courage, which amounts to a kind of knowledge.  
Finally, the entire exchange is predicated on the idea that Euthyphro’s divine 
wisdom will enable Socrates to rebuke Meletus’ charges in court. In other words, 
Euthyphro is initially depicted as an authority on divine matters. As the dialogical 
engagement progresses, his authority is undermined. This is another motif of the early 
dialogues, namely that Socratic interlocutors are initially presented as experts only to 
wind up barren of expertise at the conclusion of the dialogue.
60
  
One problem with this is that we are told that Euthyphro has been laughed out of 
the assembly. This hardly lends itself to the image of an authority figure. That said, Plato 
often incorporates elements of comedy in his dialogues, and that one recurrent motif of 
                                                 
59
 Wolfsdorf (2008) 15.   
60
 Consider Protagoras of the Protagoras; Hippias of the Hippias Major; Dionysodorus and Euthydemus of 
the Euthydemus; Nicias and Laches of the Laches.  
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Ancient Comedy is for the divinations of a seer to be lampooned.
61
 The irony is that 
Socrates is not content to rest with the Assembly; rather, he seeks to engage with 
Euthyphro, challenging him to defend his convictions.    
Indeed, this last point contributes to the “apologetic tendency” (Burley 204) of the 
dialogue. Euthyphro claims that by harming Socrates, the core of the city is wronged. If 
there is in fact a connection between the Euthyphro and Socrates’ trial, then it makes little 
sense to think that Euthyphro represents an unconventional point of view. Rather, it adds 
to the overall pathos of the dialogue that Euthyphro embodies a degree of religious 
orthodoxy. His inability to articulate a satisfactory definition of piety confirms Socrates’ 
intellectual superiority.
62
 In this way, Socrates and Euthyphro are two quite different 
people. 
A satisfactory portrait of Euthyphro, then, amounts to synthesizing the two 
positions. While there is strong evidence for Euthyphro’s sectarianism, it is worthwhile to 
remember that sectarianism, in Ancient Greece, was far more happenstance than in other, 
more determinately religious cultures. I submit then that Euthyphro is a religiously 
orthodox seer, but someone whose orthodoxy is distinctly revolutionary. In this way, he 
neither embodies the religious beliefs of the ordinary Athenian nor represents a 
doctrinaire orientation that prohibits religious innovation. Euthyphro is not afraid to flout 
                                                 
61
 Aristophanes’ The Birds 950-990; The Knights 60, 110. Flower (2008) notes that seers (manteis) in Old 
Comedy were often characterized, even lampooned as, oracle-speakers or collectors (chresmologoi). 62-63   
62
 Of course, intellectual superiority does not necessarily mean that Socrates has a positive account of piety. 
This could easily be contextualized by appeal to Socratic ignorance. My argument does not depend on the 
degree of Socrates’ wisdom, only that he registers higher than everyone else.  
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public opinion – he unabashedly presents his divinations to the assembly but he has yet to 
suffer any significant consequences for his beliefs.
63
  
It is worthwhile to note that it was a common occurrence to present oracles to the 
assembly. Munn (2000) writes: 
Diopeithes and Lampon, both famous expounders of oracles 
mentioned by Aristophanes in the Birds of 414 and in numerous 
other passages, are both attested as proposers of decrees in the 
Athenian Assembly in the 420s. Their advice typically concerned 
matters of religion, but the oracles that they and others expounded 
for the edification of all Athenians touched on all aspects of 
Athenian policy (86).  
 
Even Thucydides, noteworthy for his ambivalence about divination, alludes to its 
ubiquity.
64
  It is clear, then, that it was not unique for oracles to be presented to the 
Athenian assembly.   
 But we must still speculate on the precise nature of Euthyphro’s mantic abilities. 
If Euthyphro does in fact present oracles to the assembly, then he is able to interpret his 
own divinations. This means that he is some sort of technical seer, someone with a set of 
specialized skills. Euthyphro does not lose his mind when he divines. Nevertheless, there 
is other evidence, specifically in the Cratylus, that counters this characterization. As I 
turn now to that dialogue, I aim to underscore Euthyphro’s affinity to inspiration 
specified as the temporary loss of self-awareness. This prepares us for the final section 
where I integrate Euthyphro’s occupation with his claim to divine knowledge.    
Part II – Euthyphro in the Cratylus 
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 As McPherran (2002) writes, citing Tulin (81), “Oddly, though, it is this seemingly conventional notion 
of miasma that Euthyphro uses to explicate what appears to be a quite forward-looking, cosmopolitan 
principle of impartial justice” (112).  
64
 Instead of raging against Nicias’ devotion to divination, he is content to write that the Greek general 
seemed to give divination too much importance (History of the Peloponnesian War 7.50.4). This would 
seem to carve out space where divination would have qualified value. Nevertheless, 5.26.3 is more 
straightforwardly skeptical.   
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 The Cratylus also contains evidence that Euthyphro is a seer, specifically in 
Socrates’ references to his mantic properties. First, something must be said about the 
content of the dialogue. It deals with the ‘correctness of names’ thesis, which holds that 
the essence of each noun (including proper nouns like the names of Gods) is contained 
within its etymology. For example, Agamemnon contains two words that encapsulate the 
meaning of the man. He is admirable (agastos) because he holds his ground (epimone) 
(395a). This is in contrast to the opposite position, argued by Hermogenes, which holds 
that names are purely conventional.  
It has been argued that the Euthyphro of the Cratylus should not be taken to be the 
protagonist of the Euthyphro, but the case for their identity is quite strong.
65
 For one, he 
is introduced when Socrates is in the midst of investigating a series of divine 
etymologies.
66
 It is doubtful a mere coincidence that immediately preceding Socrates’ 
allusion to Euthyphro he is investigating the etymology of Zeus, Cronus, and Uranus. 
These are the same three deities whom Euthyphro explicitly cites in defense of his first 
definition of piety in the eponymous dialogue.
67
   
Impressed with Socrates’ performance to date, Hermogenes declares: “Indeed, 
Socrates, you do seem to me to be exactly like a prophet who has suddenly been inspired 
to deliver oracles” (kai men dē, ō Sōkrates, atekhnōs ge moi dokeis hōsper hoi 
enthousiōntes exaiphnēs khrēsmōdein) (396d2-3). Socrates assents to this 
characterization and explains: 
                                                 
65
 Taylor (1926) 146-147 expresses doubt that the two figures are meant to embody one person. More 
contemporary scholars, however, see no reason to reject the thesis that they represent the same man. 
Consult Sedley (2003) 40; Baxter (1992) 108; Barney (2001) 57.  
66
 The etymological section can be ably divided into three sections – the divine names, the physical names, 
and the names of virtues and vices.  
67
 Nails (2002) 153 notes that it is unlikely for two individuals with the same name to have such similarity. 
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I was with him [Euthyphro] at dawn, lending an ear to his lengthy 
discussion. He must have been inspired (enthousiōn), because it 
looks as though he has not only filled my ears with his superhuman 
wisdom (tēs daimonias sophias) but taken possession of my soul as 
well (396d5-7). 
 
kai aitiōmai ge, ō Hermogenes, malista autēn apo Euthuphronos 
tou Prospaltiou prospeptōkenai moi: heōthen gar polla autō sunē 
kai pareikhon ta ōta. kinduneuei oun enthousiōn ou monon ta ōta 
mou emplēsai tēs daimonias sophias, alla kai tēs psukhēs 
epeilēphthai.  
 
Socrates embraces this inspiration for the sake of the investigation, but will seek 
purification the next day from someone with relevant expertise – a priest or a wise man.  
 On the one hand, the exchange is banal. Socrates’ interlocutors often characterize 
him idiosyncratically.
68
 Nevertheless, a number of puzzles emerge. What is the purpose 
of Socrates’ etymological investigation? Why appeal to the inspiration of Euthyphro, a 
seer, in the first place? It is not an isolated incident; Socrates goes on to appeal to 
Euthyphro’s mantic properties throughout the etymological section.69 Is this meant to 
entrench the conviction that Euthyphro is responsible for the entirety of the etymological 
proceedings? Finally, why does Socrates require purification, and from whom will he 
receive it? To a degree, these questions are all related, but as much as is possible, I try to 
keep them separate.  
 The etymological section has not always been held in good standing. As is often 
the case with eccentric Platonic passages, scholars are more comfortable looking through 
the lens of irony than in confronting the possibility of philosophical content.
70
 In recent 
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 Euthyphro refers to Socrates as a Daedalus (Euthyphro 11b); Meno compares Socrates to an electric ray 
(Meno 80a); Socrates variously characterizes himself as a seer (Cratylus 396d), a gadfly (Apology 31c), and 
a midwife (Theaetetus 149a).  
69
 cf. 399a; 400a; 407d; 409d; 428c. 
70
 Baxter (1992) 94-99, for instance, argues that the etymological section is best interpreted as an extended 
satire on Greek popular attitudes about the interrelationship between language and the world.  
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years, however, there has been something of a resurgence. There are at least two strong 
reasons not to dismiss it. First, etymology was a prevalent intellectual enterprise in 
Classical Greece.
71
 Indeed, even Plato utilizes etymology in dialogues other than the 
Cratylus.
72
 
What, then, is its function in this particular context? I argue that the key is in the 
opening stages of the dialogue when Hermogenes implores Socrates to help him interpret 
Cratylus’ bewildering position concerning the correctness of names. If Socrates would 
interpret Cratylus’ “oracular utterances” (manteian) (384a4) Hermogenes would happily 
listen. Hermogenes would furthermore like to hear about Socrates’ own reflections on the 
subject.  
 Socrates, predictably, disavows such knowledge.
73
 He does, however, assent to an 
investigation. After critiquing Hermogenes’ conventionalism, the discussion proceeds to 
a study of etymologies. What is significant about this early exchange is that Socrates is 
adopting Cratylus’ viewpoint. The evidence for this is twofold. First, their connection is 
substantiated by the allusions to the oracular – just as Cratylus makes “oracular 
utterances” (384a4), so too does Socrates cite inspiration. Second, the etymology section 
can be fruitfully characterized as an agon between Socrates and Cratylus, and more 
generally, between philosophy and etymology.
74
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 Goldschmidt (1940) 109-142; Baxter (1992) ch. 4-5. Barney (2001) 53 cites the Derveny Papyrus, 
composed circa late 5
th
 century, as an example of early etymologizing. That etymology was widespread 
does not mean that it enjoyed uncritical admiration. Like all intellectual disciplines, it was often ridiculed. 
Indeed, it is lambasted by Euripides (Bacchae 292-7) and Aristophanes (The Clouds 394).  
72
 cf. Phaedrus 244c-d; Laws 654a, 714a, 957c. The Laws is an incontestably late dialogue, which means 
that Plato did not change his mind about the value of etymology, however qualified. Sedley (2003) 25-26 
notes the importance of etymology in Socrates’ discussion of musical expertise at Philebus 17c11-e6.   
73
 Socrates has not taken Prodicus’ fifty drachma course, which exhausts the topic. Rather, he has only 
taken the one drachma course, thereby making him seem unqualified (384b-c).  
74
 Barney (2001) 60-73.  
31 
 
 
 
The agon is a contest between two parties. In this case, it is not internal to a 
specific domain. Instead, it is a competition between two disciplines on the subject of 
method. Such generality makes it ineffective for Socrates to simply assert the importance 
of dialectic (philosophy) because it will fall upon deaf ears. Cratylus will simply assert 
his own position and the two combatants will talk past one another. A more promising 
strategy is to adopt the viewpoint of your opponent and defeat him by his own tactics. 
Socrates often employs this strategy.
75
  
 Even if we accept that the etymology section is best interpreted agonistically, 
there is still the puzzle of Euthyphro and the oracular imagery. If Socrates is seeking to 
triumph over Cratylus by outperforming him at his own expertise, why dilute the victory 
by appeal to divination? This means that Socrates cannot defeat Cratylus on his own 
terms. He needs divine help.  
 In a general sense, the appeal to Euthyphro, and by extension the gods, is a claim 
to authoritative knowledge. Not only does it empirically explain how Socrates, a man 
who is relatively uneducated in the field of etymology, is able to demonstrate such 
ability, but it also stamps the proceedings with divine authority. Consider that Socrates 
submits to the Homeric thesis that humans use different names than the gods. This is so 
because the latter know a thing’s correct name tout court (391d).  
This only amounts to a short sojourn, however, because Socrates proceeds to 
digress to something more manageable and within the scope of human ability (392b2), 
namely the way two names can refer to the same thing. The Gods are too transcendent for 
humans to directly access – “we know nothing about the gods themselves or about the 
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 Barney (2001) 63-64 refers to the Simonides exchange in the Protagoras. Two other examples are 
Socrates’ first speech in the Phaedrus where he characterizes the nature of eros and the early exchange in 
the Euthydemus.   
32 
 
 
 
names they call themselves – although it is clear that they call themselves true names” 
(hoti peri theōn ouden ismen, oute peri autōn oute peri tōn onomatōn, hatta pote 
heautous kalousin) (400d6-8). This forces a transition to the second best option, namely 
those humans who originally gave the gods their names (401a).  
There is a sense in which ancient peoples occupy a middle ground between 
contemporary Athenians and the gods.
76
 Both Socrates (397c) and Cratylus (438c) agree 
on this. If Socrates can tap into the original mindset of the ancients, he will discover the 
forgotten meanings of words, thereby pleasing the gods (400d).
77
 In this way, the 
discussion takes a secular turn, and focuses on human knowledge and ignorance. The turn 
is ambivalent, however, for accessing the gods, if possible, seems altogether preferable 
given their veridical nature. This may explain why Socrates appeals to the power of 
inspiration amidst his etymological excavations.   
 Another explanation for Socrates’ appeal to Euthyphro is that it distinguishes 
Socrates the philosopher from Socrates the etymologist. In other words, divination 
enables Socrates to both superlatively etymologize, thereby trumping the ability of 
Cratylus, and yet remain uncommitted to the thesis that it is a practice worth cultivating 
and pursuing. It makes sense, according to this line of thought, that Socrates insists that 
they seek purification after their discussion.   
                                                 
76
 cf. Philebus 16c. 
77
 Plato has an intricate position. On a fundamental level, he rejects the ancients on the grounds that if we 
can come up with an adequate explanation that is to be wholly preferred (Phaedrus 274c). More generally, 
he seems content to “follow custom” (tō nomō pisteuteon) (Timaeus 40e2) and believe the ancient account 
of the Gods. This is desultory, however, since we have plenty of examples of Plato re-designing the 
cosmos. The benevolent demiurge is a case in point.   
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But who is qualified to purify Socrates? The likely candidate is the dialectician 
referenced at 390c.
78
 The dialectician is introduced at the conclusion of Socrates’ polemic 
against conventionalism. Hermogenes has asserted a theory of language such that names 
get their meaning based on the conventions of a community or an individual.
79
 A problem 
emerges when Hermogenes acquiesces to a distinction between technai of making and 
those of using. Examples are cited aplenty – the lyre-player will supervise the maker of 
lyres (390b) – but who will, then, supervise the maker of linguistic rules? It is “someone 
who knows how to ask and answer questions” (ton de erōtan kai apokrinesthai 
epistamenon) (390c8-9).  
Not just anyone can determine linguistic conventions. Only an acknowledged 
expert can do so; this is the dialectician, a person able to name things in such a way that 
the name reflects their nature. Hermogenes’ conventionalism is thereby refuted on the 
grounds that (1) there are individuals who possess more wisdom in naming things and (2) 
the ability to name wisely depends upon capturing the nature of the thing in the selected 
name. The connection between this argument and the subsequent etymological section is 
clear. 
In the Cratylus, Socrates appeals to Euthyphro’s ability to inspire him. In fact, 
Euthyphro is inspired and actually transmits this to Socrates.
80
 What is the purpose of 
citing Euthyphro’s inspiration? I outlined several reasons. For one, it is a claim to 
authoritative knowledge. Inspiration is the result of divine contact. Furthermore, and 
paradoxically, inspiration enables Socrates to distance himself from the content of his 
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 Both Baxter (1992) 109 and Gaiser (1972) 50 argue that the individual best qualified to purify Socrates 
will be he dialectician.  
79
 Hermogenes does not recognize that anchoring meaning in the community is systematically different 
than anchoring it in the individual.  
80
 cf. Ion 533e.   
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etymological investigations. This makes sense if we keep in mind that Socrates is in the 
midst of an agon with Hermogenes, and furthermore fundamentally remains a 
philosopher, not an etymologist.  
Something must be said about the seer’s relationship to knowledge. As I turn to 
the final section, I develop an analogy between Socrates the etymologist and Euthyphro 
the seer. In particular, I argue that just as Socrates holds true beliefs about etymology, so 
too does Euthyphro hold at least one true belief about piety. Both sets of true beliefs are 
the result of divine inspiration, and ultimately originate in Euthyphro’s access to the gods 
through divination. Although each definition of piety is deficient, they constitute 
reifications of the original divination that informed Euthyphro about his father’s 
pollution. In this way, the seer’s inability to adequately interpret his divination comes to 
the fore. Incidentally, this also explains why Euthyphro gets laughed out of the assembly 
for speaking on divine matters. He is unqualified to speak on his divinations. 
Part III – In Consideration of Euthyphro 
My intention has been to focus on the notion of mantic authenticity. In the 
Euthyphro, Euthyphro’s reputation is established. It has modest credentials. Socrates 
evaluates and ultimately rejects his mantic knowledge. I argued that Euthyphro is best 
interpreted as representing a religious orthodoxy of a distinctly revolutionary flavor. 
Since Euthyphro’s mantic knowledge of the will of the gods does not stand up to 
Socrates’ questioning, he is not an authentic seer.81  
I think this is too strong. For what Euthyphro’s ineptitude really signifies is the 
limits of divination. In other words, his inability to justify himself does not mean that he 
                                                 
81
 This is complicated because at Laws 871b, it is asserted that the prerequisite to avenging a murder is 
having been ritualistically purified. As a seer, Euthyphro divines true beliefs but cannot give an account, 
which is a condition of knowledge. The Athentian Stranger is not bound in this way.  
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is any less of a seer. Rather, it means that he cannot philosophically defend his expertise. 
He does not possess knowledge in the Socratic sense of the term. But neither do any of 
Socrates’ interlocutors, let alone Socrates himself. The two old generals, Nicias and 
Laches, of the Laches do not possess such knowledge, but Plato nowhere claims that 
either of them are any less of a general for not being able to define courage (andreia).  
In the Cratylus, Euthyphro legitimizes Socrates’ investigations. Of course, 
Socrates retains the ability to rationally evaluate the wisdom that has been implanted in 
him (396c4).
 
But Euthyphro nevertheless confers a degree of divine authority. Given 
Euthyphro’s erroneous reasoning in the eponymous dialogue, it might be thought that he 
is given too much of a role in the Cratylus. Nevertheless, I think the contexts are 
coalescent in that they reveal the power of divination together with its adjacent 
deficiencies.    
First, the function of each dialogue must be kept in mind. The Euthyphro’s 
investigation of piety amounts to the claim that adequate definitions are beyond the reach 
of humankind. This is consistent with the other definitional dialogues.
82
 Those people 
who purportedly know are shown to have, at the very least, an inflated view of their 
expertise. On the other hand, the Cratylus, especially in the early stages, depends upon 
the thesis that there are names that accord with nature, and those that do not. Since the 
gods know what the names are, Plato has tendentious reason to cite them via a seer.  
Second, it is instructive to consider the status of the etymologies. On the one 
hand, they are shown to be philosophically untenable. They imply a Heraclitean 
worldview predicated on flux; this is antithetical to Plato’s own view about at least one 
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 cf. Laches, Charmides, Republic I.  
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collection of objects – the Forms.83 That said, it ought to be noted that Cratylus, together 
with his avowal of Heraclitus’ doctrine of flux, was an early influence on Plato.84 
Granted, Heraclitean flux is not a central part of Cratylus’ account in the Cratylus. It only 
emerges during his dialogical engagement with Socrates. This is problematic for 
Aristotle’s account of Cratylus, but an attractive explanation is that Plato has dramatized 
Cratylus’ coming to believe in Heraclitean flux.85 It has been supposed that Cratylus’ 
conviction in Heraclitean flux has logically led to his doctrine of names, but in fact, it is 
the opposite. A consequence of his naturalism is Heraclitean flux.   
However, Heraclitean flux does accurately account for the perceptible world. The 
failure of the ancients, evidently, was their erroneous belief that the world only consisted 
of what was perceptible.
86
 In this sense, although the etymologies might not constitute 
philosophical knowledge, they are sound in a narrower sense.
87
  
Consider what triggers the discussion in the Euthyphro. It is to determine whether 
or not Euthyphro’s legal action constitutes an instance of piety or not. It has been argued 
that the legitimacy of this action is never actually denied by Socrates.
88
 What Socrates 
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 Sedley (2003) 5-6.  
84
 cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics A 6 987a32-b7. 
85
 Kirk (1951) 236; Sedley (2003) 17-18.  
86
 By the ancients, Socrates does not mean the Pre-Socratics. Rather, it is clear that he is referring to those 
who created original language. There is not much more one can say about such a group, and Socrates 
remains silent on who they are, only that we should not straightforwardly accept the veracity of their 
claims. Once the original meanings have been discovered, they need to be evaluated on their merits, hence 
the rejection of the ever-changing worldview on the basis of Platonic arguments about stability and the 
forms.  
87
 Sedley (2003) 28 distinguishes between the philosophically correct and the exegetically correct in 
articulating this general thesis. He goes on to characterize the etymologies as a series of true beliefs.  
88
 McPherran (2002) 112 cites Euthyphro 8d-e, Crito 49b, Apology 28b, and Gorgias 480a-d as textual 
support of Socrates’ conviction that considerations of justice must be conducted impartially, even and 
especially in cases that involve one’s friends and family. Al-Maini (2011) 2, 16 criticizes this view and 
cites myriad instances of Socrates’ filial piety (Crito 50e-51a, Menexenus 147a-c, Republic 463a-e, 574b-d, 
Phaedo 113e-114a, Gorgias 456d-457a, Alcibiades 115b-c, Laws 717b718b, 740a, 930e-932d). In the 
Gorgias section that McPherran cites, Al-Maini points out that the wrongdoing is plain and unambiguous. 
By contrast, in the Euthyphro, the wrongdoing of the father is still up for grabs. The legal proceedings will 
determine whether or not Euthyphro’s father is guilty, hence it is highly doubtful that Euthyphro’s act is 
37 
 
 
 
does object to is whether or not Euthyphro can philosophically justify his case. In fact, 
Euthyphro seems to recognize the need for such justification. One scholar has 
emphasized just this point: 
Not only does Euthyphro himself immediately acknowledge them 
[conditions for a proper definition] as legitimate (cf. 6e7-8), but his own 
argumentative practice in the dialogue is testimony to his implicit 
commitment to this condition as a requirement for normative discourse 
(Rabbas 300). 
 
Rabbas provides four reasons. First, Euthyphro justifies his action by appeal to a criterion 
(4b-e, 5d-6a). Second, he emphasizes the need for rational justification, even if the topic 
under consideration is difficult (7b-d). Third, he modifies his second definition by appeal 
to a norm that all the gods subscribe to (8b7-9). Finally, he repeatedly insists to Socrates 
that he is able to provide a satisfactory answer to the topic at hand (9b4-5, b9-10, e1-9).
89
  
 Of course, these considerations must be tempered by the fact that Euthyphro, as 
the conversation progresses, emphasizes the difficulty of the subject matter. Indeed, this 
parallels the Apology wherein Socrates formulates a deep systematic division between the 
human knowledge, which is inherently fallible, and divine knowledge, which is 
superlative and certain (Apology 23a-c). Euthyphro’s dialogical engagement with 
Socrates forces us to reflect on its relationship to Euthyphro’s expertise.  
In my discussion of the Euthyphro, I emphasized that Euthyphro is a syncretic 
figure who combines elements of Greek popular religion with more ancillary religious 
beliefs. The case against his father flouts common opinion. How did Euthyphro come to 
                                                                                                                                                 
pious.  But what I take to be instructive is Al-Maini’s comment that although “Euthyphro might claim he is 
sure of his father’s wrongdoing…the fact that both the father and family disagree gives room for pause” 
(16). This pause, I think, gestures toward Euthyphro’s mantic abilities. Divining his father’s pollution 
would both (1) generate strength of conviction, and (2) alienate his family. 
89
 In Rabbas’ (2005) argument, the criterion must be “universal, practically applicable, and essence-
revealing” (300).  
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think that his father committed an evil? More strongly, how did he develop such strength 
in the veracity of his conviction? The answer, I think, is his occupation as a seer. This is 
so for three reasons. First, consider the content of what Euthyphro knows – that his father 
has committed a heinous act and is therefore polluted. It is religious in nature; one gleans 
religious truths by means of religious experiences, or through recognized authorities like 
priests.  
Euthyphro probably developed his account of his father’s action by accessing the 
will of the gods. This works together with the fact that he seems to be solitary in his 
thinking. Both Euthyphro’s family and Socrates are flabbergasted by his willingness to 
prosecute his own father. Finally, Euthyphro’s strength of conviction also provides 
cursory evidence that he divined his belief.
90
 Since Euthyphro is a seer, he must have 
developed his expertise to the point that he is confident in his ability to adequately 
interpret his divinations. Thus, I think there are good grounds for thinking that 
Euthyphro’s conviction about his father is a result of his mantic expertise.  
Now I also argued that the etymological section in the Cratylus ought to be read 
as containing a degree of truth. I submit that the definitions in the Euthypho amount to 
the same thing. That is, despite the fact that none of the definitions prove philosophically 
adequate, there is sense in which each definition encapsulates something true. For 
example, the first definition of piety – prosecuting the wrongdoer – is a paradigmatic 
instance of piety. The problem, as I discussed earlier, is that it is too narrow to serve as a 
criterion for all cases of piety.   
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 Weiss (1994) 265 argues that Euthyphro’s motivation for prosecuting his father is actually selfish. That 
is, although he is concerned with ameliorating the pollution, he is only concerned with ameliorating it 
because it might infect him. More charitably, however, McPherran (2002) 113 points out that even for 
Socrates, what is in the interest of the self is identical with the interest of being moral.   
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The second and third definitions are similar in that they incorporate the gods. 
The problem with the second definition is that there is a lack of consensus among the 
gods. This segues to the third definition, which states that piety is what all of the gods 
love. Much has been made about the third definition.
91
 What I take to be crucial, 
however, is that an adequate definition of piety will doubtlessly include the pleasure of 
the gods. In other words, what the Euthyphro dilemma draws out is that the ‘holding-
dear-by-the-gods’ is a true but inessential property of piety.  
This might not be sufficient, however, if we stop to consider Euthyphro’s 
conception of the gods. Although the third definition turns on the notion of consensus, 
Euthyphro never characterizes them as laudable moral agents.
92
 In other words, although 
the gods agree, they still might be deplorable. This is particularly vexing given that 
Euthyphro is so confident in his convictions about the gods that he justifies himself by 
appeal to their behavior. In particular, he justifies the prosecution of his father by appeal 
to another son – Zeus – who castrated his guilty father.  
Consider the fourth definition, which defines piety as a part of justice. Given the 
absence of piety from the list of virtues in the Republic, we might reasonably think that 
Plato considers piety a secondary virtue, capable of being subsumed. The conceptual 
domain of justice is between humans; piety is that part of justice whose conceptual 
domain encompasses the relationship between gods and humans. Indeed, Socrates 
himself seems to endorse Euthyphro this time – “You seem to me to put that very well, 
but I still need a bit of information” (kai kalōs ge moi… phainēlegein, alla smikrou tinos 
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 Rabbas (2005) 291 refers to the third definition, specifically the formulation of the Euthyphro problem, 
as the fulcrum of the entire dialogue.  
92
 Weiss (1994) states, “nowhere in the dialogue do Euthyphro’s gods attain the status of being perfectly 
just and wise” (263). 
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eti  endeēs eimi) (12e9-13a1). 93 This, then, marks the true element of the fourth 
definition.  
Finally, the fifth definition, which is the knowledge of how to properly sacrifice 
and pray, is really only a specified version of the fourth definition. Each horn of the 
definition constitutes one direction in the relationship. Pious individuals pray to the gods 
in order to ask for something; they sacrifice to them in order to give the gods pleasure. 
This latter horn proves indistinguishable from the Euthyphro problem. By offering 
sacrifice, humans do not give a god something he or she needs. Rather, all a sacrifice can 
do is give pleasure, but then piety becomes none other than “what is dear to the gods” 
(15c6). Socrates and Euthyphro have returned to the third definition.  
The unique features of this definition are the practices of praying and sacrificing. 
Socrates characterizes such practices as do ut des (‘I give that you might give’) – a sense 
of reciprocity characterized by trade. It is noteworthy that Euthyphro initially 
characterizes such practices as the result of charis, or gift, which is a richer concept, more 
in line with mutual esteem.
94
 Although there is definite overlap between the two 
concepts, there are also significant differences. For one, charis cultivates social relations 
between the two parties. This is not an essential feature of a relationship based on trade.
95
   
Socrates’ equivocation is what enables him to critique Euthyphro’s final 
definition. Indeed, in other dialogues as well, the notion that the gods receive something 
from sacrifices is rejected, together with the related idea that the gods can be persuaded 
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 McPherran (1985) 221-222 argues this point, and more pointedly argues that this marks Socrates’ actual 
conception of piety. This, then, contrasts my position in that I merely want to maintain the minimal point 
that the definition contains some truth. Coming from the opposite direction, Rabbas (2005) 306 argues that 
Socrates is only ironically endorsing Euthyphro’s definition.  
94
 Mikalson (2010) 14-15. 
95
 Lannstrom (2011) 267 points out that although Euthyphro acquiesces to Socrates’ equivocation, his 
response betrays a sense of doubt: “Trading yes, if you prefer to call it that” (emporikē, ei houtōs hēdion soi 
onomazein.) (14e5).    
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by human actions.
96
 But this does not negate sacrifice as a practice that would have a role 
in the ideal state.
97
 Thus, by conceptualizing prayer and sacrifice as products of charis, 
Euthyphro has hit upon something true. Appropriate for the seer who is unable to justify 
such a belief, he is persuaded away from this idea by Socrates.    
Conclusion 
For Plato, seers can, and do, hit at the truth. In the Euthyphro, and in the Cratylus, 
we see several instances of Euthyphro’s mantic abilities. We see it in his conviction that 
his father has committed an injustice. We also see it in when Socrates refers to him in the 
etymological section of the Cratylus. Finally, I argue that each definition in the 
Euthyphro, develops out of an original conviction in the wrongfulness of his father’s 
action, and that this reflects a kernel of truth.  
What the Euthyphro shows us is that divination cannot be the final word. If a seer 
is left to interpret his divinations, he proves inept. Still, that seers require philosophy to 
buttress their claims is trivial in the sense that Plato thinks that every other branch of 
learning requires philosophical grounding. 
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Chapter 2 – Mantikē Technē   
Abstract 
 
I argue that Plato curtails mantic authority as a consequence of his concept of craft 
(technē), which best emerges in his discussion of courage and generalship in the Laches. 
By drawing together remarks made about technē in the Laches, Charmides, and Gorgias, 
I investigate the puzzle that knowledge of technē encompasses all that is past, present, 
and future. The consequences of this are spelled out in terms of the subject matter 
appropriate to divination.  
 
Introduction 
 
The prestige of seers in Ancient Greece is of particular importance given Plato’s 
valorization of philosophers. How much authority did seers actually enjoy? Did military 
seers, for instance, simply serve as lackeys to political and military leaders? In this 
chapter, I interrogate divination from two related angles. First, in the Laches, Socrates 
claims that generals always have authority over their seers (198e-199a). Is this 
historically true? If not, and I argue as such, then how do we understand the relationship 
between two technai – a superior technē like generalship and a subordinate technē like 
divination. The second aim of this chapter focuses on the subject matter of divination. 
According to Plato, each technē has a definite subject matter.98 However, an 
epistemological puzzle arises in the Laches that seems to undercut the most obvious 
candidate for divination’s subject matter – the future.  
In the Laches, Plato attempts to define courage (andreia). A central, yet highly 
ambivalent, feature of the argument centers on the craft (technē) analogy. This is the 
proposal that virtue is a technē. It is plausible for several reasons. It solves the problem of 
teaching virtue to people. It also identifies virtue with a kind of knowledge.
99
 
                                                 
98
 cf. Ion 537d. 
99
 In Plato’s early dialogues, technē and episteme are used interchangeably as evidenced by Ion 532c5-8. 
Benson (2000) 158-159. 
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Nevertheless, the analogy is problematic and ultimately untenable. Its shortcomings are 
explored throughout the early dialogues and the Laches is no exception.
100
    
In part I, I rehearse the historical context of the Laches, paying particular attention 
to Nicias, whom it is said put undeserved authority in the advice of seers. In part II, I 
briefly rehearse Laches’ and Nicias’ definitions of courage. This prepares part III, which 
analyzes the relationship between generalship and divination, particularly in the way the 
former governs the latter. I outline reasons why Plato conceptualizes such a relationship 
given that it conflicts with historical reality. Part of this analysis draws on the notion of 
the master art, which emerges in several dialogues, including the Charmides, which is 
closely linked to the Laches. Finally, in Part IV, I analyze the epistemological puzzle 
developed at Laches 198d. If the knowledge associated with a technē encompasses past, 
present, and future, then how does this relate to the subject matter of divination? Note, 
furthermore, that this is not a merely conceptual problem, since divination arises at 
several points throughout the dialogue.  
Part I – The Historical Context of the Laches 
In the Laches, Socrates and his interlocutors, Nicias and Laches, attempt to define 
courage. The investigation is triggered by a practical concern; Lysimachus and Melesias 
want to educate their sons well, that is, make them courageous. Indeed, all three 
individuals – Socrates, Nicias, and Laches – seem to be qualified to discuss the nature of 
courage. The latter two men are generals and Socrates has extensive military 
                                                 
100
 I thereby agree with Roochnik (2006) and Madigan (1985) 379-380 who argue that Plato, from the very 
beginning, is well aware that virtue does not constitute a technē. In other words, one function of the early 
dialogues, notably the Charmides and the Laches, is to dialogically explore the shortcomings of the 
analogy. For Madigan, the technē analogy fails the superlative intellectual constraints that Socrates imposes 
on virtue. The opposite view is best articulated by Irwin (1977).  
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experience.
101
 This pedagogical concern transitions to a search for an adequate definition 
of courage. Once they know the necessary and sufficient conditions for courage they can 
determine whether or not it is teachable. But who are these characters? Unlike Diotima in 
the Symposium, both Laches and Nicias are historical figures and can help enrich our 
understanding of the dialogue.
102
  
Laches was an Athenian General during the Peloponnesian War; our historical 
knowledge of him is primarily dependent on Thucydides and Aristophanes. Initially, he 
was sent to Sicily in order to help Athenian allies against Syracuse. Laches eventually 
took over full command of the 20 ships and in 426 B.C. he secured victory over Mylae 
and Messana. This first Sicilian expedition, however, did not end well. He was later tried 
by Cleon, but acquitted. Laches and Nicias subsequently secured amity with the Peace of 
Nicias (423 B.C.). In 418 B.C., however, hostilities renewed and after being appointed 
general once again, Laches was killed during the overwhelming defeat of Athenian forces 
at the Battle of Mantinea.
103
   
 Nicias was also an Athenian General during the Peloponnesian War and our 
knowledge of his affairs comes from Thucydides, Aristophanes, and Plutarch. An 
aristocrat, Nicias began taking a more prominent place in Athenian politics after the death 
of Pericles in 429 B.C. Prudence is one notable feature of his early terms as general; 
Nicias avoided long and hazardous campaigns. Once Cleon, a pro-war General, died at 
                                                 
101
 Socrates’ qualification is cited at 181b. Laches insists on Socrates’ prowess, indicating that had 
everyone behaved at the Battle of Delium as Socrates had, they would not have suffered the disaster that 
ensued. Indeed, it is worth noting that Socrates had extensive military training and experience. He was 
trained as a hoplite, which means that his family was sufficiently affluent to afford such training. In fact, 
Socrates was involved in at least three battles: Potidaea (432–429 B.C.E.), Delium (424 B.C.E.), and 
Amphipolis (422 B.C.E.).    
102
 As Altman (2010) writes, “… [the] Laches cannot be understood without Thucydides (who narrates the 
end of Nicias) (9).”  
103
 Nails (2002) 180-181. 
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the Battle of Amphipolis, Nicias was able to secure the Peace of Nicias. This agreement 
consisted of a return to the status quo in the pre-war era. Conquered lands were returned. 
The Delphic oracle regained her neutrality.
104
 Peace proved short-lived, however, for 
once Alcibiades became general he sought to re-awaken aggression, culminating in the 
Athenian defeat at the Battle of Mantinea. 
 The Sicilian Expedition is the site of Nicias’ infamy. Having denounced its 
prospects, Nicias was nevertheless made General of the expedition, along with Alcibiades 
and Lamachus. Alcibiades was subsequently charged and ordered to return to Athens; 
Lamachus died in battle. This left Nicias in complete control. Following a series of 
misfortunes and setbacks, it became clear that the Athenian forces had to withdraw from 
the siege (413 B.C.). The Athenians were prepared to depart, but there appeared an 
eclipse of the moon, which was considered a dangerous omen. Most of the Athenian 
force thought it best to delay departure. Nicias, a pious and devout general, consulted the 
seers and was told to delay for thrice nine days. It was in this intervening time that the 
remaining forces were decimated (Nicias included) and enslaved, thereby leading 
Thucydides to conclude that in the realm of divination, Nicias gave too much credit (ēn 
gar ti kai agan theiasmō) (7.50.4).105 
 There are two points to keep in mind. First, despite the credentials of the two 
generals, both of them died leading Athenian forces to gross defeat. Second, with respect 
to Nicias, his esteem for divination colluded with other factors in one of the greatest 
defeats of Athenian forces. Plato enlists the ambiguous relationship between the general 
and the seer as he works toward defining courage in the Laches.  
                                                 
104
 cf. Thucydides 5.118.  
105
 Nails (2002) 212-215.  
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Part II – The Definitions of Courage 
 Although the definitions of Laches are not directly relevant to divination, they do 
contextualize the discussion, so I rehearse them briefly. Laches’ offers three definitions 
of courage. All three have a strong military connotation. They are: 
1. Courage is when “a man is willing to remain at his post and to defend himself 
against the enemy without running away” (ei gar tis etheloi en tē taxei menōn 
amunesthai tous polemious kai mē pheugoi, eu isthi hoti andreios an eiē) (190e5-
6).  
2. Courage is “a sort of endurance of the soul” (karteria tis einai tēs psukhēs) 
(192c1). 
3. Courage is “wise endurance” (hē phronimos ara karteria) (192d9).106 
 
Nicias, by contrast, begins by citing a Socratic tenet – virtue is knowledge. He has heard 
Socrates speak of this thesis on other occasions. Courage is then some kind of wisdom 
He provides two definitions of courage: 
4. Courage is “the knowledge of the fearful and the hopeful in war and in every 
other situation” (tēn tōn deinōn kai tharraleōn epistēmēn kai en polemō kai en tois 
allois hapasin) (195a1-2).  
5. Courage is the knowledge of all goods and evils (199d). 
 
Neither Laches nor Socrates agree with the fourth definition. Laches provides counter-
examples. The doctor knows what to fear in cases of illness, but it is absurd to conclude 
that to be a doctor is to be courageous. The same goes for farmers and all of the other 
craftspeople; according to Laches, they know what to fear relative to their particular 
expertise.
107
 The consequences of Nicias’ definition are outlandish.  
 Nicias parries this charge by claiming that Laches thinks the technē of medicine 
encompasses more than knowledge of health and disease (195c). For Nicias, doctors do 
not know when it is best for a patient to regain his or her health. He secures Laches’ 
                                                 
106
 Note that Socrates makes this claim, but that Laches heartily agrees.  
107
 This is the first instance of what will later be a definitive, though contentious, feature of courage, 
namely its relationship to the future. Schmid (1992) draws out the presumptions inherent to Socratic 
foresight/forethought. 150 cf. Laches 185b; Protagoras 313a-314b, 361b; Gorgias 501b.  
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agreement that sometimes the death of a patient is preferable. In both cases, whether it is 
best for a patient to recover or die, different things are to be feared. According to Nicias, 
the doctor does not know which is best, and so does not know what is to be feared. 
 Is there another technē that specializes in knowing what is to be feared tout court? 
Laches intimates that Nicias “is calling the seers the courageous” (hoti ge tous manteis 
kalei tous andreious) (195e1) since seers know whether it is best for a person to live or 
die. If this is correct, to be courageous is to be a seer. But this is not what Nicias means 
either:  
…the seer needs to know only the signs of what is to be, 
whether a man will experience death or illness or loss of 
property, or will experience victory or defeat, in battle or in 
any other sort of contest (195e5-196a2). 
 
…mantin ge ta sēmeia monon dei gignōskein tōn esomenōn, 
eite tō thanatos eite nosos eite apobolē khrēmatōn estai, eite 
nikē eite hētta ē polemou ē kai allēs tinos agōnias 
  
The seer has predictive knowledge but lacks moral knowledge. Akin to the doctor, the 
seer does not know whether ‘x’ or ‘y’ is best. This implies that courage consists of a 
different sort of knowledge than that of a technē like divination. 108 For Laches, if it is not 
the doctor or the seer who is courageous, it must be ‘some god’ (theon tina) to whom 
Nicias refers.   
 The fundamental problem with the fourth definition is when Socrates re-
introduces the unity of the virtues. Recall that this point was already agreed upon (190c-
d). Socrates first secures the agreement of both interlocutors that fear is properly defined 
                                                 
108
 This idea, for the moment, is left unexplored Madigan (1985) 382 but it is taken up by Socrates in his 
refutation. Roochnik (1996) 101.  
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as the aversion of future evils (198b).
109
 Nicias further subscribes to the thesis that 
courage is defined as the knowledge of fearful and hopeful things. Socrates extrapolates a 
conception of knowledge such that it necessarily encompasses past, present, and future. 
In other words, if something is true in the past, it will necessarily also pertain to the 
present, and onward to the future.  
His evidence is the technē analogy. Medicine, for instance, encompasses 
knowledge of health and disease in all temporal categories. The same procedure is used 
to remedy hemorrhoids. Finally, it is the art of generalship that is best able to foresee the 
future. This is in sharp divergence from what might be ordinarily regarded as the 
expertise of the seer. Indeed, Socrates proceeds to assert that generalship does not 
“consider it necessary to be ruled by the art of the seer, but to rule it [the seer], as being 
better acquainted with both present and future in the affairs of war” (oude tē mantikē 
oietai dein hupēretein alla arkhein, hōs eiduia kallion ta peri ton polemon kai gignomena 
kai genēsomena) (198e4-199a2). In other words, Plato thinks that the general’s expertise 
always trumps that of the seer’s, and not vice-versa. This is precisely what the “law 
decrees” (ho nomos houtō tattei) (199a3).110 
Socrates secures the easy agreement of Laches and the grudging agreement of 
Nicias about the nature of knowledge. This forces a modification of the fourth definition. 
If what is feared is evil, and what is hoped for is good, and knowledge includes past, 
present and future, then courage transforms into the fifth definition, namely knowledge of 
                                                 
109
 Fear, then, is conceptually temporal in the sense that it is tied to the future. Those individuals (seers, 
generals) who are able to predict or judge the future are equipped to know what is to be feared and vice-
versa.  In the Laws, fear is defined as the “anticipation of pain” (elpis, idion de, phobos men hē pro lupēs) 
(644c8) whereas the anticipation of the opposite – pleasure – is called confidence.  
110
 Schmid (1992) writes that the law “had a dignity and solemnity in the ancient city that “science” or 
“wisdom” did not possess” (204).  
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good and evil. Yet it is problematic because now courage is synonymous with virtue 
(199e). In this sense, Nicias has not actually provided a definition of courage simpliciter.  
Part III – Generalship and Divination 
All three people agree that the technē of the general ranks higher than that of the 
seer. This is what I characterize as the hierarchy thesis. The general’s technē is ranked 
higher because it is more comprehensive. It includes the ability to fight in armor as well 
as the art of tactics.
111
 The notion of a hierarchy of technai emerges many times in Plato’s 
dialogues. Recall, for instance, the opening stages of the Laches when Nicias rehearses 
the evolution from fighting with armor to the entire art of the general (182c). It is 
worthwhile to investigate the hierarchy thesis in more general times. One recurrent 
instance is when Socrates considers the possibility of a master technē, which will rule or 
order all of the subordinate technai.
112
   
In the Charmides, for instance, one proposal for temperance (sōphrosunē) is that 
it should be defined in terms of science (technē).113 The conclusion is aporetic because 
sōphrosunē ends up defined as the knowledge of good and evil tout court. The whole of 
virtue has been defined rather than sōphrosunē. But for a good part of the dialogue, 
sōphrosunē is conceptualized as the science of science. If such a conception is correct, 
then all of the other sciences will be subordinate to the temperate individual. He or she 
                                                 
111
 Another reason why a technē might be ranked higher is that its subject matter is particularly valuable. 
The health of the soul, which is the subject matter of arête, is more valuable than the health of the body, 
which is the subject matter of medicine. I will focus on the puzzle of the exact subject matter particular to 
divination in the next section.      
112
 This notion also arises in Book I of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. 
113
 In my dissertation introduction, I surveyed the fictive chronology methodology, which separates the 
Laches from the Charmides. According to Altman (2010), the “Charmides must not be read in isolation 
from Laches on the basis of fictive chronology” (1). He goes on to claim that he will use “the reading order 
hypothesis to show that Laches actually precedes Charmides on pedagogical grounds despite fictive 
chronology” (1). 
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will glean comprehensive benefits, such as living life free from error, improving the lives 
of those whom one rules (family and state), and being happy (eudaimonas) (171e-172a).     
Science arises after Charmides has defined sōphrosunē as “the doing of good 
things” (tēn gar tōn agathōn praxin sōphrosunēn einai saphōs soi diorizomai) (163e9); 
the problem is that this admits of scenarios wherein someone performs good actions 
ignorantly. Critias revises his definition and ties sōphrosunē inextricably to knowledge. 
This triggers Socrates to comment that insofar as temperance is knowledge, it must be 
some sort of science, and therefore a science of something (165c5-6). What is the object 
of this science? It is science itself, thereby giving us the definition that sōphrosunē is the 
“only science that is both a science of itself and of the other sciences” (hoti monē tōn 
allōn epistēmōn autē te hautēs estin kai tōn allōn epistēmōn epistēmē) (166e5-6).  The 
discussion proceeds in two ways. First, Socrates and Critias investigate whether such a 
science is possible (167b10-169d2), and second, they investigate whether such a science 
is desirable (169d2-175a8).
114
 That Socrates and Critias never identify the appropriate 
scope of this conception is one of the decisive reasons why modeling virtue on technē 
ends up being unsustainable. 
Is a science of science possible? Socrates deploys a series of analogies in order to 
show the dubious nature of Critias’ definition. Does seeing apply to itself (167d)? In 
order for that to be the case, vision itself would have to have some color, since seeing 
only sees color.
115
 Socrates’ point is that it is difficult, almost impossible, to see how such 
                                                 
114
 It has been argued that Socrates’ rehabilitation of the science of the science at 172b is evidence that 
there are actually two conceptions of the science of science at play in the exchange from 169d to 171c – 
One Critean and one Socratic. Whereas the Critian version is unsustainably robust, Socrates’ proposal is 
refined and attentive to human finitude. The presence of two accounts does not affect my own conclusion, 
which is that sōphrosunē , defined as the science of science, will have comprehensive benefits. Schmid 
(1998) 105-123 
115
 Similar arguments are deploys for other powers – desire, love, fear, and opinion. 
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things apply to themselves. He remains characteristically agnostic, however, and this 
allows him to provisionally grant the possibility that such a science exists. But the 
question remains as to whether a science of science is beneficial or not. 
Socrates claims, and Critias assents, that the science of science amounts to 
nothing more than the ability to distinguish between what is genuinely a science and what 
is not (170a). In this way, sōphrosunē is analogous to both medicine and politics in that 
both latter sciences are able to distinguish between their subject matter (i.e., health and 
justice) and its absence. The problem arises when one considers that the temperate 
individual knows that he has a science but is incapable of specifying the nature of the 
particular science.  
In other words, the temperate person knows they have a science but does not 
know whether it is the science of medicine, or shipbuilding, or whatever else. This is 
because the substantive knowledge of shipbuilding is only available to the person with 
the concrete (but subordinate) science of shipbuilding. Via sōphrosunē exclusively, 
Socrates concludes that an individual will not be able to distinguish the knowledge of 
health from the knowledge of shipbuilding. Thus, paradoxically, this person “won’t know 
what he knows, but only that he knows” (ouk ara eisetai ho oiden ho touto  agnoōn, all' 
hoti oiden monon.) (170c9-10). Two consequences emerge: first, the temperate person is 
unable to evaluate someone’s claim to substantive knowledge; and second, he or she is 
unable to distinguish the genuine knower (i.e., a doctor) from the impersonator (170e).
116
 
The definition is unsatisfactory.  
                                                 
116
 The inverse is true as well. The doctor will only know health and disease, but will not know anything 
about science qua science. This has been exclusively allocated to the temperate person. Schmid notes 
Socrates’ “absolute separation between knowledge of a subject matter and knowledge of what constitutes 
knowledge in relation to a subject matter” (Schmid 110). 
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Socrates and Critias make a second attempt at outlining the benefits of 
sōphrosunē defined as the science of science (171d2-175a8).117 This attempt makes a 
weaker claim as to the science of science’s benefits. It has two parts. In the first part, 
instead of living life free of error, Socrates asserts that sōphrosunē might enable someone 
to learn quicker and to better evaluate his other subordinate sciences (172b).
118
 The 
question becomes whether scientific living enables a person to be happy. It is not 
obvious, for as Socrates demonstrates, it is not by any run of the mill science that enables 
one to be happy. In fact, as Socrates has pointed out many times, the vast majority of 
sciences are non-ethical in nature. It is the ethical technē, namely the science of good and 
evil, which gives happiness (174c). Properly speaking, this is virtue, not sōphrosunē.119 
                                                 
117
 For Schmid, this is the Socratic conception of sōphrosunē . 
118
 One of the central clues that there are two positions at play is the admission that the science of science 
can have minor benefits after all (172b). Whereas Critian sōphrosunē allows us to live lives “free from 
error” (anamartētoi) (171d7), Socratic sōphrosunē only permits us to learn more easily and to discern 
things more effectively, both in ourselves and in others. These latter benefits, however marginal, depend 
upon the ability to have sōphrosunē  in addition to other sciences, thereby alluding to the second Socratic 
argument. According to Schmid, the first argument, particularly its distinction between that one knows and 
what one knows, cannot explain how knowing that one knows will have any marginal effect like learning 
more easily (172b). Thus, the notion of nominal benefits “makes no sense” (Schmid 119) if we collapse the 
two supposed positions into the Critian option. As well, Politis (2008) distinguishes the two arguments 
according to the use of the word “only”. He convincingly argues that whether as Critias defines sōphrosunē  
as “only” the science of science and lack of science, Socrates is not so exclusive. This means that there is 
conceptual space such that sōphrosunē could encompass concrete sciences like medicine, that is, it could 
evaluate them better and learn them more easily. 20-23   
119
 Another example of a search for the master technē is the Euthydemus. Dionysodorus claims that his 
technē enables him to know everything (294b). More dramatically, he claims that if anyone knows 
anything, they must necessarily know everything. This dialogical engagement is meant to demonstrate the 
sheer force of the sophistic ability to argue, whether or not the content specific to a body of knowledge 
(e.g., medicine) is actually known or not. Also see Protagoras 312e and the subsequent discussion of 
Protagoras’ political technē, which enables people to become excellent citizens. The problem, now familiar 
to us, is that the subject matter of such a technē is unclear. The Protagoras, characteristic of the early 
dialogues and their concern with the technē analogy, exhibits a slide from political technē to justice/shame 
to political arête (322e2-3) to simply arête (323a3). If justice and shame as arête are the outcome of a 
technē, then their objectivity in the robust sense depends upon how one conceives of technē. Roochnik 
(1996) interprets this slide as Protagoras’ attempt to both justify his role as teacher by indirectly claiming a 
technē and yet simultaneously resisting the Socratic version of technē which consists of determinate 
knowledge. After all, it is important to recall that Protagoras earlier denies possessing mathematical technai 
like arithmetic, astronomy, geometry, music, and poetry (318e3-4); these are the prototypical examples of 
determinate knowledge. The search for a master technē is a common theme throughout the Platonic 
dialogues; it presupposes a hierarchy. One wonders, then, whether or not Plato’s view of divination and 
generalship embodies Greek mores.  
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The search for a master technē in the Charmides fails, but what importantly emerges 
from the discussion is that Plato classifies technai according to a hierarchy. 
As previously discussed, generalship is more comprehensive than divination, and 
therefore rules it. Does this agree with historical reality? What one sees, in fact, is that the 
general and seer often formed a symbiotic partnership.
120
 In part, this means that the seer 
had influence in the decision-making process.
121
 It also means that the seer could offer a 
prophecy altogether antithetical to the desires of the general. Granted, there was a large 
degree of leeway in mantic interpretation – this is banal in the sense that many other 
technai, such as medicine, consisted of a broad interpretive spectrum. But there were also 
some phenomena that generated a specific interpretation. For instance, if birds were seen 
fighting, there was no other available interpretation than immanent catastrophe.
122
  
Indeed, the seer did not guarantee victory or defeat. Instead, they were confined to 
merely reporting on whether the signs were favorable or not. There was always the 
possibility that the general might make a tactical blunder. This is one way that divination 
negotiated a failed prophecy.  In this way, the final decision was left up to the general, 
but it is important to realize that this was only a conceptual possibility. Given the morale-
boosting effect of the seer, along with the ubiquitous conviction that divination was 
authentic, it would be startling for a general to explicitly disregard the prophecy of the 
seer. Nevertheless, we do have concrete examples of the seer’s recommendation being 
flouted. What results is often disastrous. Granted, this makes dramatic sense in some 
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 Parker (2004) 144; Flower (2008) 153. 
121
 There are several examples of seers acting as the primary initiators of action. Thucydides relates that the 
seer Theaenetus and the general Eupompidas organized an escape during the siege of Plataea by the 
Peloponnesians and Boeotians in 428 B.C. (History of the Peloponnesian War 3.20). Generals often 
retained the services of a seer during times of war. These seers performed campground sacrifices (hiera) 
and battle-line sacrifices (sphagia) in order to determine the favorableness of, for instance, waging battle on 
a particular day.  
122
 cf. Odyssey 2.146-76; Aeshylus’ PV 488-92; Sophocles’ Antigone 998-1004.  
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genres like tragedy, but it also exists in history.
123
 There are several instances of a seer 
instigating action.
124
 More relevant to my purposes, there are myriad cases of a general, 
despite his wishes, acquiescing to the prophecy of the seer.
125
 What I conclude from this 
evidence is that the relationship between the general and his seer was not as highly 
systematized as Plato makes it sound in the Laches.  
There can be little doubt that Socrates’ claim in the Laches is an allusion to Nicias 
at Syracuse. As discussed in Part I of this chapter, Nicias’ campaign at Syracuse went 
horribly wrong. Yet there was still time to evacuate the Athenian forces. Conventionally, 
it was Nicias’ ‘over-estimation’ of divination that led to his downfall; in the 27 days that 
Nicias delayed the evacuation, the Athenian forces were decimated.  
According to the line of argument in the Laches, Plato condemns such action on 
the grounds that the general should have priority over the seer. This means that in cases 
of disagreement, the general ought to disregard the advice of the seer and act on his own 
best judgment.
126
 After all, he is the one with the expertise in military matters. Of course, 
                                                 
123
 In Xenophon’s Hellenica, for instance, there are two cases where Spartan leaders ignore unfavorable 
sacrifices and end up defeated (3.1.17-19; 4.8.35-39). In the former case, it is not the commander who 
ignores the sacrifice, but a derisive subordinate officer who cannot accept the delay.  This goes toward 
underscoring the widely held conviction that to defy the advice of a seer was tantamount to securing defeat. 
124
 cf. Herodotus 6.83 and 8.27; Thucydides 3.20.1. In terms of open and hostile disagreement, the ones that 
do exist come from tragedy and epic, which are literary forms that depend upon conflict and confrontation. 
For instance, in the Iliad, Calchas is undercut by Agamemnon when the king does not like his council (1.1-
120). Also, Sophocles’ OT 316-462 and Antigone 988-1090; Euripides’ Bacchae 215-369.   
125
 Xenophon, for instance, relates how the Ten Thousand, barren of adequate provisions, were nevertheless 
forced to stay at Calpe for three days because of unfavorable omens (Anabasis 6.4.13-27). As well, at 
Anabasis 5.51-4, in lieu of plundering, the generals accept gifts from the Tibarenians because the seers 
have divined that the gods did not consent to war.  
126
 For Schmid (2002 156-7), the general trumps the seer on the grounds that the former is responsible for 
the future in a way that the seer is not. This comes across when Socrates’ insists that knowledge 
encompasses everything that is past, present and “how what has not yet happened might best come to be in 
the future” (allē de hopē an kallista genoito kai genēsetai to mēpō gegonos, all' hē autē) (198d4-5, italics 
added). In other words, the recognition that the future is open to the will of people. That Nicias believed he 
could access the future reveals his fallacious conviction that a technē (here divination) can make the future 
wholly predictable. According to Schmid, it is this conviction that is refuted at Syracuse. As should be 
clear, however, my position rejects the thesis that the seer divines blindly, that is, without a notion of what 
is hoped for.  
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this ignores the fact that like a general, the seer divines within a context. In other words, 
the seer always divines according to the needs of the situation. The seers at Syracuse 
would have been aware whether or not Nicias was ambivalent about the prospects of 
evacuation. Thucydides relates that Nicias was reluctant to depart Syracuse because he 
might face prosecution if he were to return to Athens without having succeeded militarily 
(7.48). That Nicias had reservations about abandoning the campaign would undoubtedly 
influence the seers in their particular interpretation of the eclipse.
127
 Given that the 
relationship between seers and generals is multi-faceted, along with the recognition that 
seers sometimes spearheaded action, it is clear that Plato’s ascription of a strict hierarchy 
is normative rather than descriptive. 
Part IV – The Subject Matter of a Technē 
Insofar as generalship consists of military strategy and decision-making, the 
question arises as to the subject matter appropriate to the seer. Medicine is concerned 
with the health of the human body; architecture with construction and maintenance of 
buildings, but it is not at all clear when it comes to divination. Plato thinks each genuine 
technē has a determinate subject matter. I call this the subject matter thesis.   
The issue of a subject matter arises in the discussion of the hierarchy thesis 
discussed in the previous section. One of the major problems of defining the master 
technē is the inability to specify its subject matter. The problem also emerges in 
dialogues that evaluate whether a particular technē is genuine or not. For instance, the 
Gorgias evaluates the epistemic status of rhetoric. From the very beginning of the 
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 This goes to explain the purported “tension” (Schmidt 135) Nicias exhibits. On the one hand, he 
embodies progressive Athenian mores, insisting on the value of technē as well as the love of honor (181-
182d). On the other, his submission to divination is conservative and pious. Yet as I have attempted to draw 
out, to think that divination was conservative in Classical Greece fails to appreciate the highly integrated 
role it enjoyed.   
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discussion, Socrates questions Gorgias about the subject matter of rhetoric (449c-453a). 
Gorgias’ first attempt, namely that the distinct feature of rhetoric is its concern with 
speeches, is unsustainable. It is not distinct enough; all other technai enable speeches on 
their specific topics. So the question becomes – what sort of speeches does rhetoric 
enable you to perform well (451d)? Finally, Gorgias provides Socrates with an adequate 
definition (for the time being). Rhetoric “is a producer of persuasion” (peithous 
dēmiourgos estin) (453a3).  
Yet as the discussion develops, this definition proves unsatisfactory, partly 
because it does not specify a distinct conceptual space. Rather, as Gorgias characterizes 
it, rhetoric “encompasses and subordinates to itself just about everything that can be 
accomplished” (hoti hōs epos eipein hapasas tas dunameis sullabousa huph' hautē ekhei) 
(456b1-2). Accordingly, Socrates finally concludes that rhetoric amounts to more of a 
knack than a technē. This is so because “it has no account of the nature of whatever 
things it applies by which it applies them, so that it’s unable to state the cause of each 
thing” (hoti ouk ekhei logon oudena hō prospherei ha prospherei hopoi' atta tēn phusin 
estin, hōste tēn aitian hekastou mē ekhein eipein) (465a4-5). This is the logical 
conclusion of the inability to define the conceptual parameters of rhetoric. A genuine 
technē ought to be able to give such an account.128 
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 cf. Laches 190a; Ion 538b. Interestingly, even the four knacks that Socrates specifies – pastry making, 
rhetoric, cosmetics, sophistry (Gorgias 263b) – are distinct according to their being aimed at four different 
objects (263c). A very similar argument develops in the Ion concerning rhapsody. Ion is unable to identify 
the nature of his expertise at least to the standards Socrates has him acquiesce to. Ion knows how to 
perform Homer, but no one else. For Socrates, a genuine technē must encompass all the relevant content. 
For rhapsody, this would include both Homer and Hesiod. In the end, similar to rhetoric in the Gorgias, 
rhapsody is characterized not as knowledge but as the result of something else. In the case of the Ion, it is 
inspiration. I turn to the Ion in the next chapter in order to tease out the remaining features of divination 
understood as a technē or as the result of inspiration.  
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It is useful to note that a determinate subject matter is not the same thing as saying 
that each technē has a unique subject matter. Although this might seem intuitively 
plausible, textual evidence reveals this to be an exaggeration. Both calculation and 
numeration produce speeches on the same object, namely the odd and even (Gorgias 
451b-c). Thus, it is clear that two distinct technē can share the same object. Where they 
differ, that is, why they are not one technē, is due to the differences in their relationship 
to the object in question.
129
 In the case of calculation and numeration, for instance, the 
latter concerns itself with the magnitude of a single quantity (Gorgias 451c). So, each 
technē has a subject matter, usually but not always unique, but the way in which it relates 
to its subject matter is sufficiently unique so as to grant its status as an independent 
technē.130 
The puzzle of divination’s subject matter centers on the repudiation of Nicias’ 
fourth definition, namely that courage is the knowledge of the fearful and hopeful. 
Socrates re-characterizes this definition to mean ‘future evils and goods’.131 With this 
emphasis on future, there is an ineliminable temporality. The expertise constitutive of a 
                                                 
129
 A point well made by Wolfsdorf (2008) 94-95, and later, “…we may suppose that some technai may 
share relata [Wolfsdorf’s word for subject matter], but nonetheless be distinguishable by the nature of the 
relation to the relata” (104-105). 
130
 Recall that the subject matter of medicine is the health of the human body. However, Socrates states that 
although care of the body is a single craft, it nevertheless has two parts – gymnastics and medicine 
(Gorgias 464b). The standard idea is that both constitute individual technai, but Socrates seems to be 
claiming that they are united by the fact that they share the same subject matter. 
131
 Yonezawa (2012) states that “In order to drive Nicias into aporia, Socrates needs to replace ‘the fearful’ 
and ‘the hopeful’ in Nicias’s definition with ‘future evils’ and ‘future nonevils or future goods’” (649) and 
offers a good reconstruction of the argument. In so doing, he contrasts himself with Vlastos (1994) 120 
who claims that the transition from ‘expected evils/goods’ to ‘future evils/goods’ is a truism. Yonezawa 
urges that one needs to “distinguish between future evils themselves and those which produce the 
expectation of a future evil; the former are those evils which definitely exist in the future while the latter 
are those which cause the expectation that an evil will likely happen” (649). Likewise, Schmid (1992) 
claims that “fear would appear to be a kind of knowledge, namely the knowledge of the terrible” (154). 
Yonezawa replies that “fear is said to be ‘the expectation’ (prosdokian, 198b9) of a future evil and 
prosdokia belongs to dokos or doxa, not ‘knowledge’” (649). 
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technē cannot consistently hold a distinction between past, present, and future. As 
Socrates states: 
It seems to me and my friend here that of the various things with which 
knowledge is concerned, there is not one kind of knowledge by which we 
know how things have happened in the past, and another by which we 
know how they are happening at the present time, and still another by 
which we know how what has not yet happened might best come to be in 
the future, but that the knowledge is the same in each case (198d1-d7). 
 
dokei gar dē emoi te kai tōde, peri hosōn estin epistēmē, ouk allē men 
einai peri gegonotos eidenai hopē gegonen, allē de peri gignomenōn hopē 
gignetai, allē de hopē an kallista genoito kai genēsetai to mēpō gegonos, 
all' hē autē. 
 
To be concrete, if a doctor knows health for a human being, he does not know it relative 
to a particular time period. The technique to dress a laceration, for instance, remains the 
same in all contexts. Incidentally, it is in this argumentative section that Socrates deploys 
the seer-general relationship, insisting, as we have seen, on the priority of the general 
over the seer. The argument is of decisive importance in the argumentative development 
of the dialogue because Socrates uses it to transition from ‘future evil and goods’ to ‘all 
evils and goods’. The latter conception is not courage, but virtue tout court.132  
But unlike the doctor or the general, the seer’s expertise seems to crucially depend 
upon on a temporal distinction between past, present, and future.
133
 If technical 
knowledge transcends time, this bankrupts the seer of a distinct subject matter. This is so 
                                                 
132 Note that many find this argument unpersuasive. Bonitz (1871) 435-36; Guthrie (1998) 132-33; Kahn 
(1996) 167-68.  
133
 Accordingly, it is puzzling that Yonezawa (2012) can claim that he is “not prepared to put forth an 
alternative case in which different sorts of knowledge treat the past, present and future of the same 
objective and since the basis of a moral proposition is the same regardless of time, this argument seems to 
be acceptable” (650). He seems to totally disregard the problem this creates for divination.  
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because it is constitutive of divination that the seer has special access to the future.
134
 
What is the subject matter of divination? There are at least four possibilities: 
1. The subject matter of divination is the future. 
2. Divination is a subordinate technē and so does not have a subject matter. 
3. Divination is not a technē at all.  
4. The subject matter of divination is the will of the gods. 
 
The first option is the most intuitive but is untenable given the puzzle developed in the 
Laches about the nature of knowledge. This is so despite the fact that it captures the 
generic intuition that the seer has access to what will be. Indeed, Plato often deploys 
divination in this sense. For instance, in the Charmides, as Critias outlines the temperate 
person, Socrates asks whether this is the seer, because he knows what will be in the future 
(174a). This demonstrates that divination is tied closely to the future.
135
  
The second possibility is that divination be defined as a subordinate technē. In 
other words, it does not have a distinct subject matter.
136
 This is unconvincing. Socrates’ 
search for the master technē, which encompasses both means and ends, does not entail 
that subordinate technai like medicine and farming lack a distinct subject matter. 
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 Flower (2008) states: “The distinction thus made between ‘present’ and ‘future’ is somewhat slippery… 
(78). 
135
 Another example of the link between divination and the future occurs in the Theaetetus. Socrates claims 
that Protagoras charged so much money because he was able to persuade students that he was better at 
predicting the future than seers (179a2-4). 
136
 Sprague (1992) distinguishes between first and second order technai. Whereas the former emerges 
during the articulation and evaluation of the third definition in the Laches, the latter emerges whilst 
discussing the final definition and constitutes a richer, more synoptic, version of a technē. Specifically, it is 
constitutive of both means and ends, that is, it encompasses knowledge of what is to be feared. 38, 42, 77-
79. Madigan (1985) 385 asserts that insofar as it encompasses knowledge of appropriate ends, the second 
order technē should not be considered a technē at all. Madigan, for his own part, thinks that the Laches 
does imply that courage is knowledge of means and ends, but that this should not be characterized as a 
technē (since technē only encompass means). 
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Moreover, subordinate technai presuppose a superior one, but Socrates has repeatedly 
failed to specify this latter technē.137   
Another related possibility is that seer has no distinct subject matter whatsoever, 
and this implies that divination is not a genuine technē. However, this too is 
unsustainable. In the Ion, Socrates clearly thinks that divination has a distinct matter and 
so constitutes a legitimate technē. He deploys it several times in his dialogical 
engagement with Ion.
138
 Moreover, in the latter example, both possession divination and 
technical divination appear. Thus, the entirety of divination constitutes a technē and it is 
canonical enough that it can be deployed in support of the thesis that rhapsody does not 
constitute a technē.139  
The final possibility, which defines divination’s subject matter as the will of the 
Gods, is more attractive. It has the advantage of avoiding the problem of temporal 
knowledge. This is so because the gods, from time immemorial, have access to all that is 
past, present, and future. In the Theogony, Hesiod is urged to “celebrate things of the 
future and things that were aforetime” (hina kleioimi ta t' essomena pro t' eonta) (4). 
Shortly thereafter, Hesiod relates how the Muses communicate “what is and what shall be 
and what was aforetime, voices in unison” (eireusai ta t' eonta ta t' essomena pro t' 
eonta, phōnē homēreusai) (4). A similar fragment exists in the Iliad. In book I, line 70, 
Homer writes that Calchas knows “what is, and what will be, and what was before” (hos 
ēdē ta t' eonta ta t' essomena pro t' eonta).140 Although the vast majority of evidence 
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 This was the outcome of our rehearsal of the master technē in my previous discussion on the hierarchy 
of technai where the proposal that sōphrosunē  is the science of science, in the Charmides, proves to be 
wrong.  
138
 cf. 531b; 538e-539d. 
139
 Granted, contrary evidence also exists in the Ion (534d), with which I engage in the next chapter. 
140
 That the claim is made both by a poet (Hesiod) and by a seer (Kalchas) suggests that, if taken at face 
value, inspiration qua inspiration functions identically for both professions. Naddaf (2009), for instance, 
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demonstrates that on the level of performativity, the seer has exclusive access to the 
future, there are some examples that flout this thesis.
141
 Consider Socrates’ discovery that 
he is the wisest man in Greece (Apology 21a). This has nothing to do with the future. It 
has to do with what is unknown. Oftentimes, what is unknown is simply the future, but 
sometimes it can manifest in the past or present, as that piece of knowledge that people 
currently simply do not know.
142
  
One problem with the idea that the subject matter of divination is the will of the 
gods is that it may not be distinct enough. In military contexts like the case of Nicias at 
Syracuse, the seer’s subject matter impinges on that of the general. But the relationship 
between generalship and divination might be akin to that of gymnastics and medicine, 
namely as two technai with the same subject matter. Unlike gymnastics and medicine, 
however, which demonstrate clear continuity according to their shared concern for the 
body, the general is not directly or exclusively concerned with the gods per se. 
Generalship encompasses a wide range of expertise, such as subordinate technai like 
                                                                                                                                                 
writes that “when Homer and Hesiod are exercising their poetic function, they are both poet and mantis or 
seer, and as such, like Zeus, they have access to knowledge of all things past, present, and future” (2). 
Naddaf utilizes this textual evidence at several further points in his argument (i.e., 10, 15). Nagy (1989), as 
well, claims that the poet and the prophet were “preceded by an earlier stage when poet and prophet were 
as yet undifferentiated” (23). Nagy cites Hesiod an example of someone who “presents himself as mantis 
and kerux as well as aoidos” (23). His evidence is twofold: first that the Muses inspire Hesiod about the 
past, present and future; and second, the Muses give Hesiod a scepter, which symbolizes the possession of 
context-transcending truth. 
141
 By the same token it is naïve to think that the poets only have access to the past. Granted, consider the 
Homeric and Hesiodic claims that the inspired poet has access to Zeus, and therefore to all that is past, 
present, and future. Havelock, for one, seems to interpret said passages in this way. His focus is primarily 
on the moral instruction provided by the poet. In the same way that our ancestors were checked by certain 
nomoi and ethe, so to should contemporary and future society. In other words, the poet is pedagogical and 
justifies him or herself by appeal to the past. In reference to the passages under consideration, Havelock 
proceeds to state, “the future is added as a further extension of the present, not to prophesy change but to 
affirm continuity” (105).  In other words, the future is added in order to ground the constancy of divine 
power. Of course, such divine power can have myriad applications. One can never know the whims of the 
gods with complete certitude. Moreover, there is evidence that the Greeks believed deities, even Zeus, were 
constrained by forces like necessity. 
142
 This ought to be distinguished from knowing how to interpret an oracle or divinatory event. Such know-
how is a feature of the past, based on cumulative experiences.  
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armed combat (Laches 182b-c). One feature of this expertise is strategic planning, which 
has to do with decision making and predicting future scenarios. Such planning no doubt 
includes considerations of the past and present states of affairs as when Socrates states 
that the general’s technē is “that which best foresees the future and the other times” 
(promētheitai ta te alla kai peri to mellon esesthai) (198e4).  
Part V – Descriptive versus Normative 
As should be clear, the seer’s expertise dovetails the gods. If the gods have access 
to all that is past, present, and future, then the seer has the same access. In the previous 
section, I argued that the best candidate for the subject matter of divination is the will of 
the gods. Despite this access, Nicias’ claim that although the seer will know the signs of 
the future, he will not be able to determine whether his divination is positive or negative 
(Laches 195e-196a). In other words, the seer, and presumably the gods, only have access 
to what is descriptively, as opposed to normatively, true.
143
 The seer does not know 
whether it is good to die, for instance, but only that death is foretold.
144
 We cannot simply 
reject this point on the grounds that it is Nicias who articulates them.  
In fact, what triggers Nicias to make such an assertion is Laches’ claim that 
Nicias thinks that the seers are the courageous because “who else will know for whom it 
is better to live than to die?” (hoti ge tous manteis kalei tous andreious: tis gar dē allos 
eisetai hotō ameinon zēn ē tethnanai;) (195e1-2). But neither Laches nor Socrates 
challenge Nicias’ characterization of the seer. Laches pleads ignorance and the discussion 
                                                 
143
 One problem with this is at the conclusion of the Apology where Socrates states, concerning his 
upcoming death and the assembly’s continued existence, only the gods know which is better (42a3-5). In 
fact, this is underscored throughout the Apology. Whereas the gods know what is good and evil, humankind 
does not.   
144
 This is true of all technai save the master technē (which is never satisfactorily outlined). So, similarly, 
the doctor will not know whether or not he ought to save a person’s life. For instance, it may be better to let 
a sick tyrant die than to offer one’s services. I draw this excellent example from Wolfsdorf (2008) 107. 
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proceeds in a different direction. That Laches specifically makes such a claim is 
significant because one is immediately reminded of his valorized conception of 
divination.  
Indeed, independent of Laches, the evidence from other sources demonstrates that 
Nicias’ distinction was simply not made in the case of divination. Rather, evaluative 
considerations pervaded the principal formulation of mantic queries. In a military 
context, for instance, seers divined whether the gods looked favorably on a particular 
battle at a particular time in a particular location. There was also even a sense that the 
gods could be persuaded. 
The notion that the gods could be persuaded arises repeatedly in Plato’s 
dialogues, and not at all in a positive light. Since seers enjoyed such influence, lavish 
gifts were often bestowed upon them by political and military leaders. The expectation 
was that gift-giving won divine favor. Both Herodotus and Xenophon offer plenty of 
examples.
145
 Rather than acquiescing to this action, Plato condemns it as a form of 
bribery.   
In the Republic, for instance, Socrates heartily rejects the notion that people have 
the ability to bribe the gods to “harm just and unjust alike” (dikaion adikō blapsei) 
(364c4). This is echoed again in Book X of the Laws where the Athenian states that seers, 
together with priests and poets, often claim that the gods can be “seduced by gifts into 
turning a blind eye to injustice” (kai hoti beltious ē para to dikaion hupo tinōn dōrōn 
paratrepesthai kēloumenoi) (885d3-4). That the gods could be bribed is absurd to the 
Athenian; he later recommends imprisonment for seers who mislead people into thinking 
they can influence the gods through the “alleged magic powers of sacrifices and prayers 
                                                 
145
 cf. Histories I. 14; 25; 50-51; Anabasis III. 1; V. 3 
65 
 
 
 
and charms” (hōs thusiais te kai eukhais kai epōdais goēteuontes) (909b3). The textual 
evidence, however, is full of individuals conferring gifts in an attempt to win divine 
favor.  
 If we move beyond the political critique of divination, there is still something to 
be said about the ethico-ontological implications of Plato’s claim. In the previous chapter, 
I rehearsed the Euthyphro dilemma (Euthyphro 10a). It demonstrates quite clearly Plato’s 
rationale for separating off seers from evaluative discourse. Initially, Euthyphro’s 
justification for piety (and morality more generally) is simply whatever the gods’ love. In 
other words, morality is empty until given content by a supreme being. Once Socrates has 
Euthyphro accept the distinction between piety proper and what the gods’ love, one 
consequence is that divination is separate from considerations of value (in this case, 
ethical value).
146
  
Conclusion 
What I attempted to accomplish in this chapter is to flesh out the complex 
relationship between divination and technē, paying particular attention to the Laches and 
Charmides, together with considerations of technē drawn from the Gorgias. I argued that 
the relationship between the general and the seer was never as highly systematized as 
Plato supposes. Second, I extrapolated Plato’s conviction that each technē has a subject 
matter, and the consequences for divination. The textual evidence suggests that the seer’s 
subject matter is best conceptualized as access to the gods. Nevertheless, Plato is at pains 
to bracket normative considerations from divination. One consequence is the radical 
curtailment of mantic authority.  
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 This is part of Plato’s overall project, best expressed at Republic 382e, which re-conceptualizes the gods 
such that they become 1) intrinsically moral and 2) changeless.  
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Chapter 3 – Between Inspiration and Technē : Divination in Plato’s Ion 
Abstract 
In Plato’s Ion, inspiration functions in contradistinction to technē. Yet, paradoxically, in 
both cases, there is an appeal to divination. I interrogate this bipartite account in order to 
show how these two disparate accounts are accommodated in the text. Specifically, I 
argue that Socrates’ appeal to Theoclymenus at Ion 539a-b demonstrates that Plato 
recognizes the existence of superlative seers who defy his own distinction between 
possession and technical divination.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Plato’s Ion, inspiration functions in contradistinction to technē.147 Since Ion’s 
expertise does not stand up to Socrates’ critique, his Homeric performances cannot stem 
from knowledge, but from elsewhere, from divine inspiration. The two are presented as a 
strict disjunction. Yet, there is a puzzle here because as each gets explained, there is an 
appeal to divination. If rhapsody, and poetry by extension, cannot synthesize the two, 
why does Socrates seem to think that divination can?
148
  
This puzzle has given reason for some to conclude that Plato is being ironic.
149
 
Such an interpretive move can go in multiple directions. For instance, perhaps divination 
is not the result of genuine inspiration, but rather a self-interested ruse.  On the other 
hand, it is also possible that Plato rejects the notion that divination, specifically 
possession divination, constitutes a technē.150 This is so due to the epistemological 
                                                 
147
 Harris (2004) 189-198 argues that Socrates distorts the relationship between technē and inspiration for 
the express purpose of subverting poetry’s prestige.  
148
 Bloom (1970) states, “By reflecting on divining we can penetrate what Socrates wishes to teach us about 
rhapsody and poetry” (57).  
149
 Tigerstedt (1969) 26-29; Bloom (1970) 55-56; Murray (1996) 10-12; Liebert (2008) 202-25. 
150
 At Phaedrus 244a8-d5, Socrates distinguishes between possession divination, which occurs when a seer 
serves as a medium for a god, and technical divination where a seer interprets divine will through some 
material (e.g., the entrails of a sacrificed animal) or event (e.g., a bolt of lightning). This distinction is 
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features of divine possession. A person cannot be said to have technical knowledge while 
they serve as a medium for a god. More generally, Plato’s discussion of poetic inspiration 
is still seen as a contentious issue. Certainly, it is a change from previous conceptions of 
poetic composition/performance.
151
  
My aim is to interrogate this bipartite account in order to show how they can be 
accommodated in the case of divination. In so doing, I reject the thesis that Socrates is 
ironic when he characterizes divination as the result of inspiration, and later, possession 
divination as constitutive of a technē. In fact, this latter puzzle – synthesizing possession 
with technē – has already been scrutinized.152 What I hope to contribute is that Socrates’ 
appeal to Theoclymenus at 539a-demonstrates that Plato recognizes the existence of 
superlative seers who defy Plato’s own distinction between possession and technical 
divination. 
Divination makes three appearances in the Ion. I first rehearse the textual 
evidence that initially characterizes divination as a technē. Next I examine the thesis that 
divination is the result of inspiration. In the final section, I examine the case of 
Theoclymenus, which emerges in Socrates’ re-examination of technē. Although at first 
glance, Theoclymenus seems to embody Plato’s distinction between possession and 
technical divination, a careful reading of the Odyssey shows that he is far more 
sophisticated a seer than an individual like the Pythia who undergoes possession.  
Part I: Divination is a technē  (531b) 
                                                                                                                                                 
normally considered paradigmatic of Plato’s concept of divination, but my present argument attempts to 
draw out its limitations.   
151
 Tigersbedt (1970) 163-178. 
152
 Brickhouse and Smith (1993) 37-51 argue that the technē of the possessed seer consists of knowing how 
to enter into the inspirational state. Once in this state, however, the god who possesses the seer takes over 
and the seer can no longer be thought of as in control of his or her thoughts, utterances, and actions.  
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The most explicit characterizations of divination in the Ion depict it as a genuine 
technē. As with the other early dialogues, Socrates’ interlocutor is presented as an 
authority in his field. Ion has just won first place at a contest during the festival of 
Asclepius.
153
 His specialty is Homer; this triggers Socrates to ask whether he is qualified 
to perform the works of any other poet (531a). Given that Homer and Hesiod often 
engage with the same subjects, Socrates reasons that he who can recite the former can 
also recite the latter. Ion accepts the notion that poets often deal with the same subject. 
Nevertheless, he insists that his specialty is confined to Homer, although this is not made 
entirely explicit until later (532b-c). 
One direction the discussion might take is between genuine and incompetent 
practioners of rhapsody. But Ion’s reputation as an exemplary rhapsode has already been 
established, so Socrates adopts a different strategy. He urges Ion to consider those 
subjects like the seer’s art (mantikēs), upon which Homer and Hesiod disagree (531b). 
Which person would be able to speak more beautifully and explain their disagreement 
over divination? Socrates asks whether it would be Ion or a seer. Ion replies that it would 
be the seer. He or she would be able to explain the similarities as well as the 
differences.
154
 Even stronger, since Ion thinks that Homer is a great poet he certainly 
ought to be able to explain the works of lesser poets as well. Socrates proceeds to make 
the same point about arithmetic and medicine.  
The decision to use divination here is peculiar. It is a mainstay of Plato’s concept 
of divination that possessed seers like the Pythia are unable to evaluate their own 
                                                 
153
 This has not prevented scholars from characterizing Ion as being “an easier target” (Liebert 180) than 
most of Socrates’ interlocutors. 
154
 A similar argument arises at Phaedo 97d5 wherein it is claimed that knowledge of opposites comes tout 
court, or not at all. In other words, if someone knows something, they necessarily know the opposite as 
well. Benson (2003) 36-37; Kahn (1996) 193. 
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divinations.
155
 This is in contrast to technical seers who divine by some external means, 
such as the movement of an eagle, or a meteorological event like lightning. At this point 
in the discussion, the distinction between possession and technical divination has not 
been made. All Socrates has claimed is that Ion, qua rhapsode, ought to be able to judge 
every instance of poetry. This looks forward to Socrates’ later question – who can best 
judge poetic representations of technai, the craftsperson or the poet?
156
 In that discussion, 
divination emerges again, and receives more attention than any of the other technai.  
One can draw two details from this initial case of divination. It is the first technē 
introduced in the Ion, and so should be given careful attention.
157
 Second, Socrates 
appeals to Hesiod and Homer (Ion’s specialty), thereby prompting us to consider the 
status of divination in the Epic poets. This focus on literary representations of technai is 
crucial to Socrates’ argument.  
Part II. Divination is the result of inspiration, not technē  
As Ion’s expertise is undermined, it is left to Socrates to sketch the precise nature 
of Ion’s ability. He claims that Homer is an exemplary poet (531d); this makes him 
especially qualified to evaluate other poets. He states:  
…when a number of people speak on the same subject, it’s always 
the same person who will know how to pick out good speakers and 
bad speakers. If he doesn’t know how to pick out a bad speaker, he 
certainly won’t know a good speaker – on the same subject, 
anyway (Ion 531e8-532a4).  
 
…oukoun en kephalaiō legomen hōs ho autos gnōsetai aei, peri tōn 
autōn pollōn legontōn, hostis te eu legei kai hostis kakōs: ē ei mē 
gnōsetai ton kakōs legonta, dēlon hoti oude ton eu, peri ge tou 
autou. 
                                                 
155
 cf. Apology 22c; Meno 99c-d; Timaeus 71a-72. 
156
 Liebert (2010) 187-188. 
157
 Roochnik (1996) notes, “the Ion has the second highest frequency” (259) of the word technē and its 
relatives.  
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A genuine technē enables a person to evaluate it across the whole spectrum of its subject 
matter. In other words, it allows someone to identify the exemplary practitioners, those 
who are merely competent, and the impersonators.
158
 Akin to Homer, Ion’s exceptional 
ability commits him to the thesis that he can speak well about all of the other inferior 
poets. But Ion does not have this ability. Given that he does not satisfy this condition of 
what it means to possess a technē, namely that one be capable of speaking on the entirety 
of the subject matter, Ion does not actually have a technē.159  
Ion is exasperated (532c). He cannot explain his particular expertise without 
including things he does not know. Socrates, thus, introduces the idea that Ion does not 
perform Homer according to “knowledge or mastery” (technē kai epistēmē) (532c6-7). 
He does so through a series of analogies. He begins with the idea that each technē is 
mastered holistically (532e). For instance, a painter cannot only judge the work of one 
painter, but of every painter. No one claims the ability to judge only one painter. The 
same is true with judging sculpture (533b).
160
     
Although Ion acquiesces to Socrates’ argument, he remains puzzled by his 
particular ability. Socrates introduces a new concept – a divine power (theia de dunamis) 
                                                 
158
 cf. Charmides 170e.  
159
 In the Laches, Socrates makes a similar assertion when he asks, “And what we know, we must, I 
suppose, be able to state?” (190c5). If someone possesses a technē, he or she must demonstrate such 
expertise. Otherwise, it is functionally equivalent to not having the technē at all. As well, Roochnik (1996) 
states that “because technē grants its possessor total mastery of his field and thus should enable him to 
evaluate anyone venturing into it, Ion has been shown to be atechnos, without a technē” (260). This 
emerges as well at the end of the Symposium (223d) where it is agreed that the person who can compose 
tragedies must necessarily be able to compose comedies, since both constitute poetry. This notion of one 
technē, one subject-matter is discussed in Kahn (1996) 108-110. 
160
 The choices of painting and sculpture are artistic and are therefore close to rhapsody. As well, Socrates 
uses similar language in each case. Ion complains that when another poet is discussed, he is lost and simply 
dozes off (532c). By contrast, Socrates has never known anyone who can judge one painting or piece of 
sculpture well, yet loses this ability and dozes off when another piece of art is presented (533a; 533b).  
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– which is to be understood in strong contrast to technē.161 Like the power of the magnet, 
Ion, together with the epic poets (533e), is possessed by the divine. Not only does the 
magnet attract the iron ring, it implants power into the ring itself, thereby enabling the 
ring to pull other rings. Similarly, the Muse pulls Homer along, who in turn inspires Ion, 
who finally is able to enchant his audience with his performance.
162
 Although it is 
Socrates who introduces the concept of inspiration, specified as the rhapsode’s complete 
lack of nous (ho nous mēketi en autō enē) (534b4-5), Ion heartily subscribes to it. Does 
he think Socrates is correct? Ion replies, “Lord yes, I certainly do” (nai ma to Dia, 
emoige) (535a2). Does Ion not notice the inconsistency between inspiration and audience 
awareness? 
Socrates underscores the divide between technē and inspiration by stating that as 
long “as a human being has his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power 
to make poetry or sing prophecy” (heōs d' an touti ekhē to ktēma, adunatos pas poiein 
anthrōpos estin kai khrēsmōdein.) (534b6-8). This explains Ion ability to only perform 
Homer. In fact, the particularity of Ion’s expertise is the best evidence that he is inspired 
by the Muse. According to Socrates, what happens to Ion is analogous to “prophets and 
godly seers” (tois khrēsmōdois kai tois mantesi tois theiois) (534d2) in the sense that no 
one thinks it is the seers themselves who divine. Rather, it is the gods who use the seer as 
                                                 
161
 On the cleavage between inspiration and technē in the Ion, see Harris (2004) and Havelock (1963), the 
latter who seems to accept the Platonic division rather uncontroversially. Moreover, Murray (1996) and 
Halliwell (1999) both note how Plato distinguishes between inspiration and mimesis as it figures into the 
operational mode of the poets. They “pull the understanding of poetry in opposite directions” (Halliwell 
272). Whereas mimesis depends crucially on the theory of forms, which is absent from the early dialogues 
like the Ion, inspiration depends upon the activity of the gods. I am not at all certain that such a strong 
division can be maintained, however, especially once we turn our attention to the Symposium. For in 
Diotima’s ascent passage we have both the language of inspiration and the form of beauty as the end goal. 
162
 “…through those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended” (533e5-6). 
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a medium.
163
 Note, furthermore, that Socrates here connects seers with prophets 
(khrēsmōdois), which etymologically means ‘singer of oracles’. This pairing is unique to 
Plato.
164
  
In what remains, Socrates continues to emphasize the divine possession of the 
poet, particularly the idea that the poet is completely passive in the relationship:  
…poets are nothing but representatives of the gods, possessed by 
whoever possesses them. To show that, the god deliberately sang 
the most beautiful lyric poem through the most worthless poet. 
(534e4-535a2)
165
   
 
…hoi de poiētai ouden all' ē hermēnēs eisin tōn theōn, 
katekhomenoi ex hotou an hekastos katekhētai. tauta 
endeiknumenos ho theos exepitēdes dia tou phaulotatou poiētou to 
kalliston melos ēsen. 
 
Note the authenticating trope that the gods inspire someone who is ignorant, which was 
broadly employed in Ancient Greece, one significant proponent being the Pythia.
166
 Still, 
Socrates’ appeal to inspiration bankrupts divination of its status as a technē. Yet 
paradoxically, as we saw in the previous section, divination was already characterized as 
a technē (531b) and it will be so again (538e-539e). 
                                                 
163
 In the Republic, Socrates characterizes the Pythia as the ‘Delphic Apollo’ and as the god who sits at the 
center of the earth (427c). Legislation is the topic under consideration and Socrates asserts that since he and 
his interlocutors have no knowledge of how best to serve the divine (i.e., what sorts of temples need to be 
constructed, what sacrifices to be made, etc.), it is prudent that they follow Apollo as he manifests himself 
in the Pythia. Note, then, the co-extensiveness between the Pythia and Apollo; when the seer is possessed, 
she is literally Apollo. Her words are actually Apollo’s words.  
164
 Mikalson (2010) 125-126, following Parker (2005) 111-112, speculates that the chresmodoi might refer 
back to the 5
th
 century chresmologoi, who were collectors or interpreters of oracles. Importantly for Plato, 
the former are inspired while the latter are never depicted as such.  
165
 Roochnik (1996) 267-268 notes the appearance of the word atechnos in the following: “Tynnaichus 
from Chalcis, who never made a poem anyone would think worth mentioning, except for the praise-song 
everyone sings, almost the most beautiful lyric poem there is, and simply (atechnos) as he says himself, “an 
invention of the Muses”” (534d6-e1). In this context, atechnos means ‘literally, simply, utterly’ but in the 
context of the dialogue, which concerns itself with whether or not rhapsody constitutes a legitimate technē, 
Plato is certainly punning atechnos to additionally mean ‘without technē.  
166
 Flower (2008) 231. 
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Such a puzzle forces us to consider whether Socrates is earnest or not. First off, it 
is worthwhile to acknowledge the optimistic facet of Socrates’ claim. Even though 
rhapsody is not the result of knowledge, it is the result of some divine source, and 
therefore deserves considerable prestige.
167
 In the present context, there is a blanket 
rejection of the thesis that those who claim inspiration have a technē. Importantly, this 
does not deny the existence of inspiration, but only that such a phenomenon must be 
conceptualized as distinct from knowledge.  
It is unclear how far one can take this line of thought. Is Ion the only target? Or 
does Ion represent rhapsody? Even more comprehensive, is the target anyone who claims 
inspiration, so that the poet, seer, and priest all fall by the wayside?
168
 This last option is 
checked by the fact that in later dialogues Plato holds inspiration in great esteem.
169
 In the 
next section, I turn to the final, and most complex, instance of divination in the Ion. 
Although divination is again characterized as a technē, it ought to give us pause, and re-
consider, I urge, some of our basic convictions about Plato’s understanding of divination. 
In particular, I argue that Socrates’ appeal to Theoclymenus has a deeper purpose than 
simply constituting another instance of technē outdoing rhapsody.   
Part III. Divination is a paradigmatic technē 
In the later stages of the Ion Socrates makes the uncontroversial claim that Homer 
speaks about many different subjects (536d-542b). Does Ion claim to be able to speak 
well on all of them? Socrates secures Ion’s assent. But given the range of subjects, it 
                                                 
167
 Priests and seers “win a fine reputation because of the magnitude of their undertakings” (kai doxan 
semnēn lambanei dia to megethos tōn egkheirēmatōn) (Statesman 290d). 
168
 I borrow this list from Phaedrus 244b-d. 
169
 cf. Meno 99d; Phaedrus 244b-d 
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would be miraculous if Ion (and by extension, Homer) could speak well on so much. 
Socrates offers multiple examples.   
First, he considers chariot driving. Socrates argues that the charioteer rather than 
the rhapsode would best be able to evaluate the relevant passages. The subject matter one 
learns via navigation, one will not learn via medicine. So, the charioteer will know how 
best to evaluate Homer’s passages, and insofar as the charioteer is different than the 
rhapsode, his or her “knowledge is of different subjects also” (peri heterōn kai epistēmē 
pragmatōn estin) (538b7). Socrates proceeds to make the same point with the examples 
of medicine and fishing. 
 His final example is divination.  First, in the Odyssey, he quotes Theoclymenus, 
who is a prophet of Melampus’ sons: 
Are you mad? What evil is this that’s upon you? Night has 
enshrouded your hands, your faces, and down to your knees. 
Wailing spreads like fire, tears wash your cheeks. Ghosts fill the 
dooryard, ghosts fill the hall, they rush to the black gate of hell, 
they drop below darkness. Sunlight has died from a sky run over 
with evil mist (537b1-8) (Odyssey 20.351-57; Plato omits line 
354). 
 
daimonioi, ti kakon tode paskhete; nukti men humeōn eiluatai 
kephalai te prosōpa te nerthe te guia, oimōgē de dedēe, 
dedakruntai de pareiai: eidōlōn te pleon prothuron, pleiē de kai 
aulē hiemenōn erebosde hupo zophon: ēelios de ouranou 
exapolōle, kakē d' epidedromen akhlus 
 
The language is poetic and ambiguous and is noteworthy for being the only purported 
example of possession divination in all of Homer.
170
 Second, he quotes from the Iliad 
during the battle of the wall. The Iliadic poet states:  
There came to them a bird as they hungered to cross over an eagle, 
a high-flier, circled the army’s left with a blood-red serpent carried 
in its talons, a monster, Alive, still breathing, it has not yet 
                                                 
170
 Liebert (2010) 191; Murray (1981) 94; Lowenstam (1993) 26-27.  
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forgotten its warlust, for it struck its captor on the breast, by the 
neck; it was writhing back but the eagle shot it groundwards in 
agony of pain, and dropped it in the midst of the throng, then itself, 
with a scream, soared on a breath of the wind (7.200-207). 
 
ornis gar sphin epēlthe perēsemenai memaōsin, aietos hupsipetēs, 
ep' aristera laon eergōn, phoinēenta drakonta pherōn onukhessi 
pelōron, zōon, et' aspaironta: kai oupō lētheto kharmēs. kopse gar 
auton ekhonta kata stēthos para deirēn idnōtheis opisō, ho d' apo 
hethen hēke khamaze algēsas odunēsi, mesō d' eni kabbal' homilō 
 
This is an instance of technical divination, specifically augury, which is characteristic of 
archaic literature.
171
 Socrates’ point is that it is for the seer to “examine and judge” 
(skopein kai krinein) (539d2). What is presupposed in both examples is that Plato thinks 
that divination constitutes a legitimate technē. Although the technical/possession 
distinction is never explicitly made in the Ion, these two Homeric quotes come closest.
172
 
Indeed, it is sometimes overlooked that both possession and technical divination are 
treated by Plato, together with the Greek tradition, as genuine technai.
173
 The glaring 
question is how can divination constitute a technē, on the one hand, and be a result of a 
divine power on the other, when Socrates repeatedly emphasizes that the two are 
fundamentally incompatible?  
In what follows, I examine two accounts that seek to answer this puzzle. One 
position, and perhaps the most intuitive, is that Plato ironically depicts divination as a 
paradigmatic technē in order to tacitly undercut the veracity of his account. 174 In 
                                                 
171
 Flower (2008) 24-25 surmises that this is due to the dramatic features of augury, and contrasts this with 
the dominant form of divination in Classical Greece – extispicy, or divination by the inspection of animal 
entrails – which is less theatrical.  
172
 Liebert (2010) notes how Socrates “chooses two literary examples of the same craft which illustrate the 
paradoxical aspects of that craft” (190).  
173
 Murray (1996) 105-106 dispels the paradox of divination’s dual function in the Ion by appeal to the 
Phaedrus. 
174
 Liebert (2010) 194. 
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actuality, the seer is not the best qualified to interpret literary instances of divination. It is 
the poet. I outline reasons to reject this account.  
Second, I analyze another account that seeks to understand the notion of 
possession divination as an instance of technē. Smith and Brickhouse argue that the 
technical component of possession consists in knowing how to trigger possession. I aim 
to show that while this argument has merit in the context of possession divination, 
Theoclymenus flouts Plato’s characterization of possession divination. Theoclymenus, in 
Homer, represents a superlative seer, and I argue that Plato recognizes the existence of 
such individuals.  
Part IV. The Homeric Quotations  
One of the recurring ideas concerning possession divination is the inability of its 
practitioners to adequately judge their own divinatory experiences. If someone has 
temporarily lost their self-awareness, then they cannot be justifiably held accountable for 
their assertions.
175
 Socrates often pivots on the idea of possession as he extrapolates 
poetic inspiration. As late as the Laws, for instance, the Athenian relates:  
…when a poet takes his seat on the tripod of the Muse, he cannot 
control his thoughts. He’s like a fountain where the water is 
allowed to gush forth unchecked… (719c). 
 
…hoti poiētēs, hopotan en tō tripodi tēs Mousēs kathizētai, tote ouk 
emphrōn estin, hoion de krēnē tis to epion rhein hetoimōs ea… 
 
One might think that the notion that seers served as mediums to gods was fairly 
ubiquitous in Ancient Greece. In fact, some focus on the relationship between possession 
                                                 
175
 Woodruff (1982) 138; Stern-Gillet (2004) 180; Murray (1981) 88-89 challenges the notion that 
inspiration entirely bankrupts responsibility, for if inspiration is situated along a spectrum according to the 
impact of that which inspires, then one not necessarily lose all autonomy. Granted, this claim seems more 
historical than Platonic, for it seems to be Plato’s express purpose to characterize possessed seers as lacking 
any autonomy/choice/responsibility over their divinations.  
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and poetic inspiration in Archaic Greece, and the degree to which mantic possession can 
be applied to poetry.
176
  
 Still, in the context of the Ion, it is puzzling that the seer, especially the possessed 
seer, is deployed as someone qualified to interpret literary instances of divination in the 
Homeric Epics. As Liebert argues:  
Unlike depictions of medicine or charioteering, which can be 
isolated from their literary context and judged according to general 
principles, a visionary prophecy cannot be meaningfully assessed 
once it has been extracted from its fictional world (191).  
 
In other words, a divination implanted in a literary context is functionally 
indistinguishable from a concept like foreshadowing. But the seer does not specialize in 
literary concepts and so does not constitute an expert in this case.  
This claim necessitates a close examination of how the quotations function in the 
Homeric texts. Consider the example of possession divination again:  
Are you mad? What evil is this that’s upon you? Night has 
enshrouded your hands, your faces, and down to your knees. 
Wailing spreads like fire, tears wash your cheeks. Ghosts fill the 
dooryard, ghosts fill the hall, they rush to the black gate of hell, 
they drop below darkness. Sunlight has died from a sky run over 
with evil mist (537b1-8) (20.351-57; Plato omits line 354). 
 
The divination foretells the future ruin and death of Penelope’s suitors; such an 
interpretation is accessible to anyone paying minimal attention to the plot.
177
 In fact, 
given the Homeric poet’s own account of the scene, which occurs just prior to the 
                                                 
176
 Tigersted (1970) 165-173; Murray (1981) 87-88, 94-95. What is generally accepted is divination’s 
association with possession and passivity. Tigersted states that the Greeks, “from time immemorial, 
believed in mantic inspiration as a state of divine madness or possession” (165). It is this notion of 
possession that Plato transfers from divination to poetry. Naddaf (2009), contra Tigersted and Murray, 
argues that even the early poets like Homer and Hesiod experienced ecstatic possession, specified as being 
“overpowered by the Muses and Apollo” (12).  
177
 Accordingly, “the prophecy functions rather as a narrative device, an instance of foreshadowing and 
dramatic irony, and not an instance of divination per se” (Liebert 192). 
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Theoclymenus’ divination, the poet and seer actually co-exist. The preceding description 
to the divination section: 
…but among the suitors Pallas Athena roused unquenchable laughter, and 
struck away their wits. And now they laughed with jaws that were not 
their own, and they ate flesh that was defiled with blood, and their eyes 
were filled with tears, and their spirits wanted to cry out (Odyssey 20.345-
49).   
 
… hōs phato Tēlemakhos: mnēstērsi de Pallas Athēnē asbeston gelō ōrse, 
pareplagxen de noēma. hoi d' ēdē gnathmoisi geloiōn allotrioisin, 
haimophorukta de dē krea ēsthion: osse d' ara spheōn dakruophin 
pimplanto, goon d' ōieto thumos. 
 
The passages are remarkably similar in tone and language. What gives the divination 
legitimacy, then, is not something external to the text, but rather confirmed by the literary 
context, both in terms of when it appears, and in the consequences to the suitors.  
The same goes for the example of technical divination. Augury is one of the most 
transparent divinatory archetypes and is easily accessible. Polydamas, a soldier, interprets 
the event, and he is furthermore characterized as a seer (2.215-229). In other words, he is 
a non-specialist and yet correctly interprets the divinatory event. This contradicts 
Socrates’ claim that the omen can only be adequately judged by a specialist, the seer. 
Thus, Polydamas’ ability to explain the event:  
…is also a narrative device, a case of foreshadowing in the guise 
of a character’s foreknowledge. Theoclymenus’ prophecy and the 
Trojan bird omen are thus inversely related literary devices; the 
prophecy provides a metatextual interpretation of the poems own 
signs… while the omen is one such sign whose demand for 
interpretation is met by a character within the poem (Liebert 194). 
 
According to Liebert, Ion should never have accepted the thesis that the seer is the best 
person to judge literary instances of divination. Rather, he should have insisted on the 
expertise of the poet/rhapsode. For Liebert, Socrates’ appeal to Homeric quotations on 
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divination undermines his own argument that those with a technē are best qualified to 
interpret literary representations of their particular expertise.   
 Although divination is most representative of this thought, it is worthwhile to note 
that divination only arises after a long exhaustive list of uncontentious technai – 
charioteering, medicine, and fishing. The last two are especially important given that 
Socrates quotes Homeric passages, which are meant to display each technē at work. 
Consider medicine first wherein Socrates quotes the formulation of a medicinal drink:    
…over wine of Pramnos she [Hecamede] grated goat’s milk cheese 
with a brazen grater...and onion relish for the drink (Iliad 11.639-
40 with 630, qtd at 538c4-5). 
 
…oinō pramneiō, phēsin, epi d' aigeion knē turon knēsti khalkeiē: 
para de kromuon potō opson: 
 
Nestor has rescued Machaon out of the fighting. The two men return to Nestor’s tent and 
are served this medicinal drink by Hecamede. It is quite instructive to note that nowhere 
is Hecamede characterized either as a healer, or as a doctor. It is the language of 
medicine, after all, that Socrates uses. Rather, the only extrapolations of her character 
seem to be that she is Nestor’s servant, beautiful as a goddess (11.637-38), and 
knowledgeable about making a medicinal drink.  
Does knowing how to make a medicinal drink qualify one as knowing medicine? 
Or is such knowledge disseminated in the broader public realm? This passage is 
particularly striking, in fact, because it is Machaon who is elsewhere characterized as a 
healer (Iliad 2.29-33). In this context, however, he is the wounded party.  
The penultimate example of a technē is fishing. Socrates asks Ion whether a 
fisherman or a rhapsode would best be able to interpret the following passage to be 
beautiful or not:  
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Leaden she plunged to the floor of the sea like a weight that is 
fixed to a field cow’ horn. Given to the hunt it goes among 
ravenous fish, carrying death (Iliad 24.80-82, qtd. at 538d1-3). 
 
hē de molubdainē ikelē es busson hikanen, hē te kat' agrauloio 
boos keras emmemauia erkhetai ōmēstēsi met' ikhthusi pēma 
pherousa:  
 
Again, the literary context is awkward. It is not a fisherman who delivers this passage; it 
is Homer, the speaker of the poem. In the context, it presupposes knowledge of fishing 
rather than claiming knowledge of fishing. It is, in fact, a literary trope – a simile to be 
exact – about Iris, the divine messenger, seeking out Thetis at the bottom of the ocean. 
Granted, in both cases, namely that medicine and fishing, Socrates’ express 
purpose is to ask who is best qualified to judge such passages. In that sense, he does not 
need the passages to demonstrate a doctor, or a fisherman, at work. All he needs Ion to 
accept is that it would be the appropriate specialist who would be best qualified to 
interpret the passages. But independent of Socrates’ purpose, there is the underlying 
problem of squaring the literary context with Socrates’ philosophical argument. For one, 
Hecamede is not obviously a doctor; her wisdom might easily be folk wisdom. As well, it 
would do well to recognize the conceptual implications of a simile, which is by nature a 
comparative use of language.  
In order to make a successful simile, one needs to know both sides of the 
comparative. Accordingly, given that the simile is deployed in a divine context – Iris 
seeking out Thetis at the bottom of the ocean – one wonders how a fisherman could be 
expected to adequately interpret this use of language if his expertise qua expertise is only 
fishing. He does not know anything about the divine. Indeed, this triggers Socrates to 
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transition to divination.
178
 So, each technai exhibits a paradox between the expertise of 
the craftsperson and the literary representation of said craft.  
Despite the continuities with the other technai, I submit that there is something 
peculiar about divination, which ought to give pause. Consider again the claim that the 
first quotation of Theoclymenus’ constitutes the only instance of possession divination in 
the Homeric texts. There is certainly something unnerving about it.
179
 Consider, 
furthermore, that it is Erymachus, Polybus’ son, who accuses Theoclymenus of being 
“out of his mind” (aphrainei) (20.360). This implies that Theoclymenus’ is indeed 
possessed, but it is a suitor who makes the claim, and the suitors reject the divination as 
laughable. In this sense, the claim that Theoclymenus is out of his mind is a claim that he 
is mad, as opposed to genuinely inspired. Shortly thereafter, Theoclymenus retorts that he 
has a “mind in his breast” (noos en stēthessi) (20.366) to make his own exit. In fact, he 
subsequently interprets his divine episode:   
I see advancing on you all a catastrophe which you cannot hope to 
survive or shun, no, not a single one of you with your brutal acts 
and reckless plots here in the home of godlike Odysseus (20.367-
370).  
 
tois exeimi thuraze, epei noeō kakon ummin erkhomenon, to ken ou 
tis hupekphugoi oud' aleaito mnēstērōn, hoi dōma kat' antitheou 
Odusēos aneras hubrizontes atasthala mēkhanaasthe. 
 
This contradicts the notion that the possessed seer cannot interpret their divination.  
There are at least two directions, then, to head in consideration of this statement. 
On the one hand, one could claim that possessed seers can in fact interpret their 
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 Charioteering, the first example, is also problematic. In Homer, Nestor is advising his son to use 
gamesmanship, which strictly speaking, does not fall within the realm of the charioteer’s competence.  
Bloom (1970) 55. 
179
 Liebert quotes several scholars who characterize it as “the most eerie passage in Homer,” (Russo and 
Heubeck 124) and part of “a very remarkable and macabre scene.” (Stanford 353). 
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divinations. Plato repeatedly denies this possibility.
180
 On the other, Theoclymenus might 
be an altogether different sort of seer.
181
 There is a genuine sense in which Theoclymenus 
flouts the usual sense of a possessed seer. Theoclymenus appears to have a visionary 
expertise minus the mediumistic possession of seers like the Pythia.  
Flower introduces the concept of intuitive divination, which he situates in-
between technical and possession divination.
182
 He defines intuitive divination as a 
special ability wherein the seer spontaneously ‘sees’ reality or the future but does not 
depend on being possessed during the event of divination. For example, consider Calchas 
in the Aeschylus’ Agamemnon. From witnessing two eagles, he prophesizes that Troy 
will fall. A sacrifice is needed. Calchas is not possessed but he does intuit, or see, things 
to come. This concept can be fruitfully applied to Theoclymenus; he uses the same ocular 
imagery that Calchas uses (20.367).  
Socrates cites two examples of divination because they constitute distinct types, 
and it has been thought that this must mean Socrates’ first Homeric quote is possession 
divination.
183
 But paying careful attention to the Homeric epics shows that the situation is 
more complicated. The difference between the two Homeric quotations is not one of 
possession and technical, but technical and visionary. This solves the problem of 
interpreting literary instances of a technē. If it is the case that Theoclymenus is a 
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 cf. Phaedrus 244d-e; Timaeus 71a-72. 
181
 Theoclymenus mirrors the abilities of real seers. He is a unique figure, capable of interpreting his 
divinations. This is precisely what one ought to expect in a mythical context populated by heroes and gods. 
Yet I want to resist such a stark division between the real world and foundational texts of Classical Greece, 
since they undoubtedly formed a symbiotic relationship. Flower (2008) 94. 
182
 Flower (2008) 87-91 also characterizes this type of divination as ‘second sight’ or an “innate faculty of 
divination (emphutikos mantikē)” (87). Dodds (1963) 70-71 also makes reference to this, drawing together 
Theoclymenus, Cassandra of the Agamemnon, and the Argive seer of Apollo, all for whom prophetic 
madness was “spontaneous and incalculable” (70). Dodds distinguishes between the visionary divinations 
of these figures and the enthusiasm, or strong possession, of the Pythia.  
183
 Murray (1981) notes: “It has long been recognised, however, that, with the exception of Theoclymenus 
at Ody. XX. 351-7, prophecy of this visionary nature is absent from Homer” (94).  
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visionary seer, not a possessed one, then he can interpret his own prophetic vision. The 
visionary prophet retains his self-consciousness and can interpret his own vision.
184
 
Nevertheless, it is true that Plato characterizes possession divination as a technē. In the 
next section, I investigate this claim, and conclude that while the possessed seer does 
have a technē, it cannot account for either Theoclymenus, or a seer like him who is 
required to interpret a divination.  
Part V. Possession Divination is a Technē 
Early in the Ion, divination is characterized as a technē. Then it is characterized as 
the complete opposite of a technē, namely as a result of a divine power. At first glance, 
the third instance of divination seems to combine the two, that is, as characterizing 
possession divination as a technē. How are we to make sense of this claim? In this 
section, I examine Smith and Brickhouse’s answer to this question. To begin, it is useful 
to rehearse Vlastos’ account of divination, which emerges in his discussion of Socrates.  
Vlastos argues that Socrates follows the precepts of reason wherever it leads him; 
one of his challenges then is to square Socratic reason with Socratic religiosity. In 
particular, Vlastos needs to provide an account of Socrates’ daimonion. Does Socrates 
receive knowledge from his daimonion? If not propositional knowledge, might it be some 
more auxiliary type, such as know-how? Vlastos baldly rejects the idea that Socrates 
might gain knowledge from something other than reason. He cites the Crito as evidence: 
                                                 
184
 Flower (2008) 88-89 also distinguishes between two sorts of possession. The first is the familiar sort 
where the seer’s self temporarily departs, such that the god literally occupies the body of the seer. The 
seer’s self-consciousness is absent. In the second sort, by contrast, the seer retains some semblance of self-
identity. Cassandra in Aeschylus’ Agamemnon is an example. Even though she prophesizes, she is aware of 
the content of her prophecy, which in this case is her own death.  In fact, I disagree with Flower (2008) 78-
79 who seems to think that Theoclymenus does not interpret his vision, since he is an “altered state of 
consciousness” (79), but leaves the interpretation to the audience. The text clearly shows that 
Theoclymenus interprets his vision to mean the future ruin of Penelope’s suitors. 
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Not now for the first time, but always, I am the sort of man who is 
persuaded by nothing in me except the proposition which appears to me 
to be the best when I reason about it (46b4-6)  
 
hōs egō ou nun prōton alla kai aei toioutos hoios tōn emōn mēdeni allō 
peithesthai ē tō logō hos an moi logizomenō beltistos phainētai. 
 
Still, Vlastos must provide some explanation for Socrates’ daimonion as well as his 
various appeals to divination (Apology 33c5-7). In the Apology, Socrates states:  
Regarding the poets, I soon realized that it is not by wisdom that poets 
do what they do, but by some natural talent and by inspiration, like the 
diviners and oracle givers, who also say many fine things but know 
nothing of what they say (22b8-c4).  
 
egnōn oun au kai peri tōn poiētōn en oligō touto, hoti ou sophia poioien 
ha poioien, alla phusei tini kai enthousiazontes hōsper hoi theomanteis 
kai hoi khrēsmōdoi kai gar houtoi legousi men polla kai kala, isasin de 
ouden hōn legousi. 
 
Vlastos emphasizes the ignorance of those who experience divine inspiration. Although 
they might speak well, they cannot be said to have knowledge. In other words, “For 
Socrates diviners, seers, oracle-givers, poets are all in the same boat. All of them in his 
view are know-nothings” (Vlastos 170). Instead, it is left to Socrates to critically interpret 
the assertions of those who undergo inspiration. Recall, after all, that those who are 
inspired, notably seers, speak in a beguiling fashion, and therefore must be carefully 
interpreted.
185
   
In their own analysis of divination in Plato’s dialogues, Smith and Brickhouse 
rightly point to various passages in the dialogues (Ion 538e; Laches 198e-199a; Phaedrus 
244c) where divination is characterized as a technē. If it is a technē, then divination must 
constitute some form of knowledge. They conclude that the seer possesses “a genuine – 
though relatively paltry – craft, and thus a… certain – though relatively paltry – form of 
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 Vlastos (1991) 170-171 goes to say that Socrates cannot hold the traditional notion of divine inspiration, 
since the traditional view holds that seers and poets have knowledge.  
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knowledge” (37). What buttresses their analysis are two sections in the Statesman (260e1, 
290c4-6) that distinguish between two sorts of technai. The first initiates commands; the 
kingly technē is the paradigmatic example. The second, by contrast, merely apes the 
commands of the first. Such technai include: “the interpreter, the person who gives the 
time to the rowers, the seer, the herald, and many other sorts of expertise related to these” 
(eis tauton meixomen basilikēn hermēneutikē, keleustikē, mantikē, kērukikē, kai pollais 
heterais toutōn tekhnais suggenesin, hai sumpasai to g' epitattein ekhousin) (Statesman 
260d11-e2).  
But according to the Apology, seers “know nothing of what they say” (isasin de 
ouden hōn legousi) (22c1-4). How can a seer be ignorant yet still possess a technē? More 
to the point, the reason seers do not know what they say is because they are mad and out 
of their minds.
186
 In response to this, Smith and Brickhouse state: 
What needs to be explained then is the relationship between the 
diviner’s craft and the knowledge which constitutes it and the truths or 
commands they divine when they are “mad” and “out of their minds” 
(42).  
 
According to Socrates, poets are akin to seers in that they function not according to 
knowledge, but to “a sort of natural talent and by inspiration” (alla phusei tini kai 
enthousiazontes) (Apology 22b8-c2). When a seer divines, they are not self-aware, and so 
can hardly be thought of as utilizing a technē. Consequently, they are not qualified to 
offer an interpretation of the divination.
187
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 cf. Phaedrus 244a6-d5; Ion 534b5. 
187
 Instructive here is Timaeus 71e-72b wherein Plato introduces the need to appoint official interpreters of 
seer. For Plato, “as long as the fit remains on him [the seer], the man is incompetent to render judgment on 
his own visions and voices” (tou de manentos eti te en toutō menontos ouk ergon ta phanenta kai 
phōnēthenta huph' heautou krinein)  (72a3-4). This might mean that the seer is permitted to interpret their 
own divinations once they have regained their cognitive faculties. Instead, Plato asserts the need to appoint 
official interpreters and further states that these individuals should not be misinterpreted as seers 
themselves (72b). These interpreters would have a degree of interpretive skill and therefore possess a 
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The only thing the seer might reasonably know is that they have had a genuine 
divinatory episode.
188
 How then can Socrates claim that divination is a technē? 
According to Smith and Brickhouse, the answer lies in the ability of the seer to enter into 
a state of madness or frenzy: 
…even if this technē only enables the diviners to enter into the 
state of receptivity to the god – a state in which they are ekphrones 
– the knowledge that constitutes their technē is hardly trivial (45).  
 
It is in this qualified sense that Smith and Brickhouse disagree with Vlastos. Seers do 
possess a technē; it consists of the ability to enter into a state of frenzy. The Pythia knows 
the necessary conditions to enter into a state of possession. Like Vlastos, Smith and 
Brickhouse maintain that the seer can access superlative moral truths. The problem, of 
course, is these moral truths remain something of a mystery. We cannot know what 
motivates the gods to state them, or even whether or not we accurately interpret them.
189
 
 Smith and Brickhouse’s argument has a pleasing synthesis. They combine both 
horns of divination in such a way that preserves (1) the mediumistic nature of possession 
together with (2) the features of a technē. I agree with their account for possessed seers 
like the Pythia, but their argument glosses over a seer like Theoclymenus. In particular, 
their account is unable to account for a seer who has a divine gift, experiences visions, 
                                                                                                                                                 
technē. Such interpreters are needed because they are in their ‘right mind’ and can ‘recollect and ponder’ 
what was said or described while the seer was asleep or in a visionary state. One might think it obvious that 
one could remember the content of a prophetic dream, but important here is Plato’s claim is words “spoken 
[out loud] in dream”.  
188
 Smith and Brickhouse (1993) 45. 
189
 McPherran (1996), like Smith and Brickhouse, interrogates Vlastos’ connection between Socrates’ 
daimonion and divination. Vlastos, recall, develops an analogy between these two in order to show that the 
daimonion, like the madness that the seer experiences, can do nothing but cause Socrates to re-consider 
something. Several considerations, including the adjectival character of the daimonion, give credence to the 
idea that Socrates does not experience an all-consuming possession of the sort experienced by seers. 
Rather, what seems to occur is “the other sort of psychological disassociation recognized by late – and so 
possibly early – antiquity, where ‘subjects’ consciousness persists side by side” (McPherran 196). 
Nevertheless, McPherran agrees with Smith and Brickhouse that Socrates grants seers “a certain kind of 
menial craft knowledge; namely, the knowledge of how to put themselves into a position to receive a god’s 
revelations (196-197).  
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and furthermore is the person most qualified to “examine and judge” (skopein kai 
krinein) (539d2) relevant passages in Homer. Seers who undergo possession cannot 
examine and judge their divinations.
190
 Moreover, such a seer cannot be characterized 
merely as a technical seer, an augur for instance, because their expertise includes a 
visionary element.  
When Socrates introduces the two examples of Homeric divination, he does so in 
order to show Ion that rhapsody does not have its own distinct subject matter. Since a 
genuine technē requires its own subject matter, rhapsody is not a technē. More 
specifically, he shows Ion that the relevant craftsperson, not the rhapsode, is best able to 
interpret literary instances of their technē. Clearly, for epistemological reasons already 
outlined, it is terribly difficult to see how a possessed seer could ‘examine and judge’ 
what occurs to Theoclymenus.  
One difficulty with this argument is that the focus is too much on Theoclymenus 
as he is depicted in Homer. In the context of Plato’s Ion, together with evidence drawn 
from dialogues like the Phaedrus, it is much easier to think that Plato rejects the 
possibility of a seer like Theoclymenus, as I characterize him.  
This would be persuasive if there was no evidence of seers like Theoclymenus in 
Plato’s dialogues. But one paradigmatic example of a superlative seer is Diotima in the 
Symposium. She is depicted as a seer, she hails from Mantinea (mantis – seer), and is 
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 Important here is to distinguish between the official interpreters that can be trained to interpret 
divinations (Timaeus 71a-72) and seers themselves. The former does not jive with Socrates’ argument in 
the Ion, which stipulates that only practitioners of a technē can judge (literary) depictions of that technē. 
Since one could train an official interpreter, could Theoclymenus’ divination, then, be an instance of 
possession divination? I do not think so because Socrates’ argument exclusively deals with experts judging 
(literary) depictions of their own technē. The problem with treating Theoclymenus’ vision as an instance of 
possession divination is that a possessed seer cannot formulate such judgments. This should trigger serious 
reflection on the part of the reader as to what Socrates is thinking by deploying divination as his final, and 
indeed most sustained, example.  
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responsible for delaying a plague for ten years by recommending the appropriate 
sacrifices (Symposium 201d).  
Although a thorough investigation of Diotima is beyond the scope of the present 
chapter, it suffices that she is both (1) a seer, and (2) depicted in an argumentative 
exchange with Socrates. She is not a philosopher but she knows the nature of Eros as 
well as the form of Beauty. From where else could she have gleaned such information 
except by the practice of her expertise? The crucial point is not necessarily what she 
knows, but that she is able to conceptualize and articulate it in a discursive exchange.  
Her particular knowledge befits a philosopher like Socrates. She twice sketches 
the different stages in the ascent toward the form of Beauty, which only a philosopher can 
ever know. She first gives a more detailed account (210a-212a), but within this she also 
provides a short synopsis (211b-d) not altogether identical with what we see in the longer 
account. Diotima’s ability to ‘examine and judge’ her divinations demonstrates that 
Theoclymenus is not as antithetical to Plato as it might first seem. Since Diotima can 
argue for her position, she is not a seer of the usual Platonic sort. In fact, in her ability to 
argue and extrapolate a position, she seems to act much more like Socrates, say in the 
Apology, despite the fact that she is not a philosopher 
Smith and Brickhouse’s argument answers the puzzle of how one could claim that 
the possessed seer has a technē. What I have outlined, by contrast, is how such an 
account fails in the context of Theoclymenus, due to Socrates’ claim that such a seer is 
best able to interpret his divinations. This is the strongest evidence why Socrates’ first 
appeal to Theoclymenus is not an appeal to Theoclymenus the possessed seer, but to 
Theoclymenus the intuitive seer, someone who specializes in prophetic visions. As I have 
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argued, the ability to have prophetic visions is different than divine possession in the 
sense that the former does not eliminate self-awareness. A consequence of such self-
awareness is that the seer can interpret their own divination. 
   What is the reason for undermining the distinction between inspiration 
and technē? I submit that this undermining serves to tacitly offer Ion a way out of the 
epistemological labyrinth erected by Socrates. Recall that Socrates commits Ion to a 
straightjacket: either he is possessed by a god, and therefore does not have technē, or he 
does have a technē and can therefore (1) apply it to the whole subject matter, and (2) 
interpret literary depictions of it. Ion can do neither and therefore must be possessed by a 
god when he performs Homer.  
Yet consider Ion’s self-assessment, which occurs directly after Socrates’ 
articulation of the inspiration thesis. This self-assessment strongly suggests that he is 
consciously calculative as to the effect he has on his audience (535e). Socrates queries 
Ion: Does he lose himself to the stories he performs? Does he weep during woeful 
episodes? Is he frightened when he tells a horror story? To all of these, Ion answers in the 
affirmative, thereby cementing Socrates’ thesis that Ion is not in his right mind while he 
is performing.  
Yet Ion is ever the performer in that he remains attuned to the ebb and flow of the 
audience. He states:  
You see I must keep my wits and play close attention to them [the 
audience]: if I start them crying, I will laugh as I take their money, but 
if they laugh, I shall cry at having lost money (535e3-5).  
 
dei gar me kai sphodr' autois ton noun prosekhein: hōs ean men klaontas 
 autous kathisō, autos gelasomai argurion lambanōn, ean de gelōntas, autos 
 klausomai argurion apollus. 
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This seems to contradict Socrates’ account of divine inspiration, which is supposed to 
eliminate the rhapsode’s self-awareness.191 Not only does it show that Ion is aware of his 
effect on the audience, but it also shows that he is acutely concerned with making money. 
Of course, monetary concerns are not incompatible with divine inspiration, but what is 
beguiling is Ion’s self-awareness during the duration of his performance.192 He is 
supposed to be possessed by a god.  
On the usual reading, Ion is not divinely inspired at all. Plato is hinting that divine 
inspiration is ersatz and self-serving. Far from being out of his mind, Ion is intimately 
aware of his abilities and his effect on audiences. He admits to catering his performance 
to the audience. Plato, however, has Socrates ignore Ion’s duplicity. Not only does Ion’s 
self-assessment counter Socrates’ inspiration account, but it does so tacitly, and has the 
further consequence of making Ion look like a fool. Instead of challenging Ion for 
contradicting himself, Socrates simply re-iterates the disjunction between inspiration and 
technē.  
I submit that the characterization of divination in the dialogue offers Ion a means 
of navigating out Socrates’ straightjacket. A seer like Theoclymenus, or even Diotima, 
can simultaneously claim inspiration together with an epistemological awareness that 
allows the inspired party to critically reflect on their divinations. Ion does not perceive 
this means of accommodating Socrates’ questioning, and for good reason, as he is not 
inspired like a seer such as Theoclymenus or Diotima.  
Conclusion 
                                                 
191
 Tigerstedt (1969) 21. 
192
 Tigerstedt (1969) 21; Trivigno (2006) 294. 
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 My starting point was the paradoxical function of divination in the Ion. On the 
one hand, it is deployed as a technē, but on the other, it serves as a paradigmatic example 
of possession, such that Socrates deploys it in extrapolating the nature of Ion’s expertise. 
By emphasizing the full destabilizing potential of Theoclymenus, both in Homer, and 
how Socrates specifies him in the Ion, I have attempted to stake out a ground that cannot 
be grafted onto the distinction between technical and possession divination. In other 
words, Theoclymenus’ visions, which are certainly the result of divine inspiration, 
nevertheless occur while he remains self-aware. This is what enables him to interpret his 
divinations, which is prohibited for the possessed seer. 
 The purpose of this move is to provide Ion with a way of accommodating the 
paradoxical features of his expertise. That Ion fails to seize this opportunity shows that he 
is not an expert in the mold of Theoclymenus or Diotima. Rather, like most seers, 
rhapsodists, and poets, Ion is ignorant of his abilities. 
Bibliography 
 
Baltzly, Dirk. 1992. “Plato and the New Rhapsody” in Ancient Philosophy. 12: 29-52 
Benson, Hugh. 2003. “The Method of Hypothesis in the Meno” in Proceedings of the 
 Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy. ed. By J.J. Cleary and G.S.J.  
 Gurtler. Vol. 18 
Brickhouse, T.C. and Smith, N.D. 1993. “He Mantike Technē: Statesman 260e1 and  
 290c4-6” Polis 12: 37-51 
Bloom, Allan. 1970. “An Interpretation of Plato’s Ion” Interpretation Journal. Vol. 1: 
1.  
Dixon, Barry. 2008. “Phaedrus, Ion, and the Lure of Inspiration” in Journal of the  
 International Plato Society. N. 8 1-12 
Dodds, E. R. 1963. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berkeley: University of California  
 Press.  
Dougherty, Carol. 1991. “Phemius’ Last Stand: The Impact of Occasion on Tradition in 
the Odyssey” in Oral Tradition. 6/1: 93-103 
Grote, George, 1888. Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates: Volume II. London: 
J. Murray. 
Grube, G. 1965. The Greek and Roman Critics. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Guthrie, W. 1965. A History of Greek Philosophy: Vol. IV. Cambridge: Cambridge 
93 
 
 
 
University Press. 
Flower, Michael. 2008. The Seer in Ancient Greece. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Halliwell, Stephen. 1999. ‘Review of “Plato on Poetry: Ion; Republic 376e-398b9;  
Republic 595-608b10”’ by Penelope Murray. International Journal of the 
Classical Tradition, Vol. 6, No. 2, 271-273  
Harris, John. 2004. “Technē and Theia Moira in Plato’s Ion” in Daimonopylai: Essays in  
Classics and the Classical Tradition Presented to Edmund Berry, Ed. by Rory 
B. Egan and Mark A. Joyal. 189–198..  
Liebert, Rana Saadi. 2010. “Fact and Fiction in Plato’s Ion” in American Journal 
 of Philology. Vol. 131: 2, 179-218 
Lowenstam, Steven. “Is Literary Criticism an Illegitimate Discipline? A Fallacious 
Argument in Plato’s Ion” in Ramus 22: 19-32 
McPherran, Mark. 1996. The Religion of Socrates. University Park: Pennsylvania State 
 University Press. 
Murray, Penelope. 1981. “Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece” in The Journal of  
 Hellenic Studies. Vol. 101, 87-100 
Murray, Penelope. 1996. Plato on Poetry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Parker, Robert. 2005. Polytheism and Society at Athens. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.  
Roochnik, David. 1996. Of Art and Wisdom: Plato’s Understanding of Technē.  
 University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.  
Russon, John. 1995. “Hermeneutics and Plato’s Ion” in Clio. N. 4 Summer 399-420. 
Stern-Gillet, Suzanne. 2004. “On (Mis)interpreting Plato’s Ion” in Phronesis. Vol. 49: 2, 
169-201 
Tigerstedt, E.N.. 1969. Plato’s Idea of Poetical Inspiration. Helsinki: Helsingfors. 
Tigerstedt, E.N.. 1970. “Furor Poeticus: Poetic Inspiration in Greek Literature Before  
 Democritus and Plato” Journal of the History of Ideas. Vol. 31: 2, 163-178 
Trivigno, Franco V. “Technē, Inspiration and Comedy in Plato’s Ion” in Apeiron. Vol. 
45: 283–313 
Vlastos, Gregory. 1991. Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
 University Press 
Wilcox, Joel F. 1985. “Ficino’s Commentary on Plato’s Ion and Chapman’s  
 Inspired Poet in the Odyssey” in Philological Quarterly. Vol. 64: 2, 195-209 
Woodruff, Paul. 1982. “What Could Go Wrong with Inspiration?  Why Plato’s Poets 
Fail.” In Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts. Ed. by Julius Moravcsik and 
Philip Temkon New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield. 137-150 
Woodruff, Paul. 1997. “Ion” in Plato: Collected Works. Ed. by John Cooper. 
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Irony and Inspiration in the Phaedrus 
Abstract 
 
I interrogate Plato’s concept of irony, which I claim receives too much attention in 
interpretations of the dialogue. In the present chapter, I pay particular attention to the 
opening speeches, particularly Socrates’, of the Phaedrus. I characterize four standard 
reasons why one might think that Socrates’ first speech is ironic, and proceed to outline 
reasons to reject each argument. This investigation enables a better understanding of 
Chapter 5, which investigates the nature of divination in Socrates’ palinode.   
 
Introduction 
 
Divination occupies a central role in the Phaedrus. Not only does it formulate a 
distinction between possession divination and technical divination (244b-c), but it also 
presents several interpretive puzzles. One such puzzle centers on the first two speeches, 
specifically to what degree either deserves an ironic interpretation. While this puzzle does 
not deal directly with divination, it is relevant in that irony is often held in 
contradistinction to inspiration.
193
 Although Socrates claims to be divinely inspired, the 
fact that he later renounces the speech, together with the antithetical content of the speech 
itself, is good evidence to think that he is not serious. He appeals to the divine in jest; his 
reputation as the exemplar of rationality precedes him.  
Yet notice that both of Socrates’ speeches are the result of inspiration; both 
nevertheless express radically disparate positions on the nature of love (eros). It seems 
reasonable to conclude that the palinode (244a-257b) embodies Plato’s genuine view; it 
contains important Platonic tenets that the first speech lacks. What, then, is the status of 
Socrates’ first speech? Is it principally strategic in the sense of engaging with Phaedrus 
on his own terms? This is a familiar Socratic approach.
194
 In this chapter, I argue that 
                                                 
193
 The best example is the Ion as discussed in chapter 3. 
194
 For instance, in the Cratylus, Socrates engages in the art of etymology. Another example is the 
Protagoras where Socrates demonstrates his aptitude for delivering a long speech. 
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Socrates is genuinely inspired when he delivers the first speech. One consequence of this 
argument is that Socrates’ first speech is not as antithetical to Plato as it might first 
appear.  
My thesis does not preclude several instances of irony in the Phaedrus. What I 
want to resist is the claim that the entirety of Socrates’ first speech is an exercise in irony 
such that one cannot take any of his claims seriously. Such a deconstructive move has the 
unconvincing consequence of flattening out the difference between clear cases of, say, 
mock praise (Phaedrus 234d-e) and authentic philosophical content. In fact, this seems to 
set up a false dichotomy. What is the relationship between philosophy and irony?  
In the first section, I interrogate the status and import of irony in Plato’s 
dialogues. I then rehearse the frame of the Phaedrus together with Phaedrus’ 
performance of Lysias’ speech. It is important to see the continuity and discontinuity 
between the speeches of Socrates and Lysias. After rehearsing Socrates’ speech I 
critically evaluate the case for the ironic interpretation. 
Part I – Plato, Socrates, and Irony 
Irony is the greatest hermeneutic problem in the early-middle dialogues.
195
 On 
one hand, there is no doubt that Socrates, on occasion, deploys irony. But to what degree 
and in what sense is controversial. The puzzle is further complicated by the fact that irony 
is the most effective tool at clearing up textual inconsistencies. If a particular passage 
appears contrary to a certain interpretation, it is tempting to characterize said 
interpretation delusively. Accordingly, appeals to irony must be made with great care; 
                                                 
195
 Strauss (1964) writes, “Very much, not to say everything, seems to depend on what Socratic irony is” 
(51).  
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they can easily expand their compass beyond what is called for. In this short section, I 
rehearse three accounts of irony. 
Throughout the early-middle dialogues, Socrates repeatedly makes claims of a 
paradoxical nature, often by denying theses that he seems to discursively or 
performatively contradict. For instance, one of the most famous is Socrates’ denial of 
knowledge (Apology 21d; 23b; 31d). There are myriad instances where Socrates appears 
to avow some sort of knowledge.
196
 One attractive means of explaining this incongruity is 
irony. Socrates states that he does not know anything, but he means something different, 
often the opposite, than what is said.
197
 Meaning something different, often the opposite, 
than what is said serves as a generic concept of irony.
198
 Now it is certainly possible to 
strongly distinguish between irony and proper philosophical content. This creates a 
pleasing chiaroscuro between the literary and the philosophical.
199
 However, Plato has 
enjoyed a reputation as an expert with irony since antiquity.
200
 A more appropriate 
starting point is to consider to what degree and in what sense does Plato deploy irony in 
his dialogues.  
One attractive idea is to conceptualize irony along pedagogical lines. This can be 
taken in several directions. Consider Vlastos’ concept of complex irony, which he 
develops in his account of Plato’s Socrates.201 Whereas simple irony is meaning 
something the opposite of what is said, complex irony diverges from ordinary meaning 
                                                 
196
 Vlastos (1985) 7-10 identifies eight instances – Gorgias 472e, 486e, 505e, 512b; Apology 29b; 
Protagoras 357d; Republic 350c, 351a; Crito 48a. 
197
 Nehamas (1999) ably argues, against a tradition leading back to Quintilian, that what is meant in an 
ironic act or utterance does not always need to be the opposite of what is said. Rather, it is sufficient to 
mean something very different. 105-106 
198
 Vlastos (1991) 21 notes that this definition goes back to Quintilian. 
199
 Taylor (1959) 23.  
200
 Griswold (2002) 87. 
201
 Vlastos (1991) 21-44. 
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and takes on a new, innovative sense. For Vlastos, Socrates most often utilizes this latter 
sense. Characteristic of his pedagogical convictions, Socrates refuses to disclose this new 
meaning; rather, his interlocutors are left to their own devices. If this is true, then Vlastos 
has circumvented Socratic denials of knowledge and pedagogy. Concretely, Vlastos 
states: 
In the conventional sense, where to “teach” is simply to transfer 
knowledge from a teacher’s to a learner’s mind, Socrates means what he 
says: that sort of teaching he does not do. But in the sense which he would 
give to “teaching” – engaging would-be learners in elenchtic argument to 
make them aware of their own ignorance and enable them to discover for 
themselves the truth they teach had held back – in that sense of “teaching” 
Socrates would want to say that he is a teacher, the only true teacher (32).  
 
I quote this passage at length because it reveals the scope of the pedagogical model. Irony 
functions as a means to achieve some educational end. Importantly, this shows how 
“Socrates could have deceived without intending to deceive” (Vlastos 44). In other 
words, since Socrates lets his interlocutors discover the truth for themselves, their error is 
their own, and cannot be helped. Along this line, then, Socratic irony is fundamentally 
protreptic.
202
  
Another strain of this protreptic conception is Straussian, particularly in its 
sensitivity to the cleavage between the philosopher and the non-philosopher.
203
 
According to Strauss, the philosopher seeks to communicate with, and perhaps convert, 
the non-philosopher. Yet he cannot do so by the principles of philosophy proper. 
Accordingly, the genuine philosopher adopts language and argumentative strategies that 
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 Nehamas (1999) 70, 103.  
203
 Strauss (1964) 51. 
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mirror his interlocutors. Strauss, himself, focuses on the way this emerges in the 
Republic, particularly in the philosopher’s engagement with the many (demos).204  
The pedagogical theory of irony works toward integrating irony into philosophical 
considerations, but one might think that it does not go far enough. A final account, then, 
not only explains irony via pedagogical considerations, but also claims that it reveals 
important features about the human condition.
205
 On such an account, irony, in some 
cases, functions internal to Plato’s philosophical project. Hyland, representative of this 
position, claims that irony, along with the dialectical nature of the dialogues, as well as 
Plato’s repeated use of metaphor and imagery, demonstrates the necessary heterogeneity 
of the whole. This is in sharp contrast to a homogeneous conception of the whole.
206
 
One interesting facet of Hyland’s account is its attempt to integrate Socratic irony 
into Platonic irony. As Nehamas reminds us, we often forget that Socrates is Plato’s 
literary creation. We need to always keep in mind the “irony of the author” (72) over and 
above the character of Socrates. Indeed, in the three theories rehearsed so far, the 
continuities between Socratic and Platonic irony might seem contiguous, especially if we 
reject that part of the developmental thesis that the early dialogues embody the views of 
the historical Socrates. My own argument moves back and forth between Socrates a 
character and Plato the author. 
As I stated earlier, irony is excessively deployed as a catch-all to explain away 
recalcitrant evidence of a particular interpretation. Following Miller, Vlastos, and 
Wolfsdorf, it is useful to rehearse the development of the term in Classical Greece.
207
 It 
                                                 
204
 Strauss (1964) writes that “Irony is…the noble dissimulation of one’s worth, of one’s superiority” (51).  
205
 Hyland (1995) 94-98. 
206
 Hyland’s example of the homogeneity of the whole is Hegel.  
207
 Miller (1976) 309-313; Vlastos (1991) 21-29.   
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stems from the verb eironeia, which means ‘dissembling’. Aristophanes uses it in a more 
specific sense; an eiron is someone who uses deception in order to gain some advantage 
over another, often by adopting a benevolent persona. The word is also used in several 
early Platonic dialogues.
208
 But eironeia is different than irony, particularly due to the 
malevolent nature of the former. The irony that occurs in conversation, so-called verbal 
irony, is neither intentionally deceptive nor malicious in end.
209
 Rather, to be verbally 
ironic is to deliberately emphasize the blatant falsity of an utterance. This is, obviously, 
often done for humor.  
If this division is correct, then we can ask whether Socrates is either verbally 
ironic or eiron.
210
 Wolfsdorf seeks to retain the complexity of the Socratic character; he 
concludes that in the majority of cases, ascriptions of verbal irony to Socrates simply do 
not work. For instance, it is commonplace to think that Socrates’ glad-handing at the 
beginning of dialogues is ironic.
211
 Yet Wolfsdorf argues that there is no indication that 
Socrates is being verbally ironic.   
The notion that Socrates is an eiron is even less likely. Recall that there were two 
distinguishing characteristics to be an eiron. First, one has to intentionally deceive. Does 
this coalesce with the Socratic character? This is a consequence of the ironic 
interpretation: when Socrates claims to know nothing, he is intentionally deceiving (for 
some other purpose) those around him. Yet for someone who so values virtue, it is 
                                                 
208
 cf. Apology 37e5-38a1; Euthydemus 302b3-4; 302b6-7; Republic 337a4-7; Gorgias 489e1-3. 
209
 Another sort of irony is situational. It involves the incongruity between what someone says or believes, 
and the way things actually are. Oedipus, for instance, seeks to discover the Laius’ murderer, failing of 
course to recognize that he is the murderer. Since the analysis is focused on the Platonic dialogues, 
situational irony is moot. Suffice to say that it shares the same “conceptual core” (246) as verbal irony.  
210
 Wolfsdorf (2006) writes, “To be more precise, since there is no good reason to assume that Socrates is a 
strictly transtextually identical character, the question is whether in any particular instance he is being 
verbally ironic or eiron” (246).  
211
 cf. Euthyphro 5a-d. 
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difficult to make the case that deception is ever good. This thesis is a consequence of 
several argumentative engagements throughout the early dialogues.
212
 
The second criterion is even less convincing – does Socrates have a malevolent 
agenda when he engages with his interlocutors? Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Socrates’ explicit aim is to seek after the truth regardless of his interlocutors’ convictions. 
He only seeks the best argument.
213
 The displeasure of his interlocutors is a side-effect of 
his investigations, but it is never his intention to harm.  
In his own work on the consistency of Socrates’ philosophical claims, 
Wolfsdorf’s introduces the concept of a-structure, which he defines as a compositional 
technique utilized in the Platonic dialogues wherein there exists “a linear sequence or 
progression of beliefs and values” (15). In the case of the early dialogues, a-structure 
constitutes a shift from traditional Athenian views to Platonic views. For Wolfsdorf, this 
partly explains both the intertextual and intratextual inconsistencies of the early 
dialogues. In other words, depending on the stage of argumentative development in a 
particular dialogue, Socrates may strategically adopt a certain view that is inconsistent 
with what he says at other stages in the same dialogue, or in another dialogue altogether. 
According to Wolfsdorf, Plato utilizes a-structure for protreptic reasons, that is, to 
encourage readers to adopt philosophy as opposed to tradition and custom.  
Granted, Wolfsdorf applies a-structure to the early dialogues. It is certainly 
debatable that the concept can be applied to middle dialogues like the Phaedrus. But I 
think it can since the Phaedrus embodies both old and new Platonic positions. As I argue 
shortly, the standard reading of Socrates’ first speech interprets it in light of Socrates’ 
                                                 
212
 It is akin, for instance, to the argument that doing wrong is never justified (Crito 49a-b) 
213
 cf. Crito 46b. 
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palinode. It is supposed that from the very beginning of his engagement Socrates is well 
informed about the nature of eros. Consequently, Socrates is ironic when he delivers his 
first speech about the negative effects of eros. In the next section, I examine the initial 
exchange between Socrates and Phaedrus. 
Part II – The Frame (227a-230e)  
The frame of Plato’s dialogues foreshadows and even structures subsequent 
philosophical arguments. The Phaedrus is no exception. I emphasize three components of 
the frame. First, there is the strangeness of the surroundings. Socrates does not normally 
find himself outside the city walls, frequenting nature. Second, there is the theme of 
loving speeches, specifically the effects they have on both performer and audience. 
Finally, there is the myth of Boreas and Orithuia, and Socrates’ beguiling interpretation 
of it.  
Having departed the company of Lysias, Phaedrus runs into Socrates outside of 
the city walls. Plato rarely depicts Socrates outside the Athenian walls. Paradoxically, 
Socrates delights in the divine nature of his surroundings (230b-c). Such delight is 
checked, however, by Socrates’ insistence that nature cannot teach him anything (230d). 
With Lysias, Phaedrus enjoyed a speech on eros. Socrates, characterizing himself as 
someone sick to hear speeches (228b5-6), asks Phaedrus to rehearse it for him. Already 
the distinct character of the dialogue presents itself, for Socrates is not the sort of person 
who normally loves speeches.
214
 
Having met Socrates, Phaedrus finds a companion for his “frenzied dance” 
(sugkorubantiōnta) (228b7), which consists of practicing Lysias’ speech.215 Phaedrus 
                                                 
214
 cf. Protagoras 334c-335c, Gorgias 449b-c, 461d-462a. 
215
 On the dramatic setting of the Phaedrus, see Ferrari (1987) chapter 1, and Griswold (1986) 33-36. 
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insists that he did not memorize the speech only to have Socrates point to the written text 
beneath his cloak. Instead of memorization, Phaedrus is consigned to read from a text. 
This looks forward to the discussion of rhetoric in the latter half of the dialogue. Socrates 
further uses the term “drug” (pharmakon) (230d6) to characterize Phaedrus’ effort to 
have him leave the city.
216
 These ideas – frenzied dance and potions that charm – 
underscore the most important component of eros, which is its ability to take hold of a 
person and put them in a new state of mind, beyond their immediate control.   
Prior to beginning his speech, Phaedrus cites the myth of Boreas and Orithuia.
217
 
Does Socrates think the myth is true when most intellectuals (sophoi) reject its 
truthfulness?
218
 Socrates replies that he could offer a “clever story” (sophizomenos) 
(229c6), but developing such an explanation necessitates an account of all the other 
mythical creatures like the Chimera and Gorgons.  
Instead, Socrates insists on spending his time with more important matters, 
namely self-knowledge. How can he spend his time on myth if he does not, pace the 
Delphic oracle, even adequately understand himself? Socrates concludes by stating that 
he is persuaded by “what is generally believed” (peithomenos de tō nomizomenō peri 
autōn) (230a3-4) and re-iterates his interest in self-knowledge. It is a puzzling assertion 
because Socrates usually goes out of his way to reject what is believed by the many. 
Charitably, Plato has Socrates make such a declaration because of his commitment to 
self-knowledge. It is insufficient to simply re-interpret this one myth; such a re-
                                                 
216
 This looks forward to the interlude between the Socrates’ first speech and the palinode where he 
reiterates that he was “charmed through your [Phaedrus’] potion” (242d8). 
217
 Along the Ilisus river, Boreas abducted Orithuia. The theme of violence manifests itself in the first two 
speeches on eros. Possession, as well, emerges throughout the dialogue. Griswold (1986) 36-37. 
218
 I follow Ferrari’s translation. Of note, Hackforth argues that the sophoi refers to a “school of allegorical 
interpretation” (26). For Ferrari, both interpretations flatten out the rich interpretative potential of the 
statement. The vagueness of the term must be left intact. 234-235.  
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interpretation leads to an entire overhaul of myth. Socrates has no time for such 
investigations.
219
 It is still wrong to conclude that Socrates opposes myth tout court. 
Rather, myths are relevant the degree to which they help him achieve his goal, which is 
first and foremost determining the nature of virtue and achieving self-knowledge.
220
  
Less charitably, Socrates affirms a decidedly un-Socratic tenet, namely that it is 
justifiable to agree with the demos because they constitute the majority. In other 
dialogues, Socrates unabashedly defends the thesis that one should not accept the 
convictions of the demos.
221
 Socrates is usually depicted as evaluating such accounts 
according to 1) what he takes to be the truth, and 2) what he takes to be useful in the 
context of the ideal state.
222
  
The uncharitable interpretation of this passage implies that Socrates is ironic; he 
does not seriously think that people should ever believe what the demos think. I think this 
is a distorted reading. In believing what is generally believed, Socrates simply means that 
mythological investigations are secondary unless they are relevant to his search for self-
knowledge.  
Nevertheless, what is crucial to draw from the frame is the mesmeric nature of the 
surrounding environment together with the mesmeric effect of speeches. Again, these two 
points are fundamentally modified by Socrates’ main priority, which is self-knowledge. 
How does self-knowledge relate to the effects the world can have on a person? This 
theme gets developed in Lysias’ speech.    
                                                 
219
 At Phaedo 96b-99a, Socrates expresses dissatisfaction with naturalistic explanations because they do not 
coalesce with his own concrete actions and decisions. Nicholson (1999) 20-22. 
220
 This legitimizes the myths that arise later in the dialogue, such as the allegory of the Chariot and the 
myth of the cicadas. 
221
 cf. Crito 44c 
222
 Consider Socrates’ exchange with Adeimantus in Republic II. All the traditional myths of Homer and 
Hesiod are evaluated and condemned for being both 1) untrue, and 2) unproductive. Similar assertions are 
made at Euthyphro 6b and 6c.   
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Part III – Phaedrus’ Performance (231a – 234c) 
 
The aim of the Lysias’ speech is to seduce a boy, but to do so in a surprising 
fashion. Rather than be seduced by a man in love, the speech argues that it is best to give 
into the man who is not in love. The argument depicts a fundamental tenet of rhetoric in 
late 4
th
 century Athens – the role of paradox. Persuading an audience of a recognized 
truth was one thing. But far more impressive was convincing an audience of something 
counter-intuitive. Lysias’ speech is a fine example.  
Most of the reasons depend on emphasizing the inherent instability and transience 
of the lover’s affections. For instance, the lover eventually regrets the promises he made 
once his erotic passion abets. In fact, he is likely to fall in love with someone else. 
Another reason centers on the sheer number of possible suitors. If you are only willing to 
give yourself to a lover, the range of potential partners is relatively small. By contrast, if 
you determine to give yourself to a non-lover, you open yourself up to a much larger 
group of people. More choice equals more possibility of success.  
The affections of the lover are undesirable even when he is in the midst of his 
passion. His jealousy damages the social ties of the boy; he loves the boy’s body, not his 
character or soul. In fact, he exaggerates his praise even if it is untrue or harmful. Indeed, 
the lover is ruled by need, by necessity, whereas the non-lover can improve the boy’s 
quality of life, and he follows through with such a promise because he agrees to it while 
in his right mind.   
The lover is in dire need of a fine reputation and so proudly declares his love to 
all who will hear him (231e). This comes to a fore at the end of the speech when 
Phaedrus declares:  
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If it were true that we ought to give the biggest favor to those who 
need it most, then we should all be helping out the very poorest 
people, not the best ones, because people we’ve saved from the 
worst troubles will give you the most thanks (233d5-7). 
 
 eti de ei khrē tois deomenois malista kharizesthai, prosēkei kai 
tois allois mē tous beltistous alla tous aporōtatous eu poiein: 
megistōn gar apallagentes kakōn pleistēn kharin autois eisontai. 
 
It is preferable to give your affections to someone who can return them. This is the non-
lover, a person without such outrageous sentiments. He is characterized by his sober 
judgment. Whereas the lover’s “desire has impaired his judgments” (kai autoi kheiron dia 
tēn epithumian gignōskontes) (233b1), the non-lover’s most salient characteristic is 
temperance (232a). Accordingly, it is best to give yourself to the non-lover. 
Granted, the lover has a measure of self-awareness; he knows that he is unable to 
think clearly (231d3). But his inability to think straight together with the fact that he is 
possessed by eros means that his actions are forced (231a). He has no control over 
himself. Indeed, this is the canonical, albeit negative, feature of the lover as Lysias’ 
speech conceptualizes it.
223
  
 Even though Socrates’ first speech shares affinity with Lysias’ speech, both 
speeches are rejected in Socrates palinode. Are there any clues in the speech that 
foreshadow this event? For one, consider that the non-lover displays remarkable 
ingenuity at convincing a boy to give himself over.
224
 He uses rhetoric to satisfy his 
                                                 
223
 Another main quality of the lover is fear. The lover will prevent his beloved from pursuing and 
maintaining social relationships because he fears that other people will impress his beloved (232c). The 
lover will also offer the beloved excessive compliments; he fears being disliked (233b1).  
224
 Rosen writes that the non-lover, “combines qualities of hedonism, utilitarianism, and technicism in such 
a way as to abstract from such human qualities as the beautiful and ugly or the noble and base” (433). He 
later adds that the non-lover is akin to the (Platonic) philosopher in the sense that “he disregards human 
individuality in his pursuit of the general or steadfast” (433). This is the criticism often leveled at the 
penultimate speech of the Symposium; coming into contact with the form of beauty bankrupts romantic love 
of its fundamental singularity. Instead, all instantiations of beauty are celebrated. An identical line of 
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desires. The non-lover’s desire, in fact, is the same as the lover’s. Both want the boy’s 
affections. The difference is the strategy employed to secure such affection. In this way, 
the non-lover has a measure of freedom, far more than the lover. Yet his conception of 
reason is exclusively instrumental. Given how he characterizes the lover, it is puzzling 
that the non-lover wants the same thing.  
 The non-lover admits of a sharp dichotomy between reason and desire.
225
 His 
seduction is based on reason; it is in the best interest of the boy to give himself over. But 
something more is needed. A prospective beloved needs to feel as though he is desired as 
an individual. Phaedrus’ speech gives good reasons why the boy ought to acquiesce, but 
it does not express erotic desire for the boy.
226
     
Part IV – Socrates’ First Speech (237b – 241d) 
 There are two sections to Socrates’ speech. This first part runs from 237b to 238c, 
followed by a brief interlude, and the second part runs from 238e to 241d. In the first 
section, Socrates begins with an invocation of the Muses (237a) and requests their help in 
his speech.
227
 Akin to Lysias’ speech, Socrates begins by highlighting an attractive boy 
with many suitors. Although all of these suitors are lovers, one of them adopts a different 
strategy. The boy should give himself to the person whom he does not love!  
In making his case, this “wily” (haimulos) (237b2) seducer begins in paradigmatic 
Socratic fashion by establishing the need to define the nature of love, together with its 
effects (237d2). Two principles of humanity are identified. First, there is the desire for 
                                                                                                                                                 
argument arises in the Protagoras. If we were able to discover a hedonistic calculus, we would be able to 
know what is best for us. But this seems to ignore the particularity of our attachments.  
225
 Griswold (1986) 48-51.  
226
 Accordingly, with the introduction of “divine philosophy” (theia philosophia) (239b4) in Socrates’ first 
speech, there is conceptual progress. Reason and desire become inextricably bound together. Reason shapes 
desire, and vice-versa. 
227
 The Muses are the divinities associated with poetic madness (259d).  
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pleasure. Second, there is the rational pursuit of what is best. Sometimes they are in 
unison; sometimes one holds sway over the other (237e). When desire for pleasure holds 
sway, and is contextualized in our desire for beauty, we call this Eros.  
In the second part of the speech (238e-241d), Socrates wonders whether it is the 
lover or the non-lover who most benefits the boy. The lover, governed uncontrollably by 
his desire for pleasure, does not want to be in a relationship with someone of equal or 
superior status. There are three senses in which the lover harms the boy. First, he crushes 
intellectual development. The boy will be ignorant of “divine philosophy” (theia 
philosophia) (239b4), which we later discover is the development of the soul (241c).
228
 
Divine philosophy is the superlatively valuable (241c6).   
Second, the lover wants a body that is soft and unmanly. The physical 
development of the boy is abandoned. This has the objectionable effect of putting 
confidence in one’s enemies during times of war. Now it is unclear why the lover wants 
such a body – insofar as he seeks physical beauty, he should prefer a healthy one that has 
received training and beautification.
229
 Nevertheless, for Socrates, this point is self-
evident (239d8).  
Finally, material possessions are not exempt either. Since the lover is exclusively 
concerned with his own pleasure, any potential obstacles must be curtailed. As a result, 
the lover prefers his beloved to be “wifeless, childless, and homeless” (agamon, apaida, 
aoikon) (240a7). Wealth enables a level of autonomy, thereby making the boy more 
difficult to control. Even in the case of flattery (240b), which provides transient pleasure, 
the lover fails the test. He is not even willing to give his beloved a day of pleasure.  
                                                 
228
 This is the first use of psuche in the dialogue.  
229
 According to Socrates, the lover goes after a boy who makes himself beautiful by cosmetics.  
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This is so because the lover is driven by necessity. He stalks the boy, fawning 
over him, giving him excessive compliments, while at the same, remaining hypersensitive 
to jealousy. Throughout Socrates’ description of the lover, the language of necessity is 
used repeatedly (240a, 240c, 240d, 241c).
230
 This exhibits a central feature of eros; the 
lover does not have any control over his affections and actions. He is driven by an 
insatiable desire that cannot be consciously altered or rationally persuaded with.  
But changes in affections do happen. Often spontaneously and without rhyme or 
reason, the lover’s affection weakens or evaporates entirely over time. It has already been 
established that the lover is both destructive and repulsive (240e7). But once his 
affections weaken, he becomes an entirely new man. All the promises the lover has made 
– about the boy’s future, about what he will receive – no longer hold. In other words, 
“right-minded reason” has replaced the “madness of love” (noun kai sōphrosunēn ant' 
erōtos kai manias) (241a3).231 Investing in such a person is fraught with disaster from the 
very beginning. 
Since the lover eventually regains his faculties, the notion that he lacks reason is 
complicated. When his reason returns, he regains the ability to pursue his rational self-
interest. But it is peculiar that he regains this faculty of reason only when he must begin 
to repay his debt to the boy. In other words, the transition back to reason at the very 
moment when it serves him best gives credence to the idea that his reason never 
completely abandons him. Thus, the language of necessity, which the lover is so quick to 
deploy, is a pragmatic strategy to secure his desire. Fundamentally, it is nothing but a 
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 Also used is “compulsion” (anagke).  
231
 Importantly, this is the first use of nous and mania in the dialogue, the latter of which will become 
extraordinarily important for our discussion of divination.   
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charade. We are thus left with an account of the lover who constitutes a mixture of desire 
and reason.  
The non-lover is a parallel phenomenon. Despite his pretense for solemn 
rationality, despite his logical arguments that dismantle the case of the lover, he is after 
the exact same end. As we saw earlier, his concept of reason is purely instrumental. His 
desire for the boy exists beyond the realm of reason, thereby establishing a connection 
between the two.
232
 
Socrates’ speech is in essence a re-articulation of Lysias’s speech. Persuasive 
reasons are given why a boy should give himself to a non-lover as opposed to lover. But 
Socrates goes on to state that he has sinned against eros. He rehabilitates eros in the 
palinode. Was Socrates always planning this reversal? There is some evidence in 
Socrates’ first speech that he does not seriously advocate Lysias’ position. In the next 
section, I rehearse the evidence for the ironic thesis that Socrates does not seriously assert 
his first speech. I outline reasons to reject the ironic interpretation. 
Part V – The Ironic Interpretation 
The ironic interpretation has been the dominant view.
233
 There are three 
interrelated reasons for this. First, in the interlude between Lysias’ speech and Socrates’ 
first speech, Phaedrus characterizes Socrates’ reaction as ironic. For Phaedrus, Socrates’ 
reaction is excessively maudlin. That Socrates is overwhelmed by Phaedrus’ performance 
coalesces with his claim to be inspired, which according to the ironic interpretation, 
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 Griswold writes, “The nonlover is a concealed lover, and the lover is a concealed nonlover” (64).  
233
 Calvo (1992) 47 provides a list. Calvo claims that despite particular differences, the standard view of 
most scholars detaches Socrates from the views expressed in his first speech. In particular, it is thought that 
the content of both speeches is the same for this is what Socrates literally claims. What is different is 
merely aspects of style. Also, what causes Socrates to deliver the palinode is “moral distaste” (48) for the 
content of the speech.   
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distances Socrates from being committed to his own speech. By the same token, another 
example of Socrates’ distancing is that he covers his head when he proceeds to perform 
his own speech. Socrates is ashamed. Finally, on the level of content itself, the ironic 
interpretation emphasizes that Socrates’ first speech is inter-textually and extra-textually 
antithetical to Platonism. I interrogate each of these reasons. 
a. Socrates’ reaction to Lysias’ speech and Phaedrus’ characterization 
When Phaedrus finishes his performance of Lysias’ speech, Socrates exclaims 
that he is “in ecstasy” (hōste me ekplagēnai) (234d1) and that he shares in Phaedrus’ 
Bacchic frenzy.
 234
 This has happened before.
235
 It is also similar to the effect a poetic or 
dramatic performance has on an audience.
236
 Inspiration is not private; it spreads to other 
people like a disease. This is why Plato finds it so troubling, especially when what is 
being disseminated is untrue and unhelpful.  
Phaedrus, exasperated and suspicious, asks, “Do you think you should joke about 
this? (houtō dē dokei paizein;) (234d6). Socrates apes Phaedrus’ question – does 
Phaedrus not think he was being serious? This is a familiar Platonic trope; an interlocutor 
accuses Socrates of irony.
237
 Socrates justifies himself by distinguishing between the 
speech’s style and content. Whereas the content is relatively banal the style is what 
caused Socrates to become enthralled. In fact, the content diverges from what wise 
people have claimed (235b). Who are these individuals? Socrates states that “perhaps it 
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 An allusion to the frenzy (228b7) associated with the love of speeches.    
235
 cf. Cratylus 396d.  
236
 cf. Ion 533e. 
237
 cf. Republic 337a. 
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was the lovely Sappho or the wise Anacreon or even some writer of prose” (ē pou 
Sapphous tēs kalēs ē Anakreontos tou sophou ē kai suggrapheōn tinōn) (235c3-5).238   
Subsequently, Socrates claims that he can make a better speech. Socrates, in some 
way, is claiming to be inspired.
239
 As Phaedrus, a speech lover, urges Socrates to perform 
his speech, Socrates states that he was “only criticizing your beloved in order to tease 
you” (hoti sou tōn paidikōn epelabomēn ereskhēlōn se) (236b5-6). Socrates is 
unimpressed with the main points, for they are rather banal. He can, however, praise the 
form, or the arrangement, in which they were organized (236a). For Socrates, it is 
obvious that it is better to give oneself to a non-lover than to a lover. The only way 
Socrates thinks that he can improve on the Lysias’ speech is in the formal sense.    
But Socrates does not want to perform his speech. This causes Phaedrus to 
threaten Socrates with physical force. He states, “We are alone, in a deserted place, and I 
am younger and stronger” (iskhuroteros d' egō kai neōteros, ek de hapantōn toutōn 
‘sunes ho toi legō) (236d1-2).240 Although the initial threat is physical, it quickly takes on 
a discursive form. Phaedrus will never again recite a speech to Socrates unless he gets 
what he wishes. Socrates, a lover of speeches (228c), exclaims that Phaedrus has found 
the proper means of forcing his hand (236e). Socrates is compelled to perform. 
                                                 
238
 Rowe (1986) discusses Socrates’ appeal to Sappho and Anacreon. He states, “The tone of the 
expressions ‘the excellent (and/or ‘lovely’, ‘beautiful’: kalos) Sappho’ and ‘the wise (sophos) Anacreon’ is 
thoroughly ironical” (151). Rowe disagrees with Robin that this provides cursory support for the strong 
thesis that Socrates is already looking forward to his second speech. It does not jive with Socrates dramatic 
turnabout. But consider that Socrates is citing poets who valorize human love in conjunction with the topic 
of the speech, which is the valorization of the non-lover. Rowe surmises that the poet probably has a sense 
of the strongest case against love, given the nature of his explorations.    
239
 Cook (1985) claims this satirically alludes to the “quantitative assumption” (431) of Lysias’ speech.   
240
 This recalls the similar situation at the beginning of the Republic, thereby highlighting an important 
Platonic distinction between force and persuasion. 
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According to Griswold, the interlude constitutes one of the most protracted 
sections of irony and humor in the entire Platonic corpus.
241
 Despite what he says 
explicitly, Socrates has not in fact been overwhelmed by Phaedrus’ speech. One 
consequence of this claim is that Socrates’ own speech must be interpreted in the same 
manner. Socrates claims he is overwhelmed by Phaedrus’ performance but Phaedrus is 
suspicious that he is not genuine. Should the reader be suspicious as well?  
b. Distancing maneuver 1: Socrates’ appeal to inspiration 
According to the ironic interpretation, there are two ways Socrates distances 
himself from his first speech. Such a maneuver is evidence that Socrates does not actually 
mean what he says. First, there are his repeated claims that he is inspired. According to 
the interpretation, Socrates is not committed to his speech because he was not in his right 
mind when he gave it. Whether he is actually or not is irrelevant. What matters, 
fundamentally, is that he is not responsible for what comes out of his mouth.  
In fact, it’s quite peculiar the way Socrates contextualizes his inspiration. For one, 
he appeals to several sources of inspiration – Phaedrus’ performance (234d), the Muses 
(237a), and the nymphs (238c9-d1, 241e). His inspiration also needs to be qualified by 
Socratic ignorance, for he states that he does not know “where and from whom I heard 
them [the words of other people streaming in through his ears]” (hupo de nōtheias au kai 
auto touto epilelēsmai, hopōs te kai hōntinōn ēkousa) (235d2-3).  
When Socrates is midway through his speech, he breaks off the discussion and 
states that he is in “the grip of something divine” (theion pathos peponthenai) (238c4). 
Phaedrus acquiesces and Socrates goes on to extrapolate the sources of this divinity – the 
natural setting and the madness of nearby nymphs. The nymphs, specifically, may cause 
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 Griswold (1986) 51-52.  
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him to begin using dithyrambs. Socrates characterizes such a possibility as an attack. 
242
 
This exchange seems to depict two tiers of inspiration. Although Socrates is already 
inspired by something divine – Phaedrus’ performance together with the surrounding 
atmosphere – he recognizes that he can descend further into madness. He is close to 
speaking in dithyrambs (238d2); the attack of the nymphs may yet be stopped (238d5); 
Socrates will find out as he progresses with his speech.
243
  
Consider after all how Socrates mimics Phaedrus’ own ecstatic state. Socrates 
repeatedly characterizes Phaedrus as in a state of frenzy (228b, 234d) and the speech 
itself lambastes the mania of the lover. Socrates not only claims to be inspired, but claims 
it several times, and from several different sources. In this way, Socrates outdoes 
Phaedrus and foreshadows his later re-appropriation of mania in the palinode. If this is 
correct, then Socrates’ appeal to external inspiration is a rhetorical strategy. It is Socrates, 
in fact, who produces the speech.
244
 His claim to be inspired is ironic. That he echoes 
what occurs to Phaedrus coalesces with the protreptic function of irony that I discussed in 
part I of this chapter.  
One weakness with the thesis that Socrates’ appeals to inspiration are ironic is the 
invocation of the Muses, which begins Socrates speech. He invokes them so that they can 
help him perform (237a10). The Muses have a long history associated with inspiration.
245
 
                                                 
242
 Note as well that Socrates also claims that Phaedrus is the cause of his current state. This is not a claim 
that Phaedrus has inspired Socrates. Instead, it is an allusion to Phaedrus forcing Socrates to deliver a 
speech (236c-d).   
243
 Nymphs have already been alluded to in the frame (230b), thereby underscoring the divine nature of the 
environment. Rowe (1986) contextualizes Plato’s appeal to dithyrambs by citing Hippias Major 292c and 
Cratylus 409c, both negative characterizations. Nevertheless, nymphs have a long history associated with 
madness and frenzy – e.g., Theogony 1-7, 130, 187, Odyssey 17.240. 
244
 Griswold (1986) 53 argues that it is indeed Socrates who formulates the speech.  
245
 cf. the opening of both Homeric epics together with Hesiod’s Theogony and Works and Days. 
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The appeal to the Muses is a decisive problem for the ironic interpretation.
246
 In fact, 
properly speaking, the invocation does not function as inspiration conceptualized as 
possession. This is in contrast to how Socrates characterizes the nymphs. Instead, by 
invoking the Muses, Socrates is praying that they will approve of what he says in the 
speech.
247
  
Another glaring weakness of the ironic interpretation is the appearance of the 
daimonion at the end of Socrates’ first speech. The daimonion only appears in order to 
prevent Socrates from doing a serious wrong.
248
 If Socrates’ first speech is ironic, then 
this bankrupts the function of the daimonion. Yet, in all other cases, the daimonion is a 
genuine instance of the divine communicating with Socrates.     
c. Distancing Maneuver 2 – Socrates’ shame 
A second way Socrates distances himself from his speech is by covering his head 
when he performs. This eliminates, or at least minimizes, the shame of having to look 
Phaedrus in the eye.
249
 Ostensibly, this is a reaction to Phaedrus, who has basically forced 
Socrates to speak. By covering his head, Socrates will prevent embarrassment from 
having to look at Phaedrus (237a). In other words, Socrates’ is not fully committed to 
what he says. He is ashamed. Not only has Phaedrus forced his hand, but Socrates also 
frets that he cannot compete with a professional like Lysias. Socrates’ shame arises later 
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 Hackforth, Nussbaum (1986) 202-203. Nussbaum, for instance, contrasts Socrates’ appeal the Muses 
with his later appeals to Pan and the nymphs (279b-c; 262d; 263d-e). She claims that the Muses ought to be 
interpreted as either the Muses of a “healthy rationalism” or of the “middle dialogues” (203). By contrast, 
Rowe (1986) thinks that the appeal to the Muses reveals the ironic nature of the passage, emphasizing 
Socrates later reticence about the speech (241e-242a) and the fact that the inspiration comes from an 
external source. 153  
247
 At Timaeus 27b-c, Socrates urges Timaeus to invoke the gods (27b8) before delivering his speech. In so 
doing, Timaeus prays that the gods will approve of what he says.  
248
 cf. Apology 31d. For Nussbaum (1986) this demonstrates that Socrates is “genuinely tempted to the 
wrong view” (201). 
249
 On the theme of shame in the Phaedrus, consult Griswold (1986) 56-57. 
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when his daimonion causes him to see that the content of his first speech was shameful 
(242d).  
But there is another way of understanding Socrates’ action. It is a temperate 
gesture made in order to quell his erotic attraction for Phaedrus. This functions on two 
levels. The beauty of the physical surroundings, the solitude, and the topic of 
conversation all point to Socrates’ erotic attraction to Phaedrus. Even deeper, the content 
of the speech itself reveals Socrates’ erotic desire for Phaedrus. For on the one hand, as I 
discussed earlier, the non-lover, despite his pretensions of rationality, is still 
fundamentally identical to the lover.
250
 This is so because the non-lover shares the same 
end as the lover. Accordingly, although Socrates valorizes the non-lover, the valorization 
is deceitful. The non-lover (Socrates) is erotically attracted to the lover (Phaedrus).
251
  
There is textual evidence in Socrates’ speech that underscores the thesis that the 
non-lover is Socrates. Granted, the first speech only engages with the lover yet there is 
evidence that Socrates is implicated. In a speech that is relatively blithe about its content, 
the most explicit evaluative statement Socrates makes is that the non-lover prevents his 
beloved from “divine philosophy” (theia philosophia) (239b). The remark is tendentious 
and antithetical to the view of most Athenians.  
Furthermore, consider the ways in which the lover impinges on his beloved, 
particularly in those ways that allude to Socrates. The beloved is kept poor (240a). Why 
does Socrates promote material wealth? One aspect of his philosophical mission is to 
challenge conventional wisdom about the importance of material wealth in the good life. 
It comes as no shock, then, that poverty is simply asserted. It is not wholeheartedly 
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 Linck (2003) follows Rosen (1988) in using ‘concealed lover’ to characterize the non-lover.  
251
 Tejera (1975) and (1992) explicates this thesis. Griswold also makes this connection. 
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condemned. Instead of wealth and community, the boy is left with an older man who has 
lost his physical beauty. Again, this alludes to Socrates’ famous bodily ugliness.  
In a surprising way, Socrates’ implicit erotic attraction to Phaedrus is further 
buttressed by his claim that his interlocutor caused him to give his speech (237a9-10, 
244a1).
252
 Superficially, it is obvious that Phaedrus forced his hand by threatening 
violence. But implicitly, there is also Socrates’ erotic passion for Phaedrus.  
d. The content of Socrates’ first speech 
In the palinode, Socrates renounces his first speech (242e-243a). According to the 
ironic interpretation, Socrates did not seriously advocate the position that the non-lover is 
to be preferred to the lover. His motivation for performing the first speech is protreptic. 
In other words, Socrates seeks to legitimize philosophy in the eyes of Phaedrus. But 
given the limitations of his interlocutor, he cannot engage in straightforward 
philosophical persuasion. Rather, different strategies are needed according to the context 
and aptitudes of the interlocutor. In the case of Phaedrus, who has fallen in love with 
Lysias’ speech, the way forward is through this ecstatic desire. 
From an extra-textual perspective, the palinode more accurately embodies 
Platonic views than Socrates’ first speech. The intelligible realm makes an appearance, as 
does the theory of recollection (249c-d). Furthermore, that the Platonic view comes later 
in the dialogue confirms its a-structure, which I rehearsed earlier. Along this line, 
whereas in the first speech Socrates parrots a conventional view, in the second he 
transitions to the Platonic view.  
Yet, there are several features of the first speech that coalesce with Socratic 
views. For one, Socrates begins by stating the need for definitional knowledge. For only 
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 In fact, Phaedrus is the cause of both speeches.  
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by agreeing on the scope of eros can the lover and the boy make any conceptual progress. 
We should not dismiss this point as a matter of form because the very act of seeking an 
adequate definition presupposes important conceptual content.
253
 Furthermore, while it 
remains undeveloped, there is mention of divine philosophy (239b5), which the lover will 
irrationally keep his beloved away from.  
In light of this point, to what degree is Lysias’ position attractive? Nussbaum, for 
one, claims that the two early speeches embody Plato’s middle position, specifically the 
metaphysical and epistemological precepts of the Phaedo and the Republic. In particular, 
Nussbaum identifies four theses from the Republic that find their way into the two early 
speeches: 
1. The appetites are “blind animal forces” (206). 
2. The non-intellectual elements, if left unchecked, “tend naturally to excess” (206).  
3. The non-intellectual elements are unable to guide a “person towards insight and 
understanding of the good” (206). 
4. The intellectual element are “both necessary and sufficient for the apprehension 
of truth and for right choice” (206). It succeeds the degree to which it rules the 
other elements.  
 
According to the first two speeches, eros is uncontrollable. If it is not reigned in, it 
advances toward immoderation. A life dedicated to eros is not a good life, but a life 
consumed by jealousy and obsession. The best life is one that minimizes eros and 
promotes the intellectual part of the soul. Suddenly, the thesis that it is best to give 
oneself to a non-lover seems less extreme. Rather, in the context of Classical Athens, it 
may well constitute a genuine dilemma for the young male coming of age.
254
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 Consider all of Socrates’ interlocutors in the early definitional dialogues. One of Socrates’ main 
philosophical convictions, it seems, is that genuine knowledge entails the ability to define. One might go so 
far as to claim that this move progresses toward the theory of recollection as well as the theory of Forms in 
Plato’s middle period.  
254
 Nussbaum (1986) 207-208 goes to great lengths in order to legitimize that a young male like Phaedrus 
might well have to make such a decision.  
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Conclusion 
Plato always engages with worthy interlocutors.
255
 It is no secret that the 
dialogues are populated with representatives of sophistry, poetry, and rhetoric.
256
 One of 
Plato’s goals in his dialogues is to legitimize philosophy and debunk its competitors. 
Such a goal is better accomplished by arming Socrates’ interlocutors with strong 
arguments. This has the satisfying effect of giving better definition to the Platonic 
position.  
I evaluated four reasons deployed to justify the ironic interpretation. First, I 
analyzed Phaedrus’ response to Socrates’ reaction. Second and third, I analyzed two ways 
in which Socrates purportedly distances himself from his speech. In the last section, I 
interrogated to what degree the first speech embodies Platonic tenets. The extent to which 
Socrates is not committed to the speech certainly rides on whether or not the speech’s 
content is consistent with his other ideas.   
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Chapter 5 – The Status of Divination in the Phaedrus 
Abstract 
 
In this chapter, I analyze the status of divination in the Phaedrus. The distinction between 
technical and possession divination, which often frames any discussion of Plato and 
divination, is critically evaluated in context with the other forms of madness discussed – 
telistic, poetic, and philosophic. One puzzle that emerges is Socrates’ laudatory account 
of prophetic madness together with the relatively low ranking of divination on the 
hierarchy of souls. I rehearse several attempts to explain this puzzle – Ferrari, Rowe, 
Griswold, and Brisson – and contextualize my own view, which emphasizes the 
epistemological limitations of divination in relation to philosophy, the highest form of 
madness.   
 
Introduction 
 
One primary focus of the Phaedrus is the notion of eros conceptualized as 
madness (mania), although the meaning of this latter concept shifts as the dialogue 
progresses. In the last chapter, I interrogated the first two speeches of the Phaedrus, 
which assert that the temperance (sōphrosunē) of the non-lover is preferred to the 
madness of the lover. The palinode marks a transition; madness is now praiseworthy.  
The notion that madness is beneficial runs opposite the account presented in 
Plato’s middle-dialogues – Phaedo, Symposium, and Republic.257 Has Plato changed his 
mind about the role and value of madness in the good life?
258
 Or does he appropriate and 
transform madness and apply it to philosophy?
259
 Both questions presuppose an account 
of divination; along with poetry and mystic rites, it is the foundation upon which Plato 
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 In the Phaedo, madness is linked to the non-rational components of the soul, which indulge the body. 
This strict division between body and soul emerges again in the Republic’s condemnation of the passions 
(Book I) and its critique of poetry. Finally, consider Alcibiades in the Symposium. He is depicted as the 
polar opposite of Socrates. Whereas Socrates’ account leads to a stable state in communion with the forms, 
Alcibiades is corrupted by the mania of personal love. Nussbaum (1986) 9, 201-204   
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 Naddaf (2012) argues in fact that there is a positive account of inspiration in the Republic, specifically in 
the sense of epipnoia (6.499b-c) and in the appeal to “divine chance” (theia tuchē) (592a8-9). 1-8 
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 Werner (2011) 47-48.  
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rehabilitates madness and incorporates it into his account of the philosopher coming to 
know the intelligible realm.
260
   
In this chapter, I investigate the seemingly ambivalent nature of divination. By 
this, I mean that in the span of four Stephanus pages (Phaedrus 244-248) divination is 
first lauded then devalued. Initially, Socrates states that the best things we have come 
from madness (244b-d); divination is a paradigmatic example. Yet, on the other hand, 
when the hierarchy of souls is presented, divination is ranked comparatively low, beneath 
the financier, the doctor, and the physical trainer (248-e). This ambivalence is not only 
specific to divination; both poetry and mystic rites are subjected to the same 
incongruence.  
In order to remedy this puzzle, it is necessary to contextualize the aims of the 
Phaedrus itself. One interpretation holds that Plato judges the three forms of madness – 
divination, mystic rites, and poetry – to be historically prestigious. This is in contrast to a 
new, higher form of madness – philosophy – which transcends, and debunks, the three 
older ones.
261
 This is untenable to the extent that all three retain a significant level of 
prestige, both in the Phaedrus and in Plato’s later dialogues. My aim in this chapter, then, 
is to develop an account of the three forms of madness that explains their relatively low 
status on the hierarchy of soul. This depends on accounting for the status of all the other 
souls on the list. 
Part I – The Four Forms of Madness 
Socrates’ daimonion triggers his palinode (244a–257b). He is compelled to 
remedy his impiety and do justice to the divine nature of Eros. Socrates should not have 
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 It has been argued that divination’s importance is overestimated. Chiasma (1992) 313-319. 
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 Ferrari (1987) 113-119. 
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rejected Eros due to its negative effects, particularly the loss of self-control that results 
from it.
262
 In fact, Socrates now states that “the best things we have come from madness, 
when it is given as a gift of the god” (nun de ta megista tōn agathōn hēmin gignetai dia 
manias, theia mentoi dosei didomenēs.) (244a9).263 This does not mean that madness is 
an unqualified good. It can still engender vice. In fact, the notion that madness is good 
when it has a divine origin distinguishes it from the human induced madness that was 
presented in the first two speeches. Accordingly, there are now two types of madness at 
play. The first is human, which is still rejected. The second is divine, which is laudable. 
There are at least four sorts of madness that counter the notion that madness is wholly 
evil – mantic, telistic, poetic, and philosophic.264  
The intimate relationship between madness and the divine is fleshed out either in 
a traditional context (i.e., the Olympian gods), or in a philosophical context, which arises 
with philosophical madness. In what follows, I sketch the first three kinds of madness. 
Special emphasis will be placed on prophetic madness, not only because this is my 
primary interest, but also because it is given the most attention. This enables a better 
understanding of the transition to philosophical madness.  
a. Prophetic Madness (244b-d) 
Socrates begins by citing the Pythia at Delphi and the Priestesses at Dodona. Both 
seers constitute model representatives of institutional divination in Ancient Greece.
265
 He 
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 The mad lover cannot control himself (231d4) and acts irrationally (238a1, 238b8) (alogos; aneu logou). 
263
 The phrase – ‘a gift of the god’ – is echoed later when Socrates states that the cicadas can give them the 
“gift from the gods” (ho geras para theōn ekhousin anthrōpois didonai) (259b3) if they proceed with their 
philosophical conversation, which is the best kind of music (259d).  
264
 The list is not automatically exhaustive, as noted by Burger (1980) 48, White (1993) 74, and Werner 
(2011) 50.  
265
 According to Ferrari (1987), the Pythia and the priestesses of Dodona were prestigious in Archaic 
Greece, but that there influence was waning by Plato’s era. This is so although Ferrari himself grants, “the 
123 
 
 
 
goes on to refer to the Sybil, insisting that he will not critically engage with them because 
their authenticity is evident to all.
266
 All three examples of prophetic madness are female. 
According to Socrates, such seers accomplish “little or nothing” (brakhea ē ouden) 
(244b4-5) when in their right mind (sophronousai). Prophetic madness is praiseworthy to 
the extent that it originates from the gods, thereby establishing a distinction between the 
divine and human realms. 
The Pythia is the canonical seer who undergoes possession; this is verified later 
when Socrates rehearses the four forms of madness (265b), and the god that characterizes 
each. In the case of prophecy, it is Apollo. This is so despite the fact that at Dodona, it 
was Zeus who inspired the seers. Indeed, something more must be said about the 
Priestesses at Dodona. Dodona arises later when Socrates rehearses the Egyptian 
rejection of writing. Phaedrus claims that Socrates is good at composing stories (275b). 
Socrates responds: 
…the priests of the temple of Zeus at Dodona say that the first 
prophecies were the words of an oak. Everyone who lived at that 
time, not being as wise as you young ones are today, found it 
rewarding enough in their simplicity to listen to an oak or even a 
stone, so long as it was telling the truth…(275b5-8) 
 
…brakhea ē ouden hoi de g', ō phile, en tō tou Dios tou Dōdōnaiou 
hierō druos logous ephēsan mantikous prōtous genesthai. tois men 
oun tote, hate ouk ousi sophois hōsper humeis hoi neoi, apekhrē 
druos kai petras akouein hup' euētheias, ei monon alēthē legoien… 
 
Socrates must mean the opposite of what is said. His claim about the ancients – that they 
were not as wise as Phaedrus and his generation – is inconsistent with several other 
                                                                                                                                                 
Delphic oracle…was still active in his [Socrates’] time (114). Flower, by contrast, rejects the thesis that 
divination waned in Classical Greece. 
266
 Throughout Classical Greece, there were collections of oracles attributed to among others, the Sibyl(s). 
The chresmologoi were qualified to interpret such oracles. In Old Comedy like Aristophanes, seers are 
often lampooned by being characterized as chresmologoi. It suffices that the Classical authors – Herodotus, 
Euripides, and Plato – continued to distinguish between the two. Flower (2008) 60-64 
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pieces of evidence. For not only does Socrates make the opposite claim at the beginning 
of his Egyptian myth – “I can tell you what I’ve heard the ancients said, though they 
alone know the truth” (akoēn g' ekhō legein tōn proterōn, to d' alēthes autoi isasin) 
(274c1-2) – but the same conviction arises in other dialogues as well.267  
 At Dodona, the method of divination was xylomancy, or divination by trees. A 
large oak tree sat in the sanctuary; the sound of the wind through its leaves was the voice 
of Zeus. The seer interpreted the sounds and was able to glean the will of Zeus. Indeed, 
this allusion to xylomancy is further entrenched at the conclusion of the dialogue when 
Socrates offers a prayer to Pan (279b). The oak tree was sacred to Pan. It is uncertain 
whether or not the seers at Dodona actually underwent possession.
268
 But Plato’s 
depiction reveals how he conceptualized them.  
Possession divination is valuable to the extent that it arises from divine contact; 
he also offers some cursory support via etymological evidence. The ancients used the 
word ‘manic’ for what happens to the Pythia, thereby inextricably “weaving insanity into 
prophecy” (auto touto tounoma emplekontes manikēn ekalesan) (244c2). For Socrates, 
his generation has forgotten this and now includes a tau in the word, forming ‘mantic’.  
Possession divination contrasts with technical divination, which is characterized 
rationally and uses “birds and other signs” (te ornithōn poioumenōn kai tōn allōn 
sēmeiōn) (244c5). It was originally called ‘oionoistic’, which is a combination of 
intelligence (noun) and learning (historian), but now is called ‘oionistic’. Socrates states: 
                                                 
267
 cf. Philebus 16c; Timaeus 22b. The reason Socrates introduces the prophetic site of Dodona is to 
buttress the Socratic tenet that the truth, no matter how it is presented, or from where it stems, is the most 
important. Phaedrus is caught up in irrelevant considerations; all that matters is the truth and the degree to 
which it can be justified. cf. Crito 46b; Protagoras 333c 
268
 Flower (2008) 217.  
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To the extent, then, that prophecy, mantic, is more perfect and more 
admirable than sign-based prediction, oionistic, in both name and 
achievement, madness from a god is finer than self-control of human 
origin, according the testimony of the ancient language givers (244d2-
5).
269
  
 
hosō dē oun teleōteron kai entimoteron mantikē oiōnistikēs, to te onoma 
tou onomatos ergon t' ergou, tosō kallion marturousin hoi palaioi manian 
sōphrosunēs tēn ek theou tēs par' anthrōpōn gignomenēs. 
 
This dichotomy between technical and possession divination proves to be tremendously 
influential.
270
 Possession divination is overtly privileged over technical divination. This is 
so because possession divination stems from a god, and technical divination stems from 
humankind.
271
   
Socrates’ example of technical divination is noteworthy. Augury was a legitimate 
form of divination in ancient Greece, although its eminence had waned by Plato’s time. 
Indeed, in the context of the Homeric epics, one might well claim that augury constituted 
the paradigmatic form of technical divination.
272
 Birds occupy an intermediary stage 
between the human and divine realms.  
b. Telistic Madness (244d-e) 
Telistic madness purifies wrongdoings and can even prophesize certain goods to 
come. One might be part of a cursed family, or be in the process of undergoing hardship. 
Such madness provides temporary relief. The god characteristic of telistic madness is 
Dionysus (265b), thereby suggesting that Socrates is referring to the cults of Dionysus.
273
 
Like prophetic madness, telistic madness emerges at various stages in the dialogue. For 
                                                 
269
 Although the etymologies have been characterized as “extravagant” (Ferrari 114) and “playful” (Burger 
49), most scholars are content to contextualize them in the context of the Phaedrus itself.    
270
 Johnston (2008) notes that “ancient intellectuals…persistently made the distinction between natural and 
artificial types of divination” (9). Cicero’s On Divination is a fine example. 
271
 Werner (2011) 50.  
272
 Halliday (1913) notes many archaic references to augury. 249-261  
273
 Dodds (1951) 75-80; Burkert (1985) 290-95. 
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instance, it undoubtedly refers to the interlude between Socrates’ first and second 
speeches. He has committed a wrong against the gods and needs purification (243a); he 
only realizes this once his daimonion appears.
274
 Telistic madness encompasses a range 
of activities – purifications, prophecies, and mystic rites.275 
That telistic madness might prophesize future goods puts it in close proximity to 
divination. Indeed, seers themselves were often thought to be capable of purification. 
Consider Euthyphro’s occupation – a seer – and what triggers his presence in Athens – 
the presence of pollution (miasma). His father has committed a wrong and together with 
his community is in desperate need of purification. Socrates often discusses the need to 
purify himself.
276
  
c. Poetic Madness (245a) 
Poetry is the third sort of madness. According to Socrates, the poet undergoes 
possession by the Muses (265b) and gains the ability to poeticize the grand elements of 
the past – principally the Homeric epics. One recurrent theme in Plato’s account of poetry 
is the relationship between inspiration and technē. This context is no exception. For 
Socrates, the poet who only possesses the ordinary poet, no matter how skilled, will 
always be trumped by the poet who experiences possession; this underscores yet again 
the distinction between madness and self-control (245a).  
It is not that the poet with technical prowess cannot compose poetry; it is that his 
poetry will be of lesser value than that of the inspired poet. Poetic madness is a necessary 
condition for poetic greatness. The same idea emerges with prophetic madness – the 
                                                 
274
 During the palinode, the language of telistic madness is used with reference to erotic madness (249c7-9, 
250b8, 253c3). Griswold (1986) 77 
275
 Linforth (1946) 163-72. 
276
 cf. Phaedo 60e2; Cratylus 396d-e. For a discussion of knowledge as philosophical purification – Dorter 
(1972) 198-218. For divination and purification in the Phaedo – Morgan (2010) 68-76.  
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distinction between mania and sōphrosunē is tantamount to the distinction between 
greatness and banality.  So far, then, there are now two conceptions of madness at play in 
the dialogue. The first is the human generated madness of lust, and the second is the 
madness originating from a god.
277
 In fact, Socrates asserts as much when he later 
distinguishes between the madness produced by “human illness” (nosēmatōn 
anthrōpinōn) and the other that is “divinely inspired” (theias) (265a). 
d. The Madness of Love (249d-257b) 
Each form of madness, so long as it originates from a god, gives rise to great 
things. According to Socrates, laudable madness also encompasses eros, which is 
governed by Aphrodite. In order to establish this thesis, Socrates first examines the nature 
of the soul and its relationship to the divine. The soul already arose three times earlier in 
the dialogue.
278
 The madness of philosophical lovers must be characterized in stages.
279
 
The first stage consists of an initial perceptible experience of beauty, often through seeing 
it, since vision is the most astute of bodily senses (251d3-4). The soul of such individuals 
fumes and rages (251c1); the psychic shafts or the lover’s soul begin to re-awaken. A 
distinctly human sort of madness permeates the lover – they cannot sleep at night and are 
obsessed with the beloved (251e). 
                                                 
277Werner (2011) writes that “human madness is a state defined by reference to psychic disharmony, and 
not external possession” (51-52) as it is with the case of the seer possessed by Apollo, or the poet possessed 
by the Muses.  
278
 First, in the latter part of Socrates’ first speech, it is claimed that the true object of education (paideusis) 
is the soul (238e-239b). Second, there is the paradoxical claim that the soul itself is a sort of seer (242d), 
that is, it has access to divine truths. Finally, the soul is mentioned in the preceding section on the notion of 
poetic madness. The Muses take an innocent soul (245a2) and enable it to create beautiful speeches, which 
educate laypeople about past glories. In both the first and third instances, there is a practical element to the 
use of soul in that both involve education. This introduces the need to give a more theoretical explanation 
of soul and explains why Socrates so abruptly turns to it. 
279
 I am indebted to Werner (2011) 54-55 for much of this account. 
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In the next stage, the lover’s soul emulates the god it was formerly associated 
with in its psychic state. There is a clear sense of hierarchy here – those associated with 
Zeus emulate him in all of their actions, to the best of his or her ability. This extends to 
the beloved as well, for the lover considers the beloved to reflect the character of Zeus. 
The same thing happens for all of the other gods – Ares, Hera, Apollo, etc.  
In the third stage, the soul of the lover deals with internal strife. The black horse 
(appetite) violently urges for sexual gratification; the charioteer (reason), together with 
the white horse (spiritedness), restrains themselves out of a sense of shame (254c). 
Eventually, the black horse has been tamed, but it has been a struggle. The result is that 
finally the beloved develops reciprocal feelings for the lover, although in a weaker sense 
(255e). The beloved is seeing himself in the lover, as one would in a mirror (255e7). Now 
that the lover and beloved have coupled, there are two possibilities. If they submit to their 
base appetites they will be consigned to live in friendship. By contrast, if the best 
components of their soul become sovereign, they will engender virtue, and live with self-
control (256b).  
Philosophic madness has a lot in common with the intense madness of human 
sexuality, which opens the Phaedrus. Nevertheless, as the philosophical lover reaches the 
apex of his development, madness falls away and is ‘enslaved’ by the charioteer (reason). 
Similarly, there is also some affinity between the divine madness of the seer and poet, 
and the philosophical lover, particularly in the progress of his love. Like the possessed 
seer, the philosopher lacks self-control. He is compelled by the beauty of the beloved. 
Nevertheless, and akin to human induced madness, the developed philosopher transcends 
the waxing and waning of possession. He is self-controlled and self-consciousness. Both 
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of these properties are absent in those who undergo divine madness. In fact, this makes 
sense when we consider the ultimate object of the philosophic madness. It is not the 
anthropomorphic gods that possess the seer and poet, but the Platonic Forms (247c-d).
280
 
Even though philosophic madness trumps the other forms of madness, we must 
still recognize that they are praiseworthy. Accordingly, the puzzle still remains as to why 
they are listed so low on the hierarchy of souls. In the next section, I rehearse the opening 
of the palinode and interrogate several possible hypotheses meant to explain this 
asymmetry.      
Part II – The Hierarchy of Souls 
According to the allegory of the chariot, the soul consists of a charioteer, two 
horses, and wings. Both the horses and the wings enable motion. Whereas the horses are 
responsible for horizontal motion, the wings are responsible for vertical motion. Motion 
is connected to desire.
281
 The charioteer, by contrast, represents reason and is able to 
exercise control over the moving components – the wings would fly blindly without 
reason, and the horses would move without purpose.  
For those few souls, such as the gods, who rise to the highest plane, they will 
come into contact with the Forms, which are immutable and unchanging (247d-e). Such a 
soul has knowledge. For Socrates, the apex is only accessible by the gods (248a); there is 
a three stage hierarchy for everybody else. First, and closest to the divine, are those souls 
who are able to catch a view of reality as it is. Second, there are souls who are pulled 
back and forth between both extremes. They see part of reality but completely miss other 
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 In the intelligible realm, Socrates relates that one will experience Justice Self-control, and Knowledge 
(247d). It is instructive that Self-control is mentioned; this buttresses the idea that the mature philosopher is 
temperate, not mad. 
281
 Eros is the sort of desire associated with wings (251c). 
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parts. Finally, there are those who are simply trying to ascend, but with little success. 
They are consigned to never having seen the intelligible realm (248b).    
Every thousand years, there is a hierarchical incarnation. Socrates enumerates 
souls in descending value; one’s place on this list corresponds to how much of the 
intelligible realm a particular soul has experienced. The list (248d-e): 
1. The lover of wisdom or beauty (philosophou ē philokalou) 
2. The law-abiding King or fit General (basileōs ennomou ē polemikou kai 
arkhikou) 
3. Statesman, household manager, financier (politikou ē tinos oikonomikou ē 
khrēmatistikou) 
4. Doctor and trainer (philoponou ē gumnastikou ē peri sōmatos iasin tinos 
esomenou) 
5. Seer and Priest (mantikon bion ē tina telestikon) 
6. Poets and other representational artists (poiētikos ē tōn peri mimēsin tis allos 
harmosei) 
7. Manual laborer and farmer (dēmiourgikos ē geōrgikos) 
8. Sophist and demagogue (sophistikos ē dēmokopikos) 
9. Tyrant  (turannikos) 
 
The only soul who has ever had the chance to grow wings is the philosopher or the 
person “who loves boys philosophically” (paiderastēsantos meta philosophias) (249a2-
3). This is so because the philosopher’s memory is best. It can recall the intelligible 
realm. One consequence of this proximity to divinity is that everyone else fails to see that 
the philosopher is “possessed by a god” (enthousiazōn, 249d3).  
Most people do not understand the philosopher. Instead, they believe the 
philosopher is mad. For it is when the philosopher sees earthly beauty that he or she is 
reminded of true beauty; turning skyward, the philosopher ignores the perceptible world. 
There is some continuity between the philosopher’s genuine possession, and the lay 
conviction that he or she is mad. Both constitute atypical behavior; the difference is that 
non-philosophers do not perceive the philosopher as someone who has experienced the 
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ineffable. In other words, we must distinguish between the external behavior of the 
philosopher, which is considered by the polloi to be wild and senseless, and the internal 
state of the philosopher, which is manifestly rational. The philosopher has achieved the 
best cognitive state; rapturous joy emerges from this state. 
There are several important puzzles associated with the list of souls. Ostensibly, 
the list acts as a simple demarcation between the philosopher and the non-philosophers. 
Still, questions abound. For one, how are we supposed to connect different souls with 
their appropriate god? Which god, for instance, corresponds to the tyrant? Furthermore, 
how do the multiple vocations within one level relate to one another? For instance, 
Apollo is connected to prophecy and Dionysus to the priest of the mysteries (265b). Do 
the statesman, household manager, and financier each have a separate deity? Finally, 
consider the hierarchy itself. Why does the doctor rank higher than the poet or seer, if 
poetic and prophetic madness are great gifts bestowed upon humankind? In the next 
section, I examine the hierarchy of souls with the aim of explaining why the three forms 
of madness occupy their station. 
Part III – The Status of Divination in the Phaedrus 
 There have been various attempts to solve the puzzle between the laudable 
account of prophetic madness (242c) and the seer’s comparatively lower rank on the 
hierarchy of souls (248d-e). One effort has been to apply the distinction between 
possession and technical divination to the hierarchy of souls.
282
 In extolling prophetic 
madness, Socrates privileges possession divination while discrediting technical 
divination. Their difference turned on the presence or absence of divine madness.  
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Since technical divination like augury does not consist of becoming possessed by 
a god, it cannot compare to someone like the Pythia. Nevertheless, the technical seer is 
still a seer. Accordingly, the fifth rank on the hierarchy is actually the technical seer. A 
similar explanation, in fact, could be given for poetry. Some poets learn how to compose 
poetry, but the truly valuable poetry must come from a possessed poet. This, then, 
explains the poet’s low rank on the hierarchy. Socrates is merely referring to the 
uninspired, technical poet.  
 There are three problems with this explanation. First, this still leaves unexplained 
why divination occupies the fourth rung, and poetry the fifth. In other words, there needs 
to be something else provided in order to make sense of the division between the kinds of 
madness. Second, although the distinction between possession and technical divination 
exists in poetry as well, there is no such division presented in telistic madness. Yet it is 
still ranked with divination on the fifth rung. Third, and the most glaring problem, if it is 
the case that technical divination occupies the fifth rung, then the word oionistikon should 
be used instead of mantikon. But the latter is employed. This suggests that if it is anyone, 
it is the possessed seer who it intended. In the following, I rehearse several other accounts 
that seek to explain the discrepancy.   
a. Ferrari’s Account 
 Ferrari proposes that the three forms of madness constitute an historical claim.
 283
 
Issues of temporality pepper each account. In the case of telistic madness, for instance, 
“ancient crimes” (epeita khronon) (243e3) are relieved; poetic madness glorifies 
“achievements of the past” (tōn palaiōn erga) (245a2-3). Finally, the oracular sites at 
Delphi and Dodona, together with the Sybil have historical prestige. Ferrari also points 
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out that the etymological evidence must be characterized along these lines. Those ancient 
people who constructed the language “in the old days” (tōn palaiōn) (244b8) thought 
madness was commendable, so they connected it to prophecy.  
 For Ferrari, Socrates is sincere in his praise for these historical forms of madness. 
However, his praise must be qualified according to the baggage each art acquires as it 
develops down through the centuries. This baggage has two components. First, it shows 
that present day people care more about linguistic differences (omegas and omicrons) 
then the genuine distinction between possession and technical divination. Second, the 
technical poet is ignorant in the sense that he thinks he can develop his expertise merely 
by recourse to “textbook codification” (Ferrari 116).284 Ferrari contextualizes this in the 
context of the subsequent critique of rhetoric, which falls prey to the same criticism. 
Rhetoric, in Plato’s time, relies on too many formalized rules.285 
Other signposts ground the idea that we must qualify Socrates’ praise for divine 
madness. For one, Ferrari notes that Socrates characterizes himself as a seer, though not 
an altogether “serious one” (spoudaios) (242c4-5). Similarly, consider that Socrates’ 
daimonion, which enjoys affinity with divination, is what initially triggers the Palinode. 
The daimonion exclusively negates (Apology 31c); it is left to Socrates to use his critical 
capacities to interpret its meaning.  In other words, like the interpreter of the Pythia, 
Socrates must evaluate his daimonion. This introduces the role for a new sort of madness 
– philosophic madness. For Ferrari, philosophy replaces the older divine forms of 
madness.  
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 Ferrari characterizes the technical seer in the same way.  
285
 Ferrari contrasts the historically prestigious forms of madness with contemporary technai like medicine, 
and contemporary dramatists like Sophocles and Euripides. He states that Socrates “adduces rather those 
ancient rites of healing which Hippocratic physicians in his day were casting in the unfavourable light of 
superstition” (114). Ferrari cites Lloyd (1979) for this topic.  
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This distinction, between historical forms of madness (prophetic, telistic, and 
poetic) and the new form of madness (philosophy) constitutes Ferrari’s response to the 
puzzle of the hierarchy of souls. Although the seer and poet are historically prestigious, 
there are transcended by philosophy. As a caveat to this, Ferrari maintains that Plato 
undoubtedly intends for the reader to experience a level of cognitive dissonance. The 
reason being that the transition to philosophy is not seamless, but fraught with uneven 
terrain.  
Like the first proposal, I submit three problems with Ferrari’s account. The first 
centers on Socrates’ claim that he is not a serious seer. Ferrari presents this as a hint that 
Socrates accepts the divine forms of madness, but only in a qualified sense. Socrates is 
not entirely earnest in his affirmation. But the translation of spoudaios is contestable. The 
most common translation is ‘earnestness’, which agrees with Ferrari’s use. This indeed 
introduces a playful, or ironic, tone.  
Yet another possible translation of spoudaios, which I think is stronger in this 
context, is being ‘good’ or ‘excellent’; Socrates is thus merely claiming to be a competent 
seer. This translation, which is now commonplace, is the one I favor. The reason for 
preferring this translation is Socrates’ analogy with people who can just barely read and 
write (242a). Although such people do not have a technē, or have knowledge in the 
propositional sense, the do have a certain rudimentary ability, which shares features with 
knowledge, and is probably best characterized as a kind of ability, or know-how. Indeed, 
such an analogy has a great deal of affinity with divination. The Pythia cannot explain her 
oracle much like the language speaker cannot explain the linguistic rules that underlie 
their language use. 
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Another issue is historical, namely the degree to which the influence of the three 
forms of madness had actually waned by Plato’s time. Although it contributes to Ferrari’s 
case to claim that by the 4
th
 century, the prestige of the Pythia was abetting, it is not 
altogether clear that that is the case. This is not fatal to Ferrari’s interpretation; he can 
still rely on the textual evidence that clearly depicts historical considerations as a central 
feature of how to think about the divine forms of madness. Finally, Ferrari fails to explain 
why the seer and the priest of mystic rites are ranked above the poet and representational 
artist.
286
 
b. Brisson’s Account 
Brisson’s account is more comprehensive than that of Ferrari. This is so due to his 
explicit aim to clarify the nature of divination in the Phaedrus as well as Plato’s 
dialogues more generally. This synoptic approach does not negate Brisson’s ability to 
shed light on specific puzzles. For instance, Brisson emphasizes that telistic madness and 
prophetic madness share a great deal of affinity, and indeed together seem to have more 
in common with philosophic madness than poetic madness.
287
  
 Even more fruitfully, when Brisson distinguishes between the first three forms of 
madness and philosophic madness, he does so by appeal to the former’s epistemological 
status. In a word, all three forms of madness constitute technai. Divination “implique un 
savoir” (227) that is not scientific, but technical in nature. The evidence for this is not 
only in the Phaedrus – it is obvious that the technical seer has a technē – but also in other 
dialogues. This is an important point, if it stands up to critical evaluation, because it 
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 He does have a good explanation for why the doctor is ranked so high, which depends upon Socrates’ 
discussion of medicine later in the dialogue.  
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 On the affinity between prophetic and telistic madness – Ion 533-536d. On their affinity with 
philosophic madness as opposed to poetic madness – Symposium 202e-203a, 188b-c, 187a-e. Brison (1974) 
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explains the place of the seer and poet on the hierarchy of souls. Both register beneath the 
doctor but above the farmer and other productive laborers, that is, both are bookended by 
technai. This strongly reinforces the idea that technical expertise is constitutive of 
divination, mystic rites, and poetry.
288
  
 Indeed, Brisson characterizes the fourth rung – the doctor or trainer – as 
essentially the person who favors physical activity. In a way this points to the higher 
rung, the general, since he who is interested in military affairs must take care of the 
body.
289
 In fact, since the doctor is undoubtedly someone with technical expertise, 
Brisson rejects the notion that the fourth rung – the philoponos – should actually be 
conceptualized as a doctor! Rather, it must be someone who is concerned with the 
development of the body – in order to “retablir l’equilibre de l’organisme” (232) – but 
not in a curative sense, but in the sense of exercise. In other words, if the goal is a healthy 
body, it is the difference between taking a pill and training your body.  
 Brisson organizes the hierarchy of souls in the following way: 
Group 1:  
 
1. The lover of wisdom   
2. The lover of beauty 
3. The law-abiding King and the fit General 
4. Statesman, household manager, financier  
 
Group 2: 
 
5. Doctor and trainer  
 
Group 3:  
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 Brisson (1974) notes that in characterizing divination as a technē, and indeed as an auxiliary to royalty 
(Statesman 290c-291a), Plato is tapping into a tradition that goes back to Homer (Odyssey 17.382-85). 227-
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 Part of Brisson’s (1974) claim is to underscore how Plato separates occupations that in the Republic are 
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6. Seer and Priest 
7. Poets and other representational artists  
8. Manual laborer and farmer 
 
Group 1b
290
 
 
9. Sophist  
10. Demagogue  
11. Tyrant291 
 
As is clear, the sixth, seventh, and eighth stages constitute one group, specifically their 
epistemological nature as constitutive of a technē. This yet necessitates the need to 
explain why they register in their particular order. For one, Brisson notes that unlike the 
Republic where the imitative artist is banished, here he is brought into the fold. The 
reason the seer and priest are ranked higher than the imitative artist is because Plato 
considers such practices less ambiguous than poetry. In fact, to a certain degree, all three 
forms of divine madness are somewhat ambiguous. In later dialogues, unsatisfied with 
this ambiguity, Plato goes to specify them as much as possible, thereby making them as 
beneficial as possible. Nevertheless, even in the context of this ambiguity, Brisson claims 
that poetry and the other imitative arts are more ambiguous than divination and 
purification, threreby justifying their lower station.
292
  
 For Brisson, the first three forms of divine madness “s’exercent dans le monde 
sensible, soumis au passage du temps et appréhendé par l’opinion vraie (234). In other 
words, each form of madness functions in the sensible world. Epistemologically 
speaking, such practices can only ever be said to have true beliefs. Philosophic madness, 
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 Group 1b is an inverted, and distorted, version of group 1. For instance, the demagogue is the distorted 
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 Brisson (1974) 233.  
292
 Brisson (1974) writes that the poetic madness “étant affectée d’un degré d’amiguité plus marqué que les 
deux précédentes” (235). Even stronger, he goes on to say that the seer and priest disclose the sacred, 
whereas the poet discloses the profane.   
 
138 
 
 
 
by contrast, aims at the intelligible world about which it can have knowledge. These are 
crucial points to understanding the scope of the divine forms of madness. The seer and 
the poet are inspired by the gods, who while enjoying proximity to the intelligible realm 
nevertheless occupy the sensible world.  
Not only is it the case that we must cash out the epistemology of the seer by 
recourse to the strong division between the intelligible and sensible words – that we can 
only opine the sensible world and know the intelligible world – but Plato is quite clear 
that seers are unable to give an account of their true claims. This is so because the seer, 
specifically the possessed seer, is literally possessed by a god.
293
 Brisson goes on to 
discuss Plato’s rehabilitation, and transformation, of divination and mystic rites in the 
later dialogues.
294
  
 Brisson’s explanation is impressive, but there are still certain threads left 
unexplored. For instance, he correctly emphasizes that Plato repeatedly characterizes 
divination as a technē, but the full force of his account depends upon the notion that seers 
and poets only have access to true beliefs. This is so because they function in the sensible 
world. In this sense, all technai, including farming, must be categorized low on the 
hieararchy. This is what we see on the hierarchy of souls.  
Nevertheless, there is, I submit, an important difference between all the technai 
that populate Plato’s dialogues, and the epistemological status of the seer and poet. What 
is emphasized in dialogues like the Meno is that the seer cannot offer an account of their 
divinations. In other words, although they may claim something true, they cannot justify 
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account of the mortal soul and the site of divination in the Timaeus. Second, he examines the political role 
in the context of the Laws.  
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it. This seems to me altogether different than the claim that the farmer only has access to 
true beliefs because his knowledge is of the sensible world. Note as well that this division 
cannot be resolved chronologically by insisting that the introduction of the 
sensible/intelligible world distinction transforms Plato’s theory of knowledge. Divination 
is still treated as a technē in a late dialogue like the Statesman. I return to this after 
rehearsing Griswold’s account.   
c. Griswold’s Account 
Griswold picks up on the notion that the final few rungs mirror the first few, and 
applies it to the whole hierarchy.
295
 The difference between them is the difference 
between care and distortion: 
1. Philosopher – care of the soul 
2. King or General – care of the city  
3. Statesman, household manager, or financier – care of the city 
4. Doctor or trainer – care of the body 
5. Prophet or Priest – care of the gods  
6. Poet or representation artists – distortion of the gods 
7. Manual laborer or farmer – distortion of the body 
8. Sophist or demagogue – distortion of the city 
9. Tyrant – distortion of the soul 
 
In other dialogues, the tyrant lives the worst possible life, precisely because his soul is the 
most unharmonious.  
There are several problems with this explanation. First, the distinction between 
the fifth and sixth rungs is dubious. If madness is laudable in divination and poetry, then 
both can be exemplary. Contrastingly, without madness, both are rather ordinary. The 
Pythia displays nothing of value when in her right mind; the poet with technical 
proficiency is banal without inspiration from the Muses. So why does divination 
constitute care of the city and not poetry? In both of Plato’s ideal states, the poets will 
                                                 
295
 Griswold (1986) 102-104. 
140 
 
 
 
have a central role to play.
296
 By the same token, criticisms of divination populate the 
dialogues, both early and late.
297
  
Rather than depict the hierarchy according to the care/distortion distinction, I 
think there is great merit in conceptualizing the hierarchy in terms of epistemology. This 
is, in part, an interpretation developed by Rowe, but mine goes further in several respects. 
For instance, like Griswold, Rowe fails to give an account as to why divination and 
mystic rites are ranked above poetry and the other mimetic arts. The criterion for ranking 
souls is based on how much of the intelligible realm a particular soul has experienced. In 
what follows, I examine each entry of the hierarchy of soul in order to contextualize its 
place. This depends upon other inter-textual evidence as well as extra-textual evidence 
from other dialogues, notably the Republic and Meno.  
i. The lover of wisdom or beauty –  
The entire palinode is meant to validate Eros and this includes specifying its 
appropriate object. The philosopher’s soul is that which has come into the closest contact 
with the intelligible realm. Strictly speaking, since there is an inextricable connection in 
the Phaedrus between philosophy and Eros, the philosopher’s soul, due to his or her very 
embodiment, is unable to remain in the intelligible realm and has taken “on a burden of 
forgetfulness and wrongdoing” (lēthēs te kai kakias plēstheisa barunthē) (248c7-8).  
Nevertheless, it still remains the case that the philosopher’s soul is that which has 
seen the most of the intelligible realm (248d2). The intelligible realm is specified as: 
What is in this place is without color and without shape and without 
solidity, a being that really is what it is, the subject of all true 
knowledge, visible only to intelligence, the soul’s steersman. Now a 
god’s mind is nourished by intelligence and pure knowledge, as is the 
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mind of any soul that is concerned to take in what is appropriate to it, 
and so it is delighted at last to be seeing what is real and watching what 
is true…(247c6-d4). 
 
hē gar akhrōmatos te kai askhēmatistos kai anaphēs ousia ontōs ousa, 
psukhēs kubernētē monō theatē nō, peri hēn to tēs alēthous epistēmēs 
genos, touton ekhei ton topon. hat' oun theou dianoia nō te kai epistēmē 
akēratō trephomenē, kai hapasēs psukhēs hosē an melē to prosēkon 
dexasthai, idousa dia khronou to on agapa te kai theōrousa talēthē… 
 
Socrates goes on to relate that the sort of knowledge associated with this realm is 
authentic knowledge (247e2).
298
 Thus, the philosopher’s soul is ranked highest because it 
is the closest to knowing the intelligible realm.    
ii. The lawful king, or someone fit for generalship and ruling –  
 In the Republic, the ideal state will only emerge if (1) a philosopher becomes a 
king, or (2) a king becomes a philosopher (473d).
299
 If this is so, the connection between 
the philosopher and the lawful king may only be a matter of degree. In fact, according the 
Republic, a lawful king – the sort that would rule the ideal state – would be best in both 
war and philosophy (543a). 
It is instructive to meditate on the connection between the king and the general. In 
Republic VIII, Socrates presents a regress of states and the souls that mirror them. The 
first stage after the Kallipolis is the timocracy (547a-550b), which is ruled by those who 
privilege victory and honor (548c). It constitutes the midpoint between aristocracy (e.g., 
the Kallipolis) and oligarchy (547c), and fundamentally concerns itself with matters of 
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“warfare and warlike activities” (all' apo ergōn tōn te polemikōn kai tōn peri ta polemika) 
(549a5). The timocratic soul is governed by the spirited part of the soul (Republic 548c); 
its authority emerges because there is fear to appoint wise individuals as rules. 
Consequently, there is an inclination toward those individuals with a natural aptitude for 
war, as opposed to peace (547e). In other words, individuals who have a “love of victory 
and the love of honor” (philonikiai kai philotimiai) (548c3-4). They justify themselves by 
their aptitude and deeds in war (549a4-5). This underscores the affinity between the 
second best constitution, together with the second best soul, and concern for military 
affairs.  
 The only allusion to kings and kingship in the Phaedrus is when Socrates 
recounts the tale of writing in Egypt. At the time, Thamus was king and when persuaded 
by Theuth, an Egyptian God, to disseminate writing throughout Egypt, he argued that 
rather than aiding a person’s memory, writing actually caused more forgetfulness in the 
soul. The distinction between knowledge and ignorance is absolutely central to Platonic 
epistemology and Thamus’ reasoning demonstrates his expertise. After all, given that 
Thamus’ argument is deployed in the service of Socrates’ argument, he should be 
considered the paradigmatic lawful king. In fact, furthering buttressing Thamus’ stature is 
that he was considered to be the king of the Egyptian gods. This underscores his divinity 
and therefore his prestige. 
iii. The statesman, household manager, or financier –  
The third stage marks the end of the ruling-classes. The souls associated with 
these occupations do govern, but neither with the exemplary knowledge of the 
philosopher nor with the spirited expertise of the king (Republic 547e). Nevertheless, 
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there is a marked shift once we get to the doctor and trainer on the fourth rung. Although 
there is scant mention of these occupations throughout the rest of the dialogue, we can 
glean some idea of their expertise from other political dialogues like the Republic and the 
Statesman.  
Consider the Republic and the next stage in the degeneration of states. After 
timocracy there is the oligarchy. The principal interest of the oligarchic soul is money 
(Republic 554a). The degeneration consists of a slide from “victory-loving and honor-
loving men” to “lovers of making money” (anti dē philonikōn kai philotimōn andrōn 
philokhrēmatistai kai philokhrēmatoi teleutōntes egenonto) (551a5-6). Consequently, this 
city is two cities, one poor and one rich (551d). How this comes about is that the 
oligarchic soul has been affected by poverty since the timocratic soul did not have 
sufficient concern for such material goods.  
Indeed, although it is generally situated in Plato’s later period, the introduction of 
the method of collection and division in the Phaedrus’ latter stages (265-266) certainly 
looks forward to dialogues like Statesman. The principal goal of the Statesman is to 
clarify the nature of the statesman’s expertise. One of statesmanship’s essential features 
is that it governs over the rest of the citizenry. In this way, it is akin to a shepherd 
overlooking his or her flock (Statesman 267d). The rest of the citizenry possess crafts 
subordinate to the statesman (290b-c). Accordingly, such expertise is more laudable than 
other crafts.  
One might take exception with the introduction of technē here, but it ought to be 
pointed out that technai have always been granted epistemological status (Apology 22d). 
The search for the political technē is a consistent theme in Plato’s dialogues. Technical 
144 
 
 
 
knowledge is genuine knowledge; it is not the highest form of knowledge but it does have 
advantages. Note, as well, that statesmanship is regularly connected with the king 
(Statesman 259b; 276e), thereby underscoring the continuities between them. 
iv. The doctor or trainer –  
The souls associated with the doctor and trainer marks an important transition, 
and devolution, from the first three rungs. The object of the philosopher’s expertise is the 
cosmos (which includes the state) and the object of the king and statesman is the state.  
But with these occupations, we have a less comprehensive expertise, namely that of the 
human body.
 300
  Medicine, in particular, often crops up in the early dialogues as Socrates 
works through the technē analogy for morality.301 According to this proposal, as medicine 
improves the health of the body, moral knowledge improves the soul. Indeed, later in the 
dialogue, Socrates develops a rapport between rhetoric and medicine. According to 
Socrates, “in both cases we need to determine the nature of something – of the body in 
medicine, of the soul in rhetoric (ho autos pou tropos tekhnēs iatrikēs hosper kai 
rhētorikēs) (Phaedrus 270b5-6).” 
What qualifies as knowing medicine? One must not only know how to engender a 
certain effect in a body, but know the scope of such treatments – the timing and the 
intensity (268c). Otherwise, the person is wrong to call himself a doctor. In fact, one must 
understand the whole – both body and soul. Hippocrates and “true argument” (ho alēthēs 
logos) (270c8) say this. 
The Charmides supports the notion that one must take into account the whole. At 
157b, Socrates states that good doctors cannot treat the eyes without treating the head, 
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over the nature of justice.  
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and cannot treat the head without treating the whole body. In other words, treating the 
part necessarily encompasses the whole. This is the mistake of most Greek doctors – they 
fail to recognize that they must treat the whole, which of course includes the soul!
302
  
So, to recapitulate, medicine and gymnastics occupy their place because medicine 
encompasses the body together with the soul.  
Although Plato regularly connects medicine and divination
303
, there is an 
important sense in which they are dissimilar, namely with respect to inspiration. It is for 
this reason that the seer and the priest of the mysteries are placed lower on the hierarchy. 
For rather than possessing technical knowledge, the seer has right opinion.  
v. The seer or priest –  
The epistemological status of divination regularly emerges throughout the 
dialogues. In the Meno, for instance, Socrates states that the outcome of divination, 
conceptualized as the result of inspiration, is not knowledge but right opinion (99c). This 
contradicts the thesis that divination is a technē.  
The idea occurs when Socrates and Meno realize that because there are no 
teachers of virtue, and that since every technē is teachable, virtue cannot be taught (96d). 
It is Socrates who realizes that the assumption – “only knowledge can lead to correct 
action” (phronēsis monon hēgeitai tou orthōs prattein) (Meno 97c1) – is false. In fact, 
right opinion, so long as one has it, will always lead to right action. This is what 
differentiates it from sheer luck. 
The distinguishing characteristic of knowledge is that it is tied down by “an 
account of reason” (aitias logismō) (98a3). Right opinion, by contrast, is unstable. Yet, in 
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the present discussion on how to achieve virtue, knowledge has failed as a candidate. 
Thus, Socrates surmises that becoming virtuous must be a matter of simply developing 
the correct ideas about virtue in whatever way possible (e.g., through habituation). The 
statesman who makes fine speeches has right opinion and in this way as well:  
…they (statesmen) are no different from soothsayers and prophets. 
They too say many true things when inspired, but they have no 
knowledge of what they are saying. (99c2-4).
304
  
 
…ouden diapherontōs ekhontes pros to phronein ē hoi khrēsmōdoi 
te kai hoi theomanteis: kai gar houtoi enthousiōntes legousin men 
alēthē kai polla, isasi de ouden hōn legousin. 
 
And later: 
We should be right to call divine also those soothsayers and 
prophets whom we just mentioned, and all the poets, and we 
should call no less divine and inspired, those public men who are 
no less under the gods’ influence and possession, as their lead to 
success in many important matters, though they have no 
knowledge of what they are saying (99c8-d5). 
 
orthōs ar' an kaloimen theious te hous nundē elegomen 
khrēsmōdous kai manteis kai tous poiētikous hapantas: kai tous 
politikous oukh hēkista toutōn phaimen an theious te einai kai 
enthousiazein, epipnous ontas kai katekhomenous ek tou theou, 
hotan katorthōsi legontes polla kai megala pragmata, mēden 
eidotes hōn legousin. 
 
Socrates goes full circle and returns to the topic of virtue. If it is neither an innate talent, 
nor something that can be taught, he concludes by a process of elimination that virtue is 
the result of inspiration akin to occupations that encompass divine contact.
305
  
vi. The poets or other representational artists –  
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From an epistemological perspective, the poets seem equivalent with the seers. 
Both types of soul lack knowledge, but they do have right opinion, which is the result of 
inspiration, not technē. So what justifies the poet’s lower place? The answer hinges on 
the reference to imitation. 
 It is well established that Plato’s greatest problem with the poets is their 
affirmation of mimesis.
306
 At Republic III, Socrates claims that due to the specialization 
of labor – that a person can only do well in one vocation – imitation is self-defeating. 
This is so because Socrates thinks that imitation is itself one vocation, and so whatever 
the imitator imitates, say medicine, is something else (394e-395b).  
 Furthermore, imitation consumes the individual such that the distinction between 
himself and what is imitated becomes blurred. According to Plato, this can have the 
disastrous consequence of molding individuals in the wrong way (395d). This does leave 
open the possibility that a poet might confine himself to only composing works that 
imitate decent people, and we will return to this idea shortly. 
In the meantime, however, there is blanket condemnation of imitation at Republic 
X. This is stronger due to the metaphysical and epistemological theses established in 
Books IV-VII. The existence of the intelligible realm diminishes the value of the sensible 
realm, which in turn, diminishes imitations of the sensible realm, whence poetry. This 
strong position on poetry has generated a great deal of controversy. What I would like to 
emphasize in this debate, and what informs my own argument, is the line that recognizes 
Plato’s affability to the poets in what is considered his late work. In other words, rather 
than totally banishing the poets from the ideal state, there seems to be good evidence for 
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thinking that Plato has a more moderate view, namely one that refines and transforms 
poetry.  
 With this mind, poetry’s station, beneath divination and purification, rests on its 
mimetic nature. Although imitation is not a principal theme of the Phaedrus, there is 
some lexical evidence. Later in Socrates’ palinode, as he extrapolates the soul’s ascent, 
he states that the person who witnesses “a godlike face or some form of body which 
imitates beauty well” (hotan theoeides prosōpon idē kallos eu memimēmenon ē tina 
sōmatos idean) (251a3-4) will feel ill (251b1) as their wings develop. Further on, as 
Socrates discusses how each soul aligns itself with a god, he remarks that the soul honors 
the god by “imitating him” (ekeinon timōn te kai mimoumenos eis to dunaton zē ) 
(252d3). The same thought occurs again (253b5). What this means is that the proper 
activity of a human soul is to imitate, to the best of its ability, the sovereign god through 
which it aligns itself. The problem with imitation, however, is that it does not always 
mimic appropriate objects like the gods.   
vii. The manual laborer or farmer –  
In the final three rungs, the regression from knowledge to ignorance continues. It 
is possible to translate demiourgikos as ‘craftsmen’ where we ought to think of the farmer 
as the paradigmatic example of someone with a productive technē. The good of farming 
is to produce food (Euthyphro 14c), and this often gets developed in the political 
dialogues.  
For instance, in the Republic, farming arises in the discussion of the ideal state, 
which contains three classes of citizens (466b; 547d). There is also a reaffirmation of this 
point in the frame of the Timaeus (17c). Consider also the myth of the metals. According 
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to Socrates, the god who created humankind mixed gold into those who are fit to rule, 
silver into the auxiliaries, and finally, “iron and bronze in the farmers and other 
craftsmen” (tois te geōrgois kai tois allois dēmiourgois) (415a5). The farmer exemplifies 
the working class in the ideal state and is its lowest member, beneath both the rulers and 
the auxiliaries.   
Like every other occupation in the Republic, farming is subject to the 
specialization of labor. The farmer will only pursue farming and nothing else. Whatever 
surplus of food he produces will be distributed amongst the citizenry. Indeed, this point is 
re-affirmed in the Critias, where is it asserted that the true farmer is none other than the 
person who devotes themselves exclusively to farming (111e). 
Like medicine, farming emerges in the latter half of the Phaedrus. As Socrates 
develops his condemnation of writing, he connects it with painting. Both seem alive but 
are actually silent. When you question a text or a painting, it cannot help but say the same 
thing. Since it cannot speak for itself, it requires the support of its father – the writer or 
the painter. By contrast, if a “discourse that is written, with knowledge, in the soul of the 
listener; it can defend itself, and it knows for whom it should speak and for whom it 
should remain silent” (hos met' epistēmēs graphetai en tē tou manthanontos psukhē, 
dunatos men amunai heautō, epistēmōn de legein te kai sigan pros hous dei) (276a5-7).  
An analogy develops then in the context of farming, between the farmer who 
would plant in the middle of summer to immediately bear fruit (and did this seriously) or 
rather, would he employ his expertise to plant when it was appropriate and be content that 
it bore fruit later (some 7 months later). The latter is preferred. Similarly, “the 
dialectician chooses a proper soul and plants and sows (phuteuē te kai speirē) within it 
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discourse accompanied by knowledge” (276e). Thus, at their very best, texts only remind 
people of what is already known.   
On the face of it, farming seems oddly placed. As a technē, albeit a minor one, it 
seems as though it ought to be ranked two places higher, above the seer and the poet. 
This is so because the farmer actually possesses technical knowledge; the other two only 
possess true beliefs.
307
 
viii. The sophist or demagogue –  
The sophist and demagogue register one step down beneath the productive technē. 
In fact, according to Plato, the sophist does not actually possess a technē at all. Rather, he 
characterizes the expertise of the sophist, together with the orator and the cosmetician, to 
be more akin to a knack than a technē (Gorgias 463b). One way to understand this idea of 
a knack is to think of it as a distorted, or alien, version of a genuine technē. According to 
Socrates, just as pastry making is a distorted version of medicine, so too is sophistry a 
distorted version of legislation (Gorgias 465c4-5). 
In the Republic’s degeneration of states, the sophist and demagogue embody the 
ethos of the democracy. In an oligarchy, the poor come to deeply resent the rich, resulting 
in a struggle between the two groups. Democracy emerges when the poor are victorious. 
Under this constitution, one finds all kinds of people. There develops false and arrogant 
convictions. Sophistry is antithetical to philosophy. It privileges opinion over knowledge, 
rhetorical victory over genuine inquiry, and embodies a relativistic moral position that 
Plato finds abhorrent no less than completely wrong. Plato’s rejection of the sophists is 
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well-known.
308
 It is not only that the sophist is ignorant, but that they willingly mislead 
others as well. In this way, they qualify for such a long rung on the hierarchy of souls. 
They are outdone by only one other occupation – the tyrant.  
ix. The tyrant –  
The tyrant is the person with the most corrupt soul. The largest discussion of the 
tyrant emerges in Republic Book IX. The development of the tyrant occurs when a 
powerful erotic love, “like a great winged drone” (hupopteron kai megan kēphēna tina) 
(572e7) is implanted and made leader of a person’s desires. The drone then: 
…adopts madness as its bodyguard and becomes frenzied. If it finds 
any beliefs or desires in the man that are thought to be good or that still 
have some shame, it destroys them and throws them out, until it’s 
purged him of moderation and filled him with imported madness 
(573a6-4). 
 
…tote dē doruphoreitai te hupo manias kai oistra houtos ho prostatēs 
tēs psukhēs, kai ean tinas en autō doxas ē epithumias labē poioumenas 
khrēstas kai eti epaiskhunomenas, apokteinei te kai exō ōthei par' 
hautou, heōs an kathērē sōphrosunēs, manias de plērōsē epaktou. 
 
It is instructive to note that the concept of mania is conceptualized negatively, and this 
ought to recall Socrates’ and Lysias’ speech at the beginning of the Phaedrus. Recall that 
erotic love, in those two initial speeches, was characterized as wholly negative.  
 The tyrant is ruled by erotic love, and this can be explicated in terms of the 
appetitive part of the soul. In this way, the tyrant is actually a slave (577c). Consequently, 
the tyrant is unable to do what he wants, that is, unable to do what is best for him. Also, 
keep in mind that the tyrant’s desires can never be genuinely satisfied. Anytime an object 
of his desire appears, the tyrant will be compelled to try and satisfy it. Sometimes, he will 
not be able to satisfy these desires, thereby generating discontentment, and anyway, by 
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pursuing one appetite, he necessarily precludes pursuing another, yielding more 
discontent.  
 The tyrant’s sense of his own good is distorted. He is enslaved, full of disorder, 
regretful, poor, and governed by fear (577c-578a). In pursuing injustice, the tyrant rejects 
justice, condemning it in ignorance (589c). Indeed, the tyrant must be discreetly 
persuaded of his error. In other words, the essence of the tyrant is someone who pursues 
all the wrong things, and so is in complete ignorance about what is true, and what is 
valuable to pursue. Consider the in-depth discussion of tyranny at Republic IX.  
Conclusion 
 I have attempted to resolve the apparent inconsistency between the thesis that 
prophetic madness is laudable and that the soul of the seer is not as esteemed as that of 
the financier or even the doctor. My argument depends upon contextualizing the value of 
prophetic madness once philosophical madness has properly taken hold. This does not 
totally debunk prophetic madness but it does noticeably transform and restrict it, 
particularly when cast in epistemological terms. More concretely, I have argued that 
while prophetic madness remains laudable due to its divine connections, it cannot sustain 
itself on the level of knowledge.  
 Rather, I have argued that divination can only access true beliefs, however 
superlative, and that this explains the apparent inconsistency between the two references 
to divination under consideration. Part of the project of justifying this thesis is to show 
that Plato does in fact make the connection between divination and true belief, and that 
the other members of the hierarchy can be appropriately extrapolated via epistemology.  
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 This focus on true belief might seem puzzling in the context of the Phaedrus, but 
as we turn to the Symposium in the next chapter, and in particular, the figure of Diotima 
and her exchange with Socrates in the penultimate speech of the symposium on Eros, I 
hope to show how true beliefs are absolutely central, not only to divination, but to Plato’s 
entire project.   
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Chapter 6 – Plato’s Symposium and Divination 
Abstract 
I argue that the character of Diotima, a seer who knows the Form of Beauty, cannot be 
classified according to the dichotomy developed in the Phaedrus. I contextualize 
Diotima’s role and wisdom, and argue that she represents a superlative seer who is 
functionally no different than a philosopher, as Plato defines them.  
 
Introduction 
 
Plato’s Symposium is an encomium on eros; it contains six speeches and a seventh 
given by the late-comer, Alcibiades. In the previous chapter, we saw Socrates distinguish 
between possession and technical divination, where the former is privileged over the 
latter. In this chapter, that distinction will be critically re-assessed in light of Diotima, a 
figure who flouts Socrates’ distinction. What I hope to show is twofold. First, that 
Diotima’s knowledge is the result of her being seer, and that this helps us better 
understand her account of eros. Second, that Diotima is an exemplary seer, capable not 
only of divining superlative truths, but also of defending them with rational argument.  
Exemplary seers like Diotima, I intent to show, are functionally no different than 
philosophers.  
In addition to Diotima, something must be said of the characters Plato chooses to 
employ in the Symposium. As has been repeatedly pointed out, the inclusion of Phaedrus, 
Eryximachus, and Alcibiades cannot help but occasion the scandal that occurred in 416-
415 B.C.E. All three were accused of defiling the Hermai and profaning the Eleusinian 
mysteries.
309
 This is significant insofar as the Eleusinian mysteries arise in my discussion 
of Diotima, whom I regard as appropriating and transforming the mysteries in the context 
of Plato’s metaphysical and epistemological project. The other three who give speeches – 
                                                 
309
 Rosen (1968) 7-8.  
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Socrates, Agathon, and Aristophanes – represent philosophy, tragedy, and comedy 
respectively. One might think of these three in competition.
310
  
The inclusion of Phaedrus and others foreshadows Diotima’s appropriation of the 
mysteries in her account of eros. Her entire exchange with Socrates, as retold by the man 
himself, reflects a relationship between initiate and initiated. More substantively, the 
content of her ideas about eros, especially as the philosopher comes to encounter the 
form of beauty, echoes the Eleusinian mysteries. I will have more to say about this when 
I come to Diotima’s speech itself.  
Although the conversation between Socrates and Diotima will garner the majority 
of my attention, it is necessary to recapitulate the earlier instances of divination, 
inspiration, and mania in the dialogue. This is so because the earlier speeches give 
definition to Socrates’ speech. Indeed, one methodological approach to the Symposium is 
to emphasize the additive nature of the dialogue, namely that each speech, while critiqued 
and transformed by Socrates, nevertheless retains a kernel of truth that develops in his 
own account.
311
  
I rehearse three instances: first, Eryximachus’ account of the role of eros in 
divination (188c-d); second, Aristophanes’ analogy between the human soul and an 
oracle (192d); and finally, Agathon’s claim that Eros has created all sorts of technai, 
including prophecy (197d).
312
 
                                                 
310
 Pausanias seems to have no place. Another way of casting the characters is in their respective 
relationships. Pausanias and Agathon are lovers; Eryximachus and Phaedrus are friends; Aristophanes and 
Aristodemus are demesman; Socrates and Alcibiades are lovers and about to be sent to Potidaea together. 
Nails (2006) 181.   
311
 Sheffield (2006) 23-24 argues for a great deal of continuity between the “so-called expert opinion” (24) 
of the early speeches and Socrates’ philosophical account. Although in the same volume, Rowe states, 
“What Plato is doing is to contrast the peculiar Socratic view with more ordinary views, not derive it from 
them” (21).  
312
 Agathon’s characterizes Eros as a god so I capitalize it here and where appropriate.  
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Part I –Three Cases of Divination in the Preliminary Speeches 
a. The Speech of Eryximachus (186a-189a) 
As noted by Edelstein, Eryximachus is one the more prestigious speakers in the 
Symposium.
313
 He is the third person to give a speech. He extends Pausanias’ bipartite 
view of eros to include everything in the universe. The Pre-Socratic influence –Heraclitus 
and Empedocles – is apparent (187a).314 For Eryximachus, Eros is a fundamental 
principle of the universe; it is responsible for all change and stability. Also like 
Pausanias, Eryximachus thinks that Eros must be instantiated in an activity. It is not in 
itself good or bad; Eros manifested by health is good, and is different than Eros 
manifested by disease, which is bad. Indeed, there is one concept of Eros at play, but it 
instantiates itself differently, depending on the context, and the way it emerges.   
Eryximachus extrapolates his claim by showing how Eros functions in four 
different technai – medicine (186b-186e), music (187a-187e), astronomy (187e-188b), 
and divination (188c-d). I will briefly rehearse all four, not only because they 
demonstrate the range of Eryximachus’ expertise, but because they also exhibit the 
manner in which Eryximachus might differ from mainstream medicine.  
 Eryximachus, first and foremost, is a physician, and he seems to be quite familiar 
with Hippocratic medicine.
315
 The subject matter of medicine is the body and the goal of 
the physician is to engender a healthy body (186c). As I previously stated, Eryximachus 
recognizes two sorts of Eros in the human body. The Eros of “health” (hugieinō) is 
                                                 
313
 His influence appears at several junctions. He cautions against heavy drinking and proposes an evening 
of speeches on a topic. Ostensibly, the topic of eros is chosen by Phaedrus, but in reality, it is Eryximachus 
who does the talking (176a-177a). Also, upon the arrival of Alcibiades, again it is Eryximachus who urges 
the latecomer to give a speech on Socrates, as opposed to eros. Edelstein (1945) 85-103. 
314
 Sheffield (2006b) 21. 
315
 McPherran (2006) 76. 
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different than the Eros of “disease” (nosōdei) (186b11). The job of the physician is to 
identify what type of Eros exists in a particular body, and how to encourage it if it is 
good, and quell it if it is bad. Fundamentally, the physician seeks to establish a harmony 
between the basic elements of the body (186d).  
Eryximachus’ next example is music and poetry. Eryximachus offers a novel 
interpretation of Heraclitus’ fragment.316 It cannot be, as the fragment might imply, that 
in the midst of harmony there is yet discord. Rather, Heraclitus must mean that a 
harmony arises by resolving two prior discords. He concludes that music is “simply the 
science of the effects of Love on rhythm and harmony” (kai estin au mousikē peri 
harmonian kai rhuthmon erōtikōn epistēmē) (187c4-5). In this particular example, the 
effects of music are broad. While it may be easy to identify the effects of music within 
the realm of rhythm and harmony, it is more complex when the audience is taken into 
account. In other words, again, pace Pausanias, different sorts of music will have 
different effects on different sorts of people. Some music is produced by the Heavenly 
Muse (187e); the love that emerges from such music ought to be cultivated. Vulgar 
music, by contrast, must be enjoyed with extreme caution, lest it corrupt you.
317
  
Eryximachus’ third example is astronomy. The subject matter of astronomy is the 
stars and the seasons. For Eryximachus, when the proper sort of eros holds sway of such 
objects, the climate is temperate and conducive to excellent harvests (188a). In other 
words, the elements of the seasons, such as hot/cold and wet/dry, are in harmony. By 
                                                 
316
 Fragment B 51. 
317
 Pausanias declared that all of the gods must be praised, but from the content of his speech, it is clear that 
he assigns no value whatsoever to Common Eros. In fact, he enumerates its hazards. Eryximachus, by 
contrast, has at least carved out a space wherein Common Eros, albeit in moderation, is permissible. 
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contrast, when these elements are in disharmony, the climate is poor and consists of 
famine and frost. 
Finally, at the conclusion of his speech, Eryximachus explicates divination. He 
states: 
Consider further the rites of sacrifice and the whole area with which the 
art of divination is concerned, that is, the interaction between men and 
gods. Here, too, Love is the central concern: our object is to try to 
maintain the proper kind of love and to attempt to cure the kind that is 
diseased. For what is the origin of all impiety? Our refusal to gratify the 
orderly kind of Love, and our defence to the other sort, when we should 
have been guided by the former sort of Love in every action in 
connection with our parents, living or dead, and with the gods. The task 
of divination is to keep watch over these two species of Love and to 
doctor them as necessary. Divination, therefore, is the practice that 
produces loving affection between gods and men; it is simply the 
science of the effects of Love on justice and piety (188c1-d3) 
 
eti toinun kai hai thusiai pasai kai hois mantikē epistatei—tauta d' estin 
hē peri theous te kai anthrōpous pros allēlous koinōnia—ou peri allo ti 
estin ē peri Erōtos phulakēn te kai iasin. pasa gar asebeia philei 
gignesthai ean mē tis tō kosmiō Erōti kharizētai mēde tima te auton kai 
presbeuē en panti ergō, alla ton heteron, kai peri goneas kai zōntas kai 
teteleutēkotas kai peri theous: ha dē prostetaktai tē mantikē episkopein 
tous erōntas kai iatreuein, kai estin au hē mantikē philias theōn kai 
anthrōpōn dēmiourgos tō epistasthai ta kata anthrōpous erōtika, hosa 
teinei pros themin kai eusebeian. 
 
As McPherran relates, this is a rich statement.
318
 In particular, as an apologia for 
divination, it flies in the face of most mainstream Hippocratic texts. Accordingly, Plato’s 
Eryximachus is something of a rogue physician, intent on retaining some role for the 
divine in medicine.
319
 There is also the claim here that divination will be able to produce, 
maintain, and remedy a loving relationship between humans and the gods. In particular, 
seers will direct the appropriate sacrifices to be made. This already looks forward to 
                                                 
318
 McPherran (2006) 85. 
319
 By contrast, Hippocratic texts tend to minimize the role of the supernatural. Instead, they try and offer 
physical explanations. McPherran (2006) 83-84.  
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Diotima’s reputation, which is grounded in part by her success in preventing a famine for 
10 years.
320
  
Nevertheless, we know that Diotima will argue that the gods, properly conceived 
as perfectly good and beautiful, do not love. This is so because they are self-sufficient 
and lacking in nothing. Eros, as we will see in the conversation between Socrates and 
Diotima, must always strive after something that is lacking. If the gods do not lack 
anything, they cannot be thought of as lovers.  
Moreover, Eryximachus’ concept of divination, together with his more general 
account of medicine, implies that divination is more than merely accessing the will of the 
gods. It is a stronger claim, namely that divination can produce positive affection 
between humankind and the divine. In other contexts, Plato completely rejects the notion 
that humans have the ability to influence the gods. Since seers enjoyed such influence, 
lavish gifts were often bestowed upon them by political and military leaders. The 
expectation was that gift-giving won divine favor. Both Herodotus and Xenophon offer 
plenty of examples.
321
 Plato condemns this action as a form of bribery.  
In the Republic, for instance, Socrates heartily rejects the notion that people have 
the ability to bribe the gods to inflict harm on both just and unjust people (364c). This is 
echoed again in Book X of the Laws where the Athenian states that seers, together with 
                                                 
320
 McPherran maintains that the prevalent concept of piety in 5
th
 century Athenian religion was the do ut 
des principle, which consists of reciprocity. Someone trades a sacrifice to the gods for something else.  
However, Lannstrom (2011) 266-268 argues that the evidence better fits a concept of piety based on 
“mutual esteem” (266) between humankind and the gods. On this view, a sacrifice is not a trade with the 
gods, but rather a gift from humankind to the divine. In the Euthyphro, for instance, Euthyphro uses the 
word charis which denotes reciprocity. It is Socrates who avoids such language. Although trade and gift 
have something in common, the important difference is that a gift works to engender intimacy between the 
giver and the recipient. Also, as Lannstrom points out, whereas a trade consists of an exchange between 
two items of more or less equal value, gifts are permitted to be of unequal value. This is so because the 
participants might come from a different economic background. In the case at hand, for instance, the gods’ 
gift to humankind is markedly more valuable than an animal sacrifice.  
321
 cf. Histories I. 14; 25; 50-51; Anabasis III. 1; V. 3. 
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priests and poets, often claim that the gods can be influenced by gifts to excuse injustice 
(885d). That the gods could be bribed is absurd to the Athenian; he later recommends 
imprisonment for seers who mislead people into thinking they can influence the gods 
through the “alleged magic powers of sacrifices and prayers and charms” (hōs thusiais te 
kai eukhais kai epōdais goēteuontes) (909b3). 322 The textual evidence, however, is full of 
individuals conferring gifts in an attempt to win divine favor, and Eryximachus, in this 
case, seems to embody Greek mores.
323
  
What I urge we take from this discussion is that Eryximachus does not represent a 
generic doctor. Rather, his willingness to integrate religious concerns and medicine looks 
forward to Diotima’s integration of religiosity and philosophy.324   
b. The Speech of Aristophanes (189d-193d) 
 In perhaps the most famous speech of the dialogue, Aristophanes offers a 
tragicomic myth concerning the origins and nature of eros.
325
 In time primeval, there 
were three types of humans – men, women, and androgynous people (189e). They 
possessed the features of two people – four arms and legs, two sets of genitals, etc. They 
were spherical like their parents.
326
 Considering themselves powerful enough to take on 
the gods, they went to war but were defeated handily.  It was left to the gods to decide 
                                                 
322
 See also Laws 908d wherein seers are characterized as individuals of cunning and deception, which is 
one sort of impiety the Athenian enumerates.  
323
 Dodds (1959) writes in both the Republic and the Laws “the authority of Delphi is to be absolute in all 
religious matters” (223). According to Dodds, this recourse to Delphic authority is a strategic appeal to a 
conservative force that will anchor the citizenry’s from deviance.  
324
 Consider Charmides 156 b-c where Socrates claims that the mark of a good doctor is to treat the whole 
body, not the particular ailment. It is irresponsible to try and remedy one part of a body without treating the 
whole thing. Also relevant is Republic 408d-e and 591c. McPherran (2006) 79-80 discusses this.  
325
 The myth may appear most obviously comical, but the tragic elements are no less important. It has 
become increasingly recognized by scholars that Plato is subverting drama according to philosophical 
principles. Relevant to this speech is the conclusion of the dialogue where Socrates has attempted to 
establish that anyone who can write a comedy must necessarily be able to write a tragedy. Hyland (1995) 
111-120.  
326
 The male was the offspring of the sun; the female of the earth, the androgynous kind of the moon, which 
combined elements of both sun and earth.  
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their fate. One possibility was their eradication. According to Aristophanes, the gods 
deemed this undesirable because they enjoyed humankind’s sacrifices and worship 
(190c).  
Instead of eliminating humankind, Zeus decides to cut each person in half. Since 
each person’s natural state is to be unified with another: 
Love is born into every human being; it calls back the halves of 
our original nature together; it tries to make one out of two and 
heal the wound of human nature (191d2-4). 
 
esti dē oun ek tosou ho erōs emphutos allēlōn tois anthrōpois kai 
tēs arkhaias phuseōs sunagōgeus kai epikheirōn poiēsai hen ek 
duoin kai iasasthai tēn phusin tēn anthrōpinēn. 
 
Aristophanes goes on to explain sexual orientation according to one’s original nature. 
The sense of belonging to someone else transcends sex. As Aristophanes states,  
It’s obvious that the soul of every lover longs for something else; 
his soul cannot say what it is, but like an oracle it has a sense of 
what it wants, and like an oracle it hides behind a riddle (192d2-4). 
 
all' allo ti boulomenē hekaterou hē psukhēdēlē estin, ho ou dunatai 
eipein, alla manteuetai ho bouletai, kai ainittetai. 
 
There is the ubiquitous claim that the seer speaks in cryptic and ambiguous language. Is 
this a conscious decision? For Aristophanes to claim that the seer ‘hides’ behind his or 
her divination with a riddle might imply that this so. By analogy, the soul yearns for its 
other half, but it cannot articulate it. Indeed, there is a probably a connection between the 
soul’s inability to articulate what it wants and its beguiling nature. The soul wants to be 
reunited with its other half, but it does not know who this is. Similarly, the seer wants 
access to the gods, but he or she does not know what the divine answer will be.
327
   
c. The Speech of Agathon  
                                                 
327
 Flower (2008) on how random oracles were in the marketplace.  
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 Agathon’s speech is particularly important because it leads directly into Socrates’ 
own speech. He starts his speech with a familiar caveat. For although some of the earlier 
speeches did well, Agathon claims that they only outlined the gifts that Eros imparts. 
They did not give an account of Eros in itself. Agathon intends to first praise Eros for 
who he is and then proceed to extrapolate his gifts (195a).  
 Against Phaedrus, Agathon states that love is the youngest of the gods. Eros is the 
most beautiful god and the happiest. Other qualities of love include: a delicate 
constitution (195e), balance, and fluidity. The ancient stories of Hesiod and Parmenides 
are the principal evidence that Eros is old. But they are untrue; had Eros been present, 
there would have been peace amongst the gods. So, it was necessity not eros that caused 
all of the conflict among the Greek gods.
328
   
 Eros is the loveliest of gods. He has all of the virtues – justice, temperance, 
courage, and wisdom.
329
 Agathon’s compliments do not end there. More than poetry, 
Eros enables all sorts of technai, both human and divine. Apollo, for instance, invented 
archery, medicine, and prophecy with the aid of Eros (197b).
330
 The inventions of the 
other gods followed a similar pattern.  
Agathon is then suddenly inspired (197c) to recite two lines of poetry. Thereafter, 
he is inspired to offer a sweeping poetical oration on the laudable nature of Eros. Eros is 
praised in numerous senses. It dissolves difference. It guards against the wicked. It 
captivates both god and human. Agathon’s speech is inspired by Eros. The degree to 
which this inspiration is genuine hinges on the veracity of his claims. That he will be 
                                                 
328
 The notion of necessity as a contrast to eros arises repeatedly in Agathon’s account. Whereas necessity, 
by definition, means compulsion and a lack of freedom, Agathon claims that the relationship between Eros 
and everyone else is one of voluntary reciprocity (196c). 
329
 Recalling the four cardinal virtues of the Republic.  
330
 Note again how medicine and divination coalesce. 
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refuted by Socrates confirms again that Plato is suspicious of poetry and the authenticity 
of poetic inspiration more generally. 
Nevertheless, Agathon’s speech ends to thunderous applause. Socrates, to 
Eryximachus, states “Didn’t I speak like a prophet a while ago when I said that Agathon 
would give an amazing speech and I would be tongue-tied” (all' ou mantikōs ha nundē 
elegon eipein, hoti Agathōn thaumastōs eroi, egō d' aporēsoimi;) (198a5-6). Eryximachus 
replies, “You were prophetic about one thing, I think, that Agathon would speak well.” 
(mantikōs moi dokeis eirēkenai, hoti Agathōn eu erei) (198a7-8). 
I want to reject an ironic interpretation of this exchange. At first blush, it might 
seem like the best interpretation. Socrates is about to show Agathon that he is wrong 
about Eros. If that is so, then Socrates is not serious when he offers such extreme praise – 
an ‘amazing speech’ (198a6). But if we appreciate that Socrates once thought as Agathon 
did (201e), Socrates’ compliment can be taken in a more genuine light. Socrates was once 
persuaded by Agathon’s position.  
As we transition to the discussion between Socrates and Diotima, there are several 
features of the preceding discussion that we ought to keep in mind. First, there is the 
common idea that divination consists of a great deal of ambiguity. The seer’s 
pronouncements are difficult to interpret. We saw this when Aristophanes’ characterized 
the soul’s longing for its other half.  
Second, medicine and divination share an affinity. We see this in both 
Eryximachus’ and Agathon’s speech. Plato, to be sure, does not deny this affinity, and 
indeed often conceptualizes them in tandem. Whereas medicine improves bodily health, 
divination improves the health of one’s relationship to the gods.  
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Finally, we see that divination is not only a descriptive practice, that is, it does not 
merely access the gods. Rather, divination is able to placate the gods, and improve 
humankind’s relationship to them. Plato, as we see in the Republic and Laws, rejects that 
one can bribe the gods. But this does not mean that the seer’s directives, to make the 
appropriate sacrifices for instance, cannot improve humankind’s relationship to the gods.  
Part II – The Figure of Diotima 
In this section, as I draw out the exchange between Socrates and Diotima, I seek 
to establish Diotima’s mantic credentials by appeal to three pieces of evidence. First, 
there is her origin and previous achievements. Second, there is her discussion of daimons 
and the claim that through them all prophecy passes (203a). In this section, I will also 
rehearse her account of the lower mysteries. Finally, in the ascent section, there is the 
mystical imagery in the final step toward the Form of Beauty. I will examine how this 
final step echoes the Eleusinian mysteries. After rehearsing this evidence, I will pose a 
question – why is Diotima appealed to in the first place? There are many possible 
answers to this question, but one topic that too often gets neglected is how Diotima 
herself has come to know the Form of Beauty. Given that so few people, if any, can ever 
ascend to knowing the Form of Beauty, and given her occupation as a seer, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Diotima has divined such information from heavenly sources.  
Two puzzles emerge. First, divination accesses the will of the gods, but in the 
ascent section, it is clear that Diotima has come into contact with the intelligible realm. In 
what way can we conceptualize a seer’s relationship to the intelligible realm, a realm 
normally only accessible by a philosopher? Second, and deepening the first puzzle, 
Diotima’s exchange with Socrates shows that she has consciously reflected and reasoned 
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about her divinations, but this is an impossibility given the epistemological constraints 
Plato imposes upon seers in other dialogues. 
i. Diotima’s Introduction and Credentials (201d-202a) 
Diotima is introduced directly after Socrates runs an elenchus on Agathon.  
Agathon submits to two incompatible theses regarding Eros. First, love is always love of 
something, and second, the beloved is always something that love lacks (200e). Socrates 
demonstrates that such convictions are incompatible given that Eros is beautiful. Socrates 
states, “Love needs beauty, then, and does not have it” (endeēs ar' esti kai ouk ekhei ho 
Erōs kallos) (201b3). Moreover, since everything that is beautiful is also good, Eros does 
not have goodness. This impasse triggers the final speech wherein Socrates immediately 
appeals to the wisdom of a third party – Diotima. Superficially, this is so because 
Socrates once believed what Agathon believed, namely that Eros is perfectly good, 
beautiful, and virtuous (201e). It was only after engaging with Diotima that Socrates 
came to understand the paucity of such an account.  
It is formative that Diotima is presented as a seer.
331
 Her name – Diotima – means 
‘Zeus-honour’, thereby implying divine favor.332 She hails from Mantinea whose 
etymology stems from mantis, which means ‘seer’.333 She prevented a plague for ten 
years by directing the Athenians toward the appropriate sacrifices (201d). According to 
Socrates, Diotima is the person who taught him “the art of love” (ta erotika) (201d5). In 
                                                 
331
 Halperin submits that “Diotima’s vocation is to be explained at least in part by reference to her gender, 
not vice versa” (124). If Plato was set on a diviner of sorts to whom Socrates would appeal, he could have 
just as easily made Diotima a man. There is myriad evidence of male diviners, both in Plato and other texts. 
332
 Nussbaum (1986) 177.  
333
 Hobbs (2006) 264 also points out that Diotima is referred to as “xene” (201e). This connects her to the 
Eleatic Stranger in the Sophist and Statesman, and the Athenian in the Laws. Hobbs goes on to say that her 
closest equivalent is the seer at Meno 81a, mostly likely for epistemological reasons.  
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fact, she is characterized as “wise about many things” (hē tauta te sophē ēn kai alla polla, 
201d3), which only serves to ground her exemplary nature.   
Currently in vogue is the notion that Diotima is Plato’s fictional creation.334 Her 
very existence may be tailored to the author’s needs. The presence of Diotima enables 
Socrates to engage in dialectic with someone. The alternative would be to give a speech 
on the nature of eros like everyone else. We know that Socrates vilifies the value of 
speech-making in relation to the possibilities inherent to philosophical conversation. 
Furthermore, Diotima’s religiosity permits Plato to subvert the dominant religious 
institutions of Athens, thereby creating space for philosophy to emerge and entrench 
itself.  
If Diotima is merely a rhetorical device, the divined wisdom she depends upon is 
not anchored in reality. Yet even though it may be the case that Diotima did not 
physically exist, it is not clear this constitutes a serious objection to the main thesis. That 
Plato would utilize his artistic license in creating such a figure betrays the recognition 
that his audience would understand the conceptual possibility of such a figure. 
ii. Eros as a Daimon (202a-209e) 
In this section, I will examine Diotima’s initial account about eros, paying careful 
attention to the intermediary nature of eros as well as Diotima’s reasoning capacities. 
Diotima rejects the thesis that love is both beautiful and good. Socrates then claims the 
opposite as a matter of disjunctive elimination (201e). Diotima rejects this move as well 
                                                 
334
 Unlike other characters that populate Plato’s dialogues, there is no strong extra-textual evidence of 
Diotima. For much of the 19
th
 century, scholars tended to grant Diotima some measure of historical 
existence. Taylor (1926), for one, subscribes to the historical reality of an actual conversation between 
Diotima and Socrates. In a similar way, the seers of tragedy, while often declaring remarkable prophecies, 
pivot on the ordinary ability of lay seers to prophesize. Given the public nature of drama in Classical 
Greece, there was no doubt a symbiotic relationship between real seers and fictitious ones.  
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and establishes a middle ground between knowledge and ignorance, namely correct 
judgment. The ignorant masses believe Eros is a god, but they are irrelevant. Diotima 
points out that the only people who matter are those individuals with knowledge (202b). 
According to Diotima, Eros is not a god. Rather, she claims that Eros is a daimon, an 
entity that occupies a middle ground between humankind and the gods. Note then how 
eros is an intermediary in a dual sense. Epistemologically, eros is situated between 
knowledge and ignorance.
335
 Metaphysically, eros is situated between the gods and 
humankind.  
Indeed, according to Diotima, any communication humankind has with the gods 
must travel through daimons. She states “Through them [daimons] all divination passes, 
through them the art of priests in sacrifice and ritual, in enchantment, prophecy, and 
sorcery” (dia toutou kai hē mantikē pasa khōrei kai hē tōn hiereōn tekhnē tōn te peri tas 
thusias kai teletas kai tas epōdas kai tēn manteian pasan kai goēteian, 203a1-2). Since 
the gods are superlative, they never directly interact with humankind, hence the role for 
daimons. Diotima goes on to contrast religious knowledge with technical knowledge. 
Whereas a person who has the former is a “man of the spirit” (daimonios anēr, 203a6), 
the latter is a mere “mechanic” (banausos, 203a7).336  
Diotima next provides Socrates with a mythical account of the origins of Eros 
(203b-d). As the child of Penia (‘poverty’), Eros is always lacking, always in need. His 
                                                 
335
 Sheffield (2006b) 64-65 notes that “Socrates does not explicitly ascribe correct belief to Eros (it is only 
a parallel, albeit a significant choice of one)” (64) but goes on to say that one might reasonably think that 
“correct belief is one outcome of Eros’ philosophical activity” (64). She cites the slave boy in the Meno as 
an example of philosophical engagement that engenders true belief, but only after a long trial-and-error 
process.  
336
 McPherran (2006) 91 points out this is an allusion to Eryximachus, specifically those doctors who do 
not integrate religiosity into their expertise. According to McPherran, these spiritual people are those with 
the ability to philosophize.  
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appearance is ugly.
337
 Like his father Poros (‘resource’), however, Eros has guile and 
seeks after wisdom. In other words, Eros is both lacking knowledge and yet conspiring 
for it.   
 Not only does Diotima enlighten Socrates about the nature of Eros, but she also 
explains the deficiencies of Socrates’ own account. He was, she claims, mistaken in 
focusing on ‘being loved’ as opposed to the proper explanadum, namely that of ‘being a 
lover’ (204c). Socrates acquiesces and pointedly turns the discussion toward the human 
realm – what use do humans have for eros? What is most interesting about Diotima’s 
reply is that she replaces beauty for goodness. The lover desires beautiful objects to 
become his own, but for what purpose? If beauty is replaced by goodness, then the 
answer is easy – happiness. (205a).338  
Of course, insofar as everyone wants happiness, are we then forced to conclude 
that all people are in love? There follows a provocative analogy between eros and 
poiesis. Poiesis, strictly speaking, means ‘making’ and this encompasses all instances of 
creation, whether literary or professional. However, the more precise meaning confines 
the domain to the literary.  
In the same way, even though it might be trivially true that everyone is in love in 
the general sense of wanting happiness, the more specific conception of love does not 
include all activities oriented toward achieving happiness – making money, attending 
festivals, playing sports. Rather, in the strict sense, everyone loves the good (206a).  The 
                                                 
337
 One cannot help but see this description as alluding to Socrates.  
338
 A.E. Taylor (1926) makes a strong identity claim between the form of Kalon in the Symposium and the 
form of Agathon in the Republic. Although Lear (2006) 102-103 thinks the replacement is ad hoc. She 
urges that we do not collapse this claim with those in other dialogues, like the Republic or Phaedrus. 
Rather, she maintain that the answer for the transition lie in Diotima’s efforts to better communicate to 
Socrates. He is clearly having trouble understanding Diotima’s position and the substitution thus functions 
as a means for Socrates to better understand.  
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exchange culminates in Diotima’s definition of love, which is “wanting to possess the 
good forever” (ho erōs tou to agathon hautō einai aei.) (206a11). Lovers pursue this by 
“giving birth to beauty” (esti gar touto tokos en kalō) (206b8); this is the first instance 
where Socrates expresses genuine confusion rather than mere surprise over a claim made 
by Diotima. He implores for divination, no doubt an allusion to Diotima’s expertise, in 
order to understand.  
What does it mean for a lover to give birth to beauty? Diotima introduces the 
concept of reproduction. In the first straightforward sense of physical reproduction, 
Diotima claims that such an activity is the mortal version of immortality. This drive 
toward immortality is characteristic of all mortal creatures, even non-human animals 
(207d).  
To further substantiate her case that all mortal things desire immortality, Diotima 
appeals to the human desire for glory, fame, and eternal recognition. For Diotima, heroes 
like Achilles would not have sacrificed themselves unless they believed their memory 
would live on for generations.
339
 Monuments to such figures and literary works preserve 
these memories. Diotima believes that those ‘children’ that come from the mind – 
thoughts, laws, customs – are more valuable than mere physical procreation because their 
creation is unique to us as humans. Nevertheless, both physical and psychic lovers are to 
be distinguished, and subordinated to, the philosophical lover, which arises in the ascent 
section.  
c. The Ascent Section (210a-212c)  
                                                 
339
 Consider further the notion of memory, particularly as it relates to the gods in Hesiod’s Theogony. The 
Muses were born from the union of Memory (Mnemosyne) and Zeus and inspire both poets and kings. In 
the proem, Hesiod writes that if the poets “sing of the famous deeds of men of old” as well as the Gods in 
Olympus, they will forget their troubles and have peace of mind. Here, the relationship between memory 
and forgetting is central. See Skarsouli (2006). 
171 
 
 
 
Diotima twice sketches the different stages in the ascent toward the form of 
beauty. She first gives a more detailed account (210a-212a), but within this she also 
provides a short synopsis (211b-d) not altogether identical with what we see in the longer 
account. The lover’s first stage is that of a single body (210a4-8). He must begin as a 
young person, and if he is led correctly, his love will give rise to beautiful logoi. If 
pursued correctly, the lover will then move to the next stage, which is to love two bodies 
rather than one. This tiny, almost insignificant step comes out in the reprieve (211c4). 
After grasping that beauty in other bodies is equivalent, the lover will extend himself to 
all beautiful bodies (210a8-b6). One body will then seem inconsequential in comparison. 
Note how the ascent begins with familiar objects of love, and only then transitions to 
increasingly unfamiliar, less accessible, objects.
340
 
The next stage constitutes a transition from body to soul. The lover will come to 
recognize that a beautiful soul is more valuable than a beautiful body. The lover will try 
to give birth to logoi that will improve young men (210c). Of note, this stage is absent 
from the summary. Nevertheless, in improving young men, the lover will be forced 
(anagkasthe) to witness beautiful activities and nomoi, and to see that all of this is 
beautiful (210c4-6). After activities, the lover is lead to various sorts of knowledge 
(210c6-7), the idea here being that there is beauty not in a single body, soul, or activity, 
but in many different kinds of knowledge. By focusing on this “great sea of beauty” (to 
polu pelagos tetrammenos tou kalou) (210d4), the lover will produce many beautiful 
logoi and thoughts (dianoemata).  
In the final step, the philosopher “all of a sudden (exaiphnes)…catch[es] sight of 
something wonderfully beautiful in its nature (katopsetai ti thaumaston tēn phusin 
                                                 
340
 This is akin to the development of the initiate in the Mysteries. Burkert (1985) 285-90. 
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kalon)” (210e6-211a1). This object which was the telos of all his previous erotic 
endeavors, is unchanging and stable. It is qualitatively different than all previous 
instantiations of beauty, and seeing the form of beauty enables the lover to give birth to 
“true virtue” (aretēn alēthē) (212a7) as opposed to images of virtue.341 Such a person, if 
they could progress to such heights, would become godlike (212b).
342
  
It has long been noted that the ascent section draws upon religious language and 
imagery, particularly those of the Eleusinian mysteries.
343
 In Classical Greece, the 
canonical way of honoring the divine was through animal sacrifice, usually state 
sponsored. Priests and leaders of political office conducted such rituals. Mystery cults 
subverted this institution by removing the intermediary and permitting those who were 
not Athenian citizens (i.e., women, the poor, even slaves) to interact directly with the 
gods. There were three roles at the annual festival at Eleusis. The initiates of a given year 
were led by a group of acknowledged leaders whilst being viewed by a third party of 
watchers. Having formerly participated as initiates, the watchers returned to the festival 
because it was understood that such an event was worth repeating. All three parties, it 
seems, learned something of value during the festival. 
 Diotima’s speech must be understood against the backdrop of the Eleusinian 
mysteries. Consider the ascent passage. Diotima’s prefaces it with the following: 
Even you, Socrates, could probably come to be initiated into these rites of 
love. But as for the purpose of these rites when they are done correctly – 
                                                 
341
 Note that throughout the ascent passage, when the lover’s erotic attachment produces speeches, or 
virtue, Plato characterizes the process as ‘giving birth’ (genesthai), which fits with Diotima’s repeated 
appeals to reproduction.  
342
 It is left ambiguous then whether Diotima actually thinks someone can achieve such knowledge or 
whether it is a conceptual impossibility for humans on earth. Blondell (2006) 147-179 
343
 Evans writes, “By far the most important mystic cult during Plato’s time, and indeed throughout most of 
antiquity, was the mystery cult of Demeter at Eleusis, a small town sixteen miles outside of Athens” (5). 
Evans (2006) argues for a connection between Diotima and the yearly celebrations of Demeter at Eleusis. 
Halperin, as well, states that Plato uses “Eleusinian imagery in speaking of eros” (127). 
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that is the final and highest mystery, and I don’t know if you are capable 
of it. I myself will tell you, she said, and I won’t stint any effort. And you 
must try to follow if you can. (210a1-6) 
 
tauta men oun ta erōtika isōs, ō Sōkrates, kan su muētheiēs: ta de telea kai 
epoptika, hōn heneka kai tauta estin, ean tis orthōs metiē, ouk oid' ei hoios 
t' an eiēs. erō men oun, ephē, egō kai prothumias ouden apoleipsō: peirō 
de hepesthai, an hoios te ēs.  
 
Analogous to the performance of the mysteries, Socrates is the novice who will be 
initiated into the mysteries of love by Diotima, the acknowledged expert.  
Only after the initiate has been taught to appreciate the beauty of someone else 
can he or she come to realize that beauty of one body is analogous to beauty of bodies in 
general. The acknowledged expert falls away and the initiate ascends on their own to the 
innermost secrets (by analogy, the form of beauty).
344
 This helps us understand the 
teleology of the ascent. One of the particularities of the ascent passage is that although 
the form of beauty is the final end, the initiate, in the earlier stages of the ascent, cannot 
have had an intention to arrive at the form of beauty.
345
  
The generic concept of teleology states that an action is performed for the sake of 
some end, where that end is known and intended. But one does not know the form of 
beauty until the final stage of the ascent. Indeed, its effect is transformative and beyond 
anything the initiate has heretofore experienced.
346
 Nevertheless, the ascent is still 
teleological in the sense that an action brings about a result through the performance of 
some function, and that that result acts as a criterion for evaluating other performances of 
                                                 
344
 Nussbaum (1986) characterizes the third and fourth steps as considered ‘decisions’ made by the initiate. 
179-180. 
345
 Contra Nussbaum (1986) 183 who holds the part of the initiate’s motivation is the form and its 
attributes. 
346
 Following Payne (2008) 123-145 who labels the generic concept of teleology – “agency-centered” (135) 
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the same function.
347
 In other words, although each stage of the ascent has value in itself, 
it can also develop the appropriate capacity required to ascend to the next stage. Not 
every lover of a body will rise to the next stage; the lover must love in the correct way in 
order to develop the capacity to love all beautiful bodies, and so on up the ladder.  
Thus, Diotima’s speech clearly references the performance of the Eleusinian 
mysteries. Since it was taboo to ever speak of the mysteries, we know little about the 
specifics of what occurred as one moved toward the higher mysteries. In the same way, 
we know very little, without actually experiencing it ourselves, what it actually means to 
reach the final stage of the ascent.   
Part III – Evaluating the Status of Diotima 
In the previous section, I posed a question concerning Socrates’ motivation for 
introducing a figure like Diotima. One could take a variety of positions, but I want to 
focus on Diotima’s occupation as a seer, and how this relates to the content of her speech. 
This is so in two senses. First, recall that one of the precepts established in the earlier 
speeches is that divination is an indeterminate technē. Not only for a technical seer to 
accurately gauge divine will, but those who are left to interpret the pronouncements of 
possession seers must cope with poetically ambiguous language. Diotima, however, 
flouts this ubiquitous feature of divination. After she defines eros as wanting to possess 
the good forever (206a8), Socrates implores for divination in order to help to understand. 
Diotima’s response is quite instructive. She responds that she will express herself “more 
clearly” (saphesteron) (206c2). She proceeds to extrapolate the idea that all humans are 
pregnant.  
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 Adopted from Payne (2008) 124-125. 
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Second, Diotima’s speech, as retold by Socrates, is a reasoned account. Not only 
does she criticize Socrates’ position, but she offers her own as a viable alternative. 
Indeed, Diotima is at her most dialogical when she is engaging, and critiquing, Socrates’ 
account of eros. Although the ascent section constitutes the essence of eros, the earlier 
discussion of the lower mysteries ought not to be dismissed as irrelevant. In fact, the 
lower mysteries are descriptively true for hoi polloi. The ascent passage is directed at the 
rare and exemplary philosopher. 
Nevertheless, it ought to be pointed out that Diotima’s arguments are actually 
fallacious. For instance, Agathon claimed that Eros lacks and so desires some beautiful 
things (201c), but Diotima equivocates, and transforms this to mean that Eros lacks any 
beauty whatsoever. In this way, it is not a god, but a daimon. Another example comes 
later when Diotima prevaricates from the claim that we all desire good things to the claim 
that we desire good things forever, hence the introduction of immortality (207a).
348
 In 
neither case does Socrates object to Diotima’s modifications.  
On the other hand, Diotima is repeatedly lauded by Socrates. She is called “wise” 
(sophē 201d3) and “most wise” (sophōtatē 208b8). Moreover, it is not as though Socrates 
is innocent from utilizing fallacious argument himself (199d-201c).
349
 One good way to 
explain Socrates’ use of fallacious argument is his conviction that one must tailor one’s 
argument to the audience. It seems fair to ascribe a similar idea to Diotima.
350
  
                                                 
348
 Ioncescu (2007) 37 offers these examples, and like myself seeks to explain them without rejecting the 
veracity of Diotima’s personage. One point Ioncescu discusses is that a seer like Diotima is unconcerned 
with arguing for her position, as opposed to revealing it in some roundabout way, as befitting her status as a 
seer.   
349
 Sprague (1962) 1-87. 
350
 Given the conversational participants in the Symposium, along with the others who do not speak, but are 
in attendance, it seems fair that Socrates would ‘talk down’ to their level. Similarly, since Diotima is 
introduced in contradistinction to Socrates (who initially thought as Agathon did), she can be characterized 
as ‘talking down’ to Socrates, at least initially.   
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In fact, throughout the exchange between Socrates and Diotima, there are 
repeated references to sophistry. Recall that one of Eros’ parents was Poros, (or 
resource). In Diotima’s description of Poros, she states that He is both a “lover of 
wisdom” (philosophōn) and a “sophist” (sophistēs) (203d7-8). Socrates refers to Diotima 
as the “perfect sophist” (teleoi sophistai) (208c3). Finally, Alcibiades makes several 
assertions that make Socrates sound as though he were a sophist. Socrates’ love is 
“deceitful” (exapatōn 222b3); he is a crafty schemer (213c). But if we keep in mind that 
the ends of each – Eros, Socrates, and Diotima – are laudable, then their willingness to 
engage in sophistical techniques are pedagogical, and therefore justified in a cursory 
fashion.  
In line with this argument, Ionescu gives three reasons why Socrates appeals to 
Diotima. All of them, to a degree, have to do with pedagogy. First, Socrates’ interlocutors 
are better persuaded by hearing that Socrates underwent an initiation, and moved from 
ignorance to knowledge. Second, by replacing Agathon with Socrates, and introducing 
Diotima, Plato is able to deliver a more technical and sophisticated account than would 
have been possible had Socrates directly engaged with Agathon. Finally, Diotima 
represents a religious perspective and so enables Plato to attract a greater audience. In 
specifying the differences between Socrates and Diotima, Ionescu writes,  
Diotima speaks with the authority of a priestess who is already wise 
(201d3, 208b8), while Socrates receives his teaching as a philosopher, 
i.e., a lover of wisdom who is not yet wise (39).  
 
Both parties act as intermediaries between the divine and the human realms. The 
difference between them is that the seer lowers the divine by means of divination, while 
the philosopher shows us the way upward by means of argument.    
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 These reasons fail to do justice to the fundamental strangeness of Diotima, 
particularly in the way that Plato normally conceptualizes divination. Recall that the 
Phaedrus (244a8-d5) holds that there are only two kinds of divination – possession and 
technical. Diotima most resembles a possession seer. This is so for several reasons. For 
one, she is a woman, and women tend to be possession seers. Second, Plato privileges 
possession divination over its technical counterpart. Diotima speaks correctly about the 
nature of eros, and even about the intelligible realm. Such superlative subject matter is 
appropriate to the highest form of divination. Third, there is an analogy between the 
notion of eros as daimon, and the possessed seer, in that both serve as intermediaries 
between the human and divine realms. Finally, mystical elements pertaining to the 
Eleusinian mysteries, particularly in the transition to the Form of Beauty, coalesce with 
the notions of possession and mania.  
 Diotima’s eccentricity centers on her ability to critically reflect on the content of 
her own divinations. Recall that one of the main features of the possession seer is that she 
cannot interpret her divinations, either during or after the prophetic episode. This is so 
because the possessed seer has temporarily lost her sense of self. This means that the 
possessed seer requires someone else to interpret her prophetic utterances. But this is not 
the case with Diotima! She is able to evaluate them herself. Moreover, she is able to 
contextualize her divinations with current beliefs and engage with Socrates over his own 
beliefs about eros.  
 Indeed, Ionescu’s claim that Diotima is a seer “who is already wise” (39) 
presupposes a host of questions and concerns. For one, we know that according to Plato, 
seers can never be wise. The best a seer can ever hope to achieve is a collection of 
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superlative true beliefs. Since Diotima can argue for her position, she is not a seer of the 
usual Platonic sort. In fact, in her ability to argue and extrapolate a position, she seems to 
act much more like Socrates, say in the Apology, despite the fact that she is not a 
philosopher. 
 The ascent section characterizes the development of the philosophical lover. 
There is no discussion of other routes to the apex of the ascent. How did Diotima become 
so wise about the nature of eros? There are two possibilities. Either she divined it in the 
ordinary way of a seer, or she herself was initiated and rose step-by-step to the intelligible 
realm. In fact, both have something in common, specifically the idea of a formal 
progression toward a superlative end. Consider that the possessed seer cannot simply 
access divine will whenever she wishes. Rather, consulting the gods was a highly 
circumscribed affair.  
 It might be helpful to ask where Socrates himself resides in the ascent. Recall that 
the entire conversation with Diotima took place in the distant past, some 25 years before 
the symposium at Agathon’s house.351 In this way, Socrates has had a quarter century to 
develop his capacity as a philosophical lover. What kind of progress, if any, has he made? 
To be sure, one option is to place Socrates at the highest stage of the ascent, having come 
into contact with the intelligible realm.
352
 His possession of the art of love might consist 
of knowing the form of beauty.
353
 Another possibility is to emphasize Socrates’ affinity 
with eros, as perpetually seeking after wisdom, but failing to attain it. This coalesces with 
our general sense of what it means to be Socratic. 
                                                 
351
 Blondell (2006) 152. 
352
 Robin (1908) 196-198; Burnet (1928) 140; Taylor (1960) 232-233; Lowenstam (1985) 92-93; 
Nussbaum (1986) 183-184; Gill (1990b) 80; and Hadot (2002) 48.  
353
 Blondell (2006) 156-158 enumerates all the reasons why Socrates might reside at the highest stage.  
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 Still others try and synthesize the two, insisting that Socrates occupies “all of the 
steps on the ‘ladder of love’” (Blondell 174).354 Although Socrates has been to the apex 
and glimpsed the form of beauty, he is still human, and must descend. To be sure, the 
argument is not that Socrates occupies each stage of the ascent all at once. If one is held 
captive by the form of beauty, one will not notice particular instantiations of beauty like 
Alcibiades. Nevertheless, since Socrates is still mortal, he cannot unceasingly 
contemplate the intelligible realm, but must descend at various times as befitting his 
nature. None of this precludes the possibility that Diotima can be given a similar 
treatment. Like Socrates, she has both come into contact with the intelligible realm, and 
descended to a lower stage in order to dialogically engage with Socrates.  
Conclusion 
 Although I take Diotima to be a Platonic construction, her character pivots on 
what Plato thinks is permissible. We have seen that she flouts the ordinary constraints 
Plato imposes on divination. This is so in two senses. First, she speaks clearly and 
explains herself. Second, in her knowledge of eros and her ability to dialogically engage 
with Socrates, Diotima flouts the epistemological constraints of the possession seer. In 
fact, in a very real way, she seems more akin to a philosopher like Socrates. Not only 
does she argue like a philosopher but the content of her wisdom – the nature of eros and 
the intelligible realm – befits a philosopher.  
This analogy might not seem so counter-intuitive if we emphasize that the 
opposite is true, namely that the genuine philosopher enjoys continuity with the 
exemplary seer. Indeed, there is a great deal of evidence throughout the dialogues that 
support philosophy’s close connection to divination. In the final chapter, I examine how 
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 Blondell (2006) 175-177 and Lowenstam (1985) 94-98 argue for this thesis.  
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Socrates, Plato’s paradigmatic philosopher, relates to religion and to divination more 
specifically. His daimonion, or divine sign, is notoriously obscure, yet it shares a kinship 
with divination. 
Bibliography 
 
Bloom, Allan. 1993. Love and Friendship. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Burkert, Walter. 1986. The Ancient Mystery Cults. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
 Press.  
Blondell, Ruby. 2006. “Where is Socrates on the ‘Ladder of Love’?” 
in Plato’s Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception. Ed. by J. 
 Lesher, D. Hails, and F. Sheffield. Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for 
Harvard. 
Burnet, John. 1928. Platonism. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Bury, R.G. 1969. The Symposium of Plato: Second Edition. Cambridge: W. Heffer and  
 Sons Ltd.    
Evans, Nancy. 2006. “Diotima and Demeter as Mystagogues in Plato’s Symposium” in 
Hypatia, 21 (2), 1-27  
Hadot, Pierre. 2002. What is Ancient Philosophy? Harvard: Harvard University Press.  
Halperin David. 1990. One Hundred Years of Homosexuality. New York: Routledge,  
 Inc.  
Hobbs, Angela. 2006. “Female Imagery in Plato” in Plato’s Symposium: Issues in  
 Interpretation and Reception. Ed. by J Lesher, D. Nails and F. Sheffield. Center 
 For Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University.  
Ionescu, Cristina. 2007. “The Transition from the Lower to the Higher Mysteries of Love 
 in Plato’s Symposium“ in Dialogue, XLVI, 27-42 
Lear, Gabriel. 2006. “Permanent Beauty and Becoming Happy in Plato’s Symposium” 
in Plato's Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception. Ed. by J. Lesher, 
D. Hails, and F. Sheffield. Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for  
Harvard. 
Lowenstam, Steven. 1985. ‘Paradoxes in Plato’s Symposium’ in Ramus 14: 85-104 
McPherren, Mark. 2006. ‘Medicine, Magic, and Religion in Plato's Symposium,’ 
in Plato's Symposium: Issues in Interpretation and Reception. Edited by J.  
Lesher, D. Hails, and F. Sheffield. Center for Hellenic Studies, Trustees for  
Harvard. 
McPherran, Mark. 1996. The Religion of Socrates. University Park: Pennsylvania State  
 University Press.  
Nehamas, A. and Woodruff P. 1997. Plato: Collected Works. Ed. John Cooper.  
 Indianapolis: Hackett.  
Nussbaum, Martha. 1986. The Fragility of Goodness. Cambridge: Cambridge University  
 Press.  
Nails, Debra. 2006. “Tragedy Off-Stage” in Plato’s Symposium: Issues in  
 Interpretation and Reception. Ed. by J Lesher, D. Nails and F. Sheffield. Center 
 For Hellenic Studies, Trustees for Harvard University. 
181 
 
 
 
Payne, Andrew. 2008. ‘The Teleology of the Ascent in Plato’s Symposium’ in Apeiron. 
Volume 41: 2, 123-146.  
Robin, Leon. La Theorie Platonicienne de L’Amour. Paris: F. Alcan. 
Robinson, Richard (1942) “Plato’s Consciousness of Fallacy,” Mind. LI No.202:97-114. 
Sheffield, Frisbee. 2006. Plato’s Symposium: The Ethics of Desire. Oxford: Oxford  
 University Press.  
Skarsouli, Penelope. 2006. “Calliope, a Muse Apart: Some Remarks on the Tradition of  
Memory as a Vehicle of Oral Justice” in Oral Tradition, 21/1, 210-228 
Sprague, Rosamund. 1962. Plato’s Use of Fallacy. London: Routledge.  
Taylor. A.E.. 1960. Plato: The Man and his Work. London: University 
Paperbacks. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 –  Socrates, Divination, and the Daimonion 
Abstract 
In this chapter, I argue that Socrates’ daimonion cannot be grafted onto the disctinction 
between technical and possession divination. Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
Socrates is functionally identical to an exemplary seer like Diotima, even though both 
individuals can successful interpret and reflect on their divine experiences. This is so 
because Socrates’ daimonion exclusively negates Socrates from acting. This is unique to 
Plato’s Socrates.  
 
Introduction 
 In the last twenty years, scholarly interest in Socratic religiosity has witnessed a 
healthy resurgence.
355
 This has dismantled the traditional idea of Socrates as the 
consummate philosopher-cum-secularist.
356
 Rather than focusing exclusively on ideas 
like Socratic intellectualism, greater attention to the religious dimension of Socrates’ 
thought has created a richer, more paradoxical, figure. One consequence of this new 
                                                 
355
 Brickhouse and Smith’ Socrates on Trial (1989); McPherren’s The Religion of Socrates (1996); Smith 
and Woodruff’s Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy (2000); and Smith and Destrée’ Socrates’ 
Divine Sign: Religion, Practice, and Value in Socratic Philosophy (2005) are representative examples.  
356
 Vlastos is the canonical example.  
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attention is that a number of interesting puzzles have emerged – the rationality of 
religious belief, epistemological issues associated with divine possession, and finally, the 
very nature of Socrates’ strangeness in the context of Plato’s dialogues. One focal point 
of such discussions is Socrates’ divine sign – his daimonion.357 Questions abound 
concerning the precise nature of this sign. Is it meant earnest or ironic? What is its 
relationship to the Socratic elenchus? What are its epistemological consequences, both 
for Socrates and for us as interpreters?  
These are all interesting questions, and I touch on them throughout this final 
chapter. My aim is interrogate Socrates’ association with divination, which helps inform, 
or enlighten, his daimonion, and his religiosity more generally. Three considerations have 
prompted this thesis. First, generally speaking, Plato thinks that philosophy and 
divination are similar insofar as both are products of madness.
358
 Second, and more 
concretely, Socrates self-identifies as a seer.
359
 He is also interpreted as such by others.
360
 
Finally, there are continuities between possession divination and the sort of Socratic 
‘possession’ that the daimonion instantiates. First, I rehearse the features of Socrates’ 
daimonion, specifically the account given in the Apology, since in many ways it provides 
the most explicit articulation of the daimonion.  
I also extrapolate Socrates’ identification with divination. One notable feature of 
Socrates is that he often identifies himself with various occupations. For instance, he self-
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 cf. Apology 31c-e, 40a-c, Euthyphro 3b, Euthydemus 272e, Republic VI 496c, Phaedrus 242 b-c; 
Theaetetus 151a. The daimonion is also mentioned at Alcibiades I 103a-b, 105 d-e, 12c-d, as well as 
Theages 128d-131a. Since the authenticity of both is considered doubtful, I exclude them from my 
argument.  
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 cf. Phaedrus 244a-249e. 
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 cf. Phaedo 85b4; Phaedrus 242c. 
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 cf. Cratylus 396d. 
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identifies as a gadfly
361
 and a midwife.
362
 Such is the case as well with his interlocutors. 
Euthyphro refers to Socrates as a Daedalus
363
; Meno compares Socrates to an electric 
ray.
364
 Each case is rich and deserves close study. Nevertheless, there is something 
exceptionally relevant about Socrates’ identification with divination. This is so not only 
because religious considerations are absolutely central to Socrates’ philosophical mission 
but also due to the frequency in which divination arises in other contexts.
365
  
I conclude that Socratic ‘possession’ is not necessarily divergent from the 
experiences of exemplary seers like Diotima in the Symposium, which I investigated in 
the previous chapter. Although, fundamentally, Socrates is a philosopher, he is not an 
anomaly impossible to replicate. Keep in mind that it is his explicit aim to engender 
philosophy in the souls’ of others. Still, what marks Socrates as unique is the essentially 
negative function of the daimonion.
366
 There is no counterpart for this in divination.  
Part I – Socrates’ Daimonion in the Apology 
 Directly after running an elenchus on Meletus, Socrates generalizes the discussion 
to his atrocious reputation. From whence did this reputation originate? As Socrates 
extrapolates his divinely-ordained mission to examine others as well as himself (28e), he 
points out that these dialogical investigations have not occurred in the political sphere. 
Socrates has failed to engage with the affairs of the city because of his daimonion. He 
states: 
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 cf. Apology 31c. 
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 cf. Theaetetus 149a. 
363
 cf. Euthyphro 11b. 
364
 cf. Meno 80a. 
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 For instance, it is deployed as a technē in arguments about the nature of moral knowledge (Laches 195e; 
Ion 531b; 539). It is also deployed epistemologically, that is, as a sort of intermediary between knowledge 
and ignorance (Symposium 203a; Meno 99c). Finally, it is characterized as a form of laudable madness 
(Phaedrus 244a).  
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 The exclusively negative function of the daimonion differentiates Plato’s depiction of it from that of 
Xenophon. Dorion (2003) 169-192. 
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I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his 
deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it 
speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never 
encourages me to do anything (31d1-4). 
 
hoti moi theion ti kai daimonion gignetai phōnē, ho dē kai en tē graphē 
epikōmōdōn Melētos egrapsato. emoi de tout' estin ek paidos arxamenon, 
phōnē tis gignomenē, hē hotan genētai, aei apotrepei me touto ho an mellō 
prattein, protrepei de oupote. 
 
Four features of the daimonion arise in this quotation: the daimonion is a sign, it has 
occurred to Socrates since childhood, it only discourages, and finally, he is charged for 
impiety, at least in part, due to its existence. 
1. The daimonion is a sign 
First, the daimonion is a sign (semeion) and often manifests as a sound (phōnē).367 
This is crucial because a sound is not necessarily linguistic in nature. In other words, 
what occurs to Socrates is not something propositional, but an auditory signal that 
indirectly triggers Socrates to stop.
368
  
Socrates does not characterize his experience in the substantive language of a god 
or a daimon. Rather, he most often uses the adjectival to daimonion, which is functionally 
equivalent to ‘to daimonion semeion’ – A divine sign. Only once does Socrates refer to a 
theion.
369
 Is the exception that proves the rule? As a matter of fact, an alternative 
interpretation holds the daimonion equivalent to theos.
370
 The two terms, at the time, 
were used synonymously. Whether or not the daimonion is a sign or an actual god/spirit 
is negligible in the context of Socrates’ self-awarenss. Socrates, in his ability to articulate 
and reflect on what happens to him, recognizes the appearance of the daimonion. 
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 Brisson (2003) 2. 
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Contrast this with possessed diviners who lose all semblance of self-consciousness, and 
are thus, for Plato, unable to interpret their divinations.
371
  
There is still a good deal of debate surrounding the nature of the god that comes to 
Socrates. Is it Apollo? Some other god in the Greek Pantheon? Apollo is an attractive 
option; after all, it is from Apollo representative – the Pythia – that has triggered 
Socrates’ dialogical investigations for moral knowledge.372 Nevertheless, there are good 
reasons to reject the thesis that Apollo is the god who communicates with Socrates. I 
defend this idea in the next section, insisting that neither Apollo nor another traditional 
Greek deity is responsible for the daimonion.
373
 Rather, all that can be adduced from the 
textual evidence is that the god embodies those characteristics that Socrates ascribes to 
the divine. For one, the gods appears to be omniscient. This is based on their knowledge 
of the future.
374
   
2. The daimonion has occurred since childhood 
The daimonion has occurred since Socrates’ childhood. This has the consequence 
of altering our understanding of the Delphic Oracle story. The standard reading holds that 
Socrates only began his divinely-ordained dialogical investigations into himself and the 
Athenian citizenry after he was informed of the Pythia’s oracle. Given that he has 
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 cf. Timaeus 71d-72a. 
372
 Van Reil (2012) 57-58 points out that if Apollo was the god that sent the divine sign, it would mean that 
Socrates ought to undergo the type of possession that the Delphic Oracle experiences. Since he does not, 
Apollo is not the origin of the daimonion.  
373
 Brisson (2005) 2-4 thinks that the god of the daimonion is a traditional god, but he does not specify 
whether it is Apollo or some other traditional deity.  
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 McPherren (2005) 21-25 thinks that whatever else, the origin of the daimonion must be an omniscient 
god.  
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experienced the daimonion all of his life, it is puzzling why so many scholars attempt to 
hold the daimonion together with Socrates’ philosophical mission.375   
Since the power of the daimonion is based on repeated success throughout 
Socrates’ life, like others, I urge that we interpret the daimonion empirically.376 Although 
induction does not guarantee certainty, Socrates has yet to experience the daimonion’s 
getting it wrong. The fallibility of the daimonion emerges in Socrates’ discussion of death 
in the Apology. In the Apology, Socrates initially expresses agnosticism about the nature 
of death. He states, “No one knows whether death may not be the greatest of all blessings 
for a man” (oide men gar oudeis ton thanaton oud' ei tugkhanei tō anthrōpō pantōn 
megiston on tōn agathōn) (29a6-8). In other words, death may be a dreamless sleep or a 
meeting with mythical heroes, or it may not. It may be exactly as everyone thinks. The 
important Socratic point is that one should not fear what one does not know. Yet, later, 
when he sentenced to death, he cites his daimonion as “convincing proof” (mega moi 
tekmērion) (40c1) that death is not an evil for the good person.  
3. The daimonion only discourages 
The daimonion only discourages. It never induces. It appears whenever some 
wrong might occur to Socrates. This is why, as I alluded to earlier, Socrates has not 
partaken in public affairs. He would have long ago been put to death. Socrates would 
then have benefited no one.
377
 The notion that the daimonion prevents Socrates from 
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 The argument in favor of such a connection is that all examples of the daimonion in Plato yield 
philosophical consideration. One, thus, wonders in what circumstances the daimonion would arise in 
Socrates prior to his philosophical mission took off.  
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 Brickhouse and Smith (2005) 44-55 contrast this approach with what they call the reductionist account, 
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experiencing a wrong emerges again later in the Apology after Socrates has been 
sentenced to death.
378
 Although conventional wisdom holds that death is an evil, the 
daimonion has not stopped Socrates, thereby giving him reason to think that death is not 
an evil.   
Although the present context is charged with significance, Socrates asserts that his 
daimonion emerges even in negligible cases. He states: 
At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual 
manifestation (hē tou daimoniou), frequently opposed me, even in small 
matters (panu epi smikrois), when I was about to do something wrong, but 
now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced with what one might 
think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of evils, my divine 
sign (to tou theion sēmeion) has not opposed me… (40a3-7, italics added)  
 
This is a puzzling claim. Does the daimonion prevent Socrates from something banal? A 
certain dish for dinner? A certain route to the park? This does not coalesce with the claim 
that the daimonion only emerges in order to prevent Socrates from experiencing some 
evil. The most attractive answer to this puzzle is to integrate this claim into the textual 
evidence we have from other Platonic dialogues.  
In the Phaedrus, for instance, the daimonion comes to Socrates only as he 
traversing the river. Granted, he comes to recognize that he has wronged Eros, a god, in 
his first speech. But, importantly, what the daimonion prevents him from doing is merely 
to cross a river. In fact, the Phaedrus contradicts what Socrates says about the daimonion 
in the Apology, namely that the daimonion emerges in order to prevent Socrates from 
committing a wrong. In the Phaedrus, Socrates has already delivered his Lysian speech 
against eros. Consequently, he has already wronged eros. He must, therefore, make up 
for his mistake by delivering another speech. 
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Another corroborating example is the Euthydemus. How does Socrates first 
engage with Euthydemus and Dionysodorus? He tells Crito that he was sitting in the 
dressing room, and intending to depart, when his “customary divine sign put in an 
appearance” (de mou egeneto to eiōthos sēmeion to daimonion) (272e4). This caused him 
to sit down for a moment, whereby his two interlocutors entered. This event again 
substantiates that feature of the daimonion that prevents Socrates from acting, but it is 
also demonstrates the banality of the daimonion – it simply stops him from leaving a 
dressing room! It is only after his dialogical investigation with his interlocutors that the 
full scope of the daimonion’s purpose is understood. That the daimonion only 
discourages enables Plato to present Socrates as simultaneously religious and rational, 
pious and autonomous. 
4. Socrates is charged because of his daimonion 
It is also crucial to recognize the nature of Socrates’ daimonion in conjunction 
with the charges that are brought against him. There are two charges.
379
 According to 
Socrates, the new charge is the one that has brought him to court. It claims that Socrates 
is “guilty of corrupting the young and of not believing in the gods in whom the city 
believes, but in other new spiritual things” (Sōkratē phēsin adikein tous te neous 
diaphtheironta kai theous hous hē polis nomizei ou nomizonta, hetera de daimonia kaina, 
24b7-8). Ignore, for the moment, the elenchus that Socrates runs on Meletus, which 
consists in having Meletus commit to the bald thesis that Socrates is an atheist, a charge 
that is later summarily refuted. Instead, consider the meaning of ‘new spiritual things’. 
There can be little doubt that Meletus has the daimonion in mind! Indeed, this 
interpretation is corroborated in the Euthyphro.  
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The dramatic setting of the Euthyphro is the agora. On his way to trial, Socrates 
encounters Euthyphro. In this way, what emerges in the Euthyphro must be interpreted in 
conjunction with the Apology. Socrates rehearses Meleteus’ charge; Euthyphro 
paraphrases the indictment. He states:  
This is because you say that the divine sign keeps coming to you. So he 
[Meletus] has written this indictment against you as one who makes 
innovations in religious matters, and he comes to court to slander you, 
knowing that such things are easily misrepresented to the crowd (3b5-7). 
 
hoti dē su to daimonion phēs sautō hekastote gignesthai. hōs oun 
kainotomountos sou peri ta theia gegraptai tautēn tēn graphēn, kai hōs 
diabalōn dē erkhetai eis to dikastērion, eidōs hoti eudiabola ta toiauta 
pros tous pollous.  
 
The daimonion is a break from conventional Athenian religious practice and Meletus has 
focused in on this in attempting to discredit, and ultimately condemn, Socrates. 
Part II – The daimonion and divination 
How does Socrates’ daimonion relate to divination? In the previous section, I 
rehearsed four features of the daimonion that emerge in the Apology. Like the daimonion, 
the Apology also contains several references to divination. For one, there is Chaerephon’s 
visit to the Pythia and Socrates’ philosophical challenge of the Pythia’s oracle.380 As 
well, consider who Socrates’ investigates in order to determine the veracity of the oracle 
– the politicians, the poets, and finally the craftspeople.381 His account of the poets 
consists of a simile to seers on the grounds that both lack knowledge. Instead of 
knowledge, the seer only has true opinion, which is the result of divine possession: 
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 One ongoing debate is the tension between the widespread conviction in the veracity of the Pythia’s 
claims and Socrates’ attempt to refute the oracle. If the authenticity of the Pythia is axiomatic, then the 
oracle’s failure is a result of misinterpretation. Socrates, or any other interlocutor, has simply failed to 
adequately interpret the Pythia’s oracle. Another interpretation, which marks Socrates with a more 
conventional religious outlook, claims that he is merely seeking to adequately interpret the Pythia, thereby 
taking for granted the Pythia’s authenticity. Gonzalez (2009) 124-129.  
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…the poets do not compose their poems with knowledge, but by 
some inborn talent and by inspiration, like seers and prophets who 
also say many fine things without any understanding of what they 
say” (22c1-4). 
 
… alla phusei tini kai enthousiazontes hōsper hoi theomanteis kai 
hoi khrēsmōdoi: kai gar houtoi legousi men polla kai kala, isasin 
de ouden hōn legousi. 
 
This characterization of divination appears antithetical to Socrates’ daimonion. The most 
glaring difference between the two is that what happens to Socrates is usually 
characterized as a sign, which implies that Socrates maintains a level of self-awareness. 
That the daimonion and divination are distinct is best expressed by Van Reil’s paraphrase 
of McPherren position: 
[Socrates’] daimonion is not of the same order as is recourse to divine 
inspiration or divination, or even a dream. Take for example the divine 
inspiration of poets (such as discussed in the Ion), or the Homeric hero 
possessed by a god, or the possession of the Maenads: each time, the 
subject is deprived of reason, and an external divine force takes control of 
his actions. There is none of this with regard to Socrates’ 
daimonion…Divination and dreams, for their part, are occasional 
interventions of the divine, signs given by a god outside of us (34).  
 
It is important to flesh out and clarify this complex argument. First, Socrates’ daimonion 
contrasts with the divine inspiration of divination and poetry. When inspired, the seer and 
the poet become literally possessed by a god. As mediums, they utter true propositions, 
but they cannot later comment, or interpret on, these propositions. This is so because they 
lack self-consciousness when the oracle is delivered, or the poem performed. A similar 
assessment can be given to Homeric and Maenadic possession.  
 In the last phrase, Van Reil writes that “divination and dreams... are occasional 
interventions of the divine” (34) and this must be understood as technical divination like 
augury. The presence of a hawk, for instance, is a “sign given by a god outside of us” 
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(34). In fact, dreams are awkwardly placed in this regard. Undoubtedly, Greek divination 
recognized prophetic dreams and Plato does not diverge from this conviction.
382
 In the 
Crito, for example, Socrates recalls and correctly interprets his dream as a prophecy for 
the day he will be executed (44a).  
Similarly, in the Phaedo, Socrates recalls the cryptic command of his dream, 
which instructed him to practice the arts (60c-e). What this demonstrates is that although 
Socrates is asleep (e.g., not conscious), he remembers the dream. This is in sharp contrast 
to those who undergo possession by a divinity. For Plato, as we have seen, such 
individuals cannot interpret their experiences. In this way, dreams are altogether different 
than possession, and therefore do little work in differentiating Socrates from seers and 
poets. Upon consideration, it is clear that they are also different than the daimonion. This 
is so for several reasons. For one, the daimonion has never misled Socrates. Dreams, by 
contrast, can deceive us.
383
  
In fact, Socrates elides divination, dreams, and the daimonion when he 
characterizes his elenctic mission as having been given to him by the god “by means of 
oracles and dreams, and in every other way that a divine manifestation has ever ordered a 
man to do anything” (…kai ek manteiōn kai ex enupniōn kai panti tropō hōper tis pote kai 
allē theia moira anthrōpō kai hotioun prosetaxe prattein.) (33c4-7). One of these final 
ways includes Socrates’ daimonion.  
Despite the argument that Socrates retains his self-consciousness where seers and 
poets do not, I maintain that there are strong reasons to give divination a formative role in 
a satisfactory account of Socrates’ relationship to the divine, most distinctly arising in the 
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case of his daimonion. I have three reasons to support this claim. First, if arguments in 
previous chapters are plausible, then a simple disjunction between possession and 
technical divination cannot stand. More concretely, such a disjunction does a disservice 
to prestigious seers – Diotima and Theoclymenus – who do not seem constrained by the 
epistemological consequences of divine inspiration. Exemplary seers, much like Socrates, 
experience the divine and yet remain self-aware. They can comment, and interpret, their 
divinations. This brings a seer like Diotima close to a philosopher like Socrates.   
 Second, one reason often cited to differentiate Socrates’ daimonion from other 
forms of human-divine interaction is that the daimonion is unique to Socrates.
384
 But 
there is good evidence that this thesis is erroneous. In the Republic, Socrates himself 
states that the daimonion can arise in others: “it [the daimonion] has happened to no one 
before me, or to only a very few” (ē gar pou tini allō ē oudeni tōn emprosthen gegonen) 
(496c2-3). Only to a very few! What does this mean? At the very least, it underscores the 
rarity, and not the exclusivity, of the daimonion. More generally, it is noteworthy that this 
claim arises as Socrates specifies the nature of the philosopher.
385
 The life of politics is 
rife with madness, specifically by the majority. It is consequently terribly hard for a 
philosopher to engage in politics. Much more likely the philosopher, or person of a 
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philosophical nature, is content to remain outside of politics. Nevertheless, Socrates 
insists that the best life for those who have the ability is the philosophical life.
386
 
Third, Socrates twice connects his daimonion with divination. In the Phaedrus, 
for example, as Socrates contextualizes the sudden appearance of his daimonion:  
In effect, you see, I am a seer, and though I am not particularly good at it, 
still – like people who are just barely able to read and write – I am good 
enough for my own purposes. I recognize my offense clearly now. In fact, 
the soul too, my friend, is itself a sort of seer; that’s why, almost from the 
beginning of my speech, I was disturbed by a very uneasy feeling, as 
Ibycus puts it, that ‘for offending the gods I am honored by men’ (242c4-
d2).  
 
eimi dē oun mantis men, ou panu de spoudaios, all' hōsper hoi ta 
grammata phauloi, hoson men emautō monon hikanos: saphōs oun ēdē 
manthanō to hamartēma. hōs dē toi, ō hetaire, mantikon ge ti kai hē 
psukhē: eme gar ethraxe men ti kai palai legonta ton logon, kai pōs 
edusōpoumēn kat' Ibukon, mē ti para theois “amblakōn timan pros 
anthrōpōn ameipsō:” 
 
Although he was disturbed by an uneasy feeling it was not until he almost departed from 
Phaedrus’ company that his daimonion appeared. In other words, his daimonion can be 
interpreted as constitutive of Socrates’ claim that he is a kind of seer. Of course, it is also 
clear that Socrates can interpret his daimonion. Not only does he know that he has 
wronged Eros, but he is also able to offer Phaedrus an explanation. He reasons that Eros 
must be a god because he is the son of Aphrodite. Consequently, a speech that disparages 
Eros constitutes an offense. 
The second occasion that Socrates’ daimonion is tied to divination is when he 
characterizes it as divinatory (mantikē): “At all previous times my familiar prophetic 
power, my spiritual manifestation…” (hē gar eiōthuia moi mantikē hē tou daimoniou…) 
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“qua man or qua man with a sense of justice, something that he shares potentially with all just men or with 
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(40a4). Brisson provides an illuminating analysis of this passage.
387
 He notes that mantikē 
is usually interpreted in conjunction with technē, so that the passage translates as 
‘divination, that is familiar to me...’ but once tied to hē tou daimoniou – the full passage 
has at least two surprising translations: 
1. ‘Divination that comes from the daimonion.’ 
2. ‘Divination that pertains to the daimonion.’  
 
Both are surprising because they connect divination with Socrates’ daimonion in a strong 
way. Brisson urges that once “we understand phōnē after mantikē and semēiou after 
daimonion” (3) the translation becomes: “the divinatory voice that is familiar to me, the 
one in which the divine signal consists” (40a4).388 
 The two passages cited demonstrate that the daimonion, as depicted by Plato, is a 
species of divination. That said, it is neither a dream nor possession that occurs to 
Socrates. As I stated earlier, there is some affinity between Socrates and exemplary seers 
in the sense that both remain aware as the divine communicates with them. Consequently, 
both can interpret and reflect on such oracular experiences. Still, there is one thing that 
differentiates Socrates’ daimonion from exemplary seers, and indeed divination more 
generally, namely the simple and straightforward fact that Socrates’ daimonion only ever 
prevents him from acting. Divination, in all its variety, can both direct and hinder action. 
Plato’s purpose for confing the daimonion to something that only prohibits must be in 
order to carve out space for Socrates’ elenchus.    
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I investigated the relationship between divination and Socrates’ 
daimonion. I rehearsed the main features of the daimonion and investigated the two 
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passages that characterize the daimionon as a form of divination. The daimonion, 
however, cannot be grafted onto the distinction between technical and possession 
divination. There is no intermediary, so it is not technical. As well, since Socrates is able 
to reflect and interpret his daimonion, he does not undergo possession akin to the 
possessed seer like the Pythia. Although Socrates enjoys some affinity with exemplary 
seers like Diotima, such as remaining self-aware while divining, there is at least one 
peculiar feature that remains. This is the exclusively negative function of the 
daimonion.
389
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Conclusion 
 There are at least two general approaches to Plato scholarship. One is to focus 
exclusively on a particular dialogue, or set of dialogues, and develop an in-depth, 
exhaustive treatment of that subject matter. Another approach is to focus on a particular 
theme, which emerges in various dialogues. This dissertation is squarely in the latter 
category. My focus, Plato’s concept of divination, emerges in different dialogues, and in 
different stages of Plato’s authorial life. 
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 In the opening chapters, I investigated how Plato utilizes divination in Socrates’ 
search for adequate definitions of specific virtues. In the Euthyphro, for instance, 
Socrates interrogates Euthyphro’s account of piety and pokes holes in each definition. 
My guiding question was whether or not Euthyphro’s occupation as a seer informs the 
argumentative and dramaturgical elements of the dialogue.   
I also analyzed Plato’s depiction of divination in the context of (1) the 
investigation of courage in the Laches, and (2) the nature of technē, which emerges in 
multiple dialogues. Concerning the former, the relationship between generalship and 
divination proves unique to Plato. It was never as highly systematized as Plato has 
Socrates suppose. I also investigated the puzzle of divination’s subject matter, 
specifically the essentially temporal nature of divination. 
In Plato’s Ion, I continued my investigation of the technē of divination. This pithy 
dialogue brings together two potentially incompatible features of divination. On the one 
hand, it is a craft with a set of specialized skills, but on the other, it is a result of divine 
inspiration. The primary topic of the Ion is rhapsody, or poetry, more generally, and this 
has the pleasing consequence of introducing a theme that emerges in later dialogues, 
namely the affinity between divination and other forms of divine inspiration, specifically 
poetry and philosophy. This dialogue is also my first foray into what I take to be the most 
contentious part of my dissertation, namely whether or not Plato recognizes a laudable 
form of divination that cannot be easily assimilated into a distinction between technical 
and possession divination.   
This distinction, the fulcrum of my argument, emerges in the Phaedrus, which 
constitutes chapters four and five. In chapter four, I looked at the opening stages of that 
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dialogue. Although it does not explicitly deal with divination, the relationship between 
eros and divination, and between mania and divination, justifies its inclusion. Unlike 
other dialogues, which characterize eros and mania negatively, the Phaedrus, with its 
sympathetic account of these concepts, provides indispensible evidence pertaining to 
Plato’s concept of divination.  
Chapter five is a thorough analysis of divination in the Phaedrus. I rehearsed 
Plato’s influential distinction between technical and possession divination. The puzzle of 
this chapter consists of divination’s praiseworthiness contrasted with the relatively low 
rank of the seer on the hierarchy of souls. Accordingly, I analyzed various scholarly 
answers to this puzzle – Rowe, Griswold, and Brisson – and developed my own account 
that emphasizes the epistemological facet of this contrast.    
In chapter six, I interrogated Plato’s Symposium, specifically the penultimate 
speech, which is the recalled conversation between Socrates and Diotima. Akin to 
Euthyphro, Diotima is a seer, and I interrogate the degree to which Diotima’s occupation 
as a seer informs her account of eros. Unlike Euthyphro, who falls prey to Socrates’ 
elenctic arguments, Socrates’ appeal to Diotima is an appeal to what he takes to be true. 
To recall, Socrates once believed as Agathon did. His critical engagement with Diotima 
is a move away from ignorance to knowledge. Equally striking is Diotima’s knowledge 
of the intelligible realm. In my view, she can only have access to the intelligible realm via 
divination. This is so despite the fact that her dialogue with Socrates reveals an ability to 
do something antithetical to the possessed seer – Diotima can reflect and engage with the 
content of her divinations. In this way, I conclude that both in the substance of her 
knowledge – the intelligible realm – and in the form through which she argues – giving 
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and being sensitive to reasons – Diotima enjoys continuity with Socrates, Plato’s 
paradigmatic philosopher.  
In fact, this is the jumping off point of my final chapter. Whereas Diotima has 
affinities to philosophy, I shift and examine Socrates’ relationship to divination. From a 
cursory perspective, Socrates is a paradigm of rationality. But a more in-depth analysis 
reveals a complicated relationship to the divine, most notably in the context of the 
daimonion. I conclude that Socrates’ daimonion is only distinguishable from Diotima’s 
ability in that the daimonion negates. In terms of remaining self-aware while divining, 
and in the ability to reflect on particular divinations, Socrates and Diotima are 
indistinguishable.  
Looking Forward 
 Plato’s dialogues are so rich in style and content that one can never hope to 
adequately account for everything. New answers to old questions trigger new questions 
and new answers, and so on. My expectation is that this dissertation has provided some 
answers, but also some new questions and directions for research. In this last section, I 
briefly sketch two directions.  
I. The Metaphysical Implications of Divination 
 One direction of research is to move from the epistemology of divination (What 
does a seer know? What are the implications of divine possession?) to the metaphysical 
side of the issue.
390
 I am thinking specifically of the Timaeus-Critias. Consider the 
traditional gods and how Plato re-contextualizes them out of their brutishness and into a 
functional role within Timaeus’ cosmogony. Instead of being cantankerous and petty, the 
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gods are assigned to fashion mortal beings (e.g., humans and animals). The demiurge 
assigns the traditional gods the task of creating those that are mortal.
391
  
In other words, the gods of Hesiod and Homer have been trumped by Plato’s 
benevolent demiurge and put to use in the formation of the cosmos understood as a 
justification for the proper ethical and political life. There are numerous examples of this 
re-contextualization throughout the Timaeus-Critias. For instance, the gods created plants 
for human benefit.
392
 As well, Plato has the Egyptian priest describe the allocation of 
earth in peaceful terms. This contradicts other well-known accounts that consist of a 
violent struggle between deities over the earthly domain. The gods cannot be in 
competition with one another.
393
  
II. The Literary Function of Divination 
In the opposite direction of metaphysics, it may be worthwhile to investigate its 
role in the drama of Plato’s dialogues. As I said in the introduction, I have attempted to 
remain senstivive to dramaturgical elements in Plato’s dialogues. But fundamentally, my 
primary focus is a philosophical analysis of divination. In other words, this dissertation 
has investigated various puzzles pertaining to the epistemology of divination - as a 
technē, as the result of inspiration or mania, and finally as a way to conceptualize 
philosophy itself.  
In Plato’s dialogues, divination functions as a literary specific device. The ability 
of the seer to access the future is often deployed as an instance of foreshadowing. 
Furthermore, it also affects the expectations of characters, together with readers of 
particular dialogues. Consider Plato’s first tetralogy – Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and 
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Phaedo. All four constitute a thematic unity – the trial and death of Socrates – and 
contain rich allusions to divination conceptualized in the context of narrative time. As 
early as the Apology, readers witness Socrates’ mantic awareness about the nature of 
death. Once Socrates has been sentenced to death, he makes a prophecy, befitting those 
who are close to death.
394
 He divines that there will be a retaliatory response against those 
who convicted him. This functions on two levels. First, it underscores Socrates’ moral 
principle that it is always bad to do wrong. This principle is developed and defended in 
other dialogues.  
The prophecy also constitutes an allusion to Plato himself for it is Socrates’ death 
that triggers Plato’s philosophical inquiries. Indeed, at the end of the Apology, Socrates 
characterizes death as one of two possibilities: either it is a dreamless sleep or the soul 
goes to a place where it can interact with an amalgam of Greek heroes and poets.
395
 In 
this latter way, Socrates includes himself amongst figures with mythic prestige. 
The theme of death and divination continues in the Phaedo. Socrates relates to his 
interlocutors a prophetic dream that bid him to compose music.
396
 For a long time, he 
interpreted this to mean the call to cultivate philosophy, specified as the greatest music. 
But with death approaching, he decides to pursue the common music – poetry – just in 
case this was the purpose of the dream. This foreshadows the swansong section at the end 
of Socrates’ argument for the immortality of the soul.397  
The swans belong to Apollo and are therefore prophetic. Incidentally, the swans 
sing the loveliest prophecy when they are close to death. The parallels with Socrates are 
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explicit. Socrates also serves Apollo, enjoys prophetic power, which actually increases as 
he nears death. Not only do Socrates and the swans have access to the future but they can 
sing benefits of the underworld. This is so despite the fact that everyone else thinks such 
singing is wistful.  
Final Thought 
 Plato’s concept of divination is heterogenous. In some ways, he embodies popular 
notions of Greek divination. In another sense, however, divination is radically 
transformed once subjected to philosophical and dialogical analyses. I hope that this 
dissertation has developed and clarified some of the puzzles pertaining to Plato’s 
depiction of divination. What else but continue to puzzle through them until the setting of 
the sun (hēliou dusmōn khronō)?398  
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